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ABSTRACT 
Basic corporate finance and microeconomic theory indicate that the primary financial 
directive of any firm ought to be to maximise the wealth of the shareholders. This 
objective benefits all stakeholders and, also ensures that scarce resources are allocated, 
managed and re-deployed as efficiently as possible for the benefit of all. 
An appropriate performance measure gauges how management strategy affects 
shareholder value as measured by the risk-adjusted return on the invested capital. The 
effectiveness of this given strategy must incorporate the required rate of return on 
invested capital, accurately measure the amount of capital used by the company, and 
correlate highly with the risk-adjusted rate of return earned by shareholders. Economic 
Value Added (EV A) is considered an appropriate measure and is a way of measuring a 
company's net operating profit after tax and after deducting the cost of capital. 
In this study the EV A concept is considered from a financial management perspeCtive. 
Several elements and advantages of the concept are discussed. The additional tasks 
required of management in this process are highlighted. It was found that one of the 
major challenges facing EV A implementation is changing traditional methods of 
financial reporting. In the theoretical study the major elements of EVA, in particular the 
advantages of the financial measurement, are discussed. 
Against this background an empirical investigation was carried out. The results of which 
provide an insight into the understanding and practical implementation of EV A by three 
v large retail groups within South Africa. 
In conclusion to this study, the approach of EVA as a financial management system is the 
key to creating wealth based on the results of the practical and theoretical investigation. 
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<;hapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Backgrou.nd to the Study 
"It is easy to forget why senior management's most important job must be to maximise its 
firm's current market value. If nothing else, a greater value rewards the shareholders 
that after all, are the owners of the enterprise. But, most important of all, society at large 
benefits too. A quest for value directs scarce resources to their most promising uses and 
most productive users. " 
(Stewart, G.B. 1991:1) 
Basic corporate finance and micro economic theory indicate that the primary fmancial 
directive of any finn ought to be to maximise the wealth of the shareholders. This 
objective does not attempt to only serve the interests of the owners ofthe large 
companies, but it also ensures that scarce resources are allocated, managed and re-
deployed as efficiently as possible for the benefit of all. The confusion surrounding the 
basic precept is that it is not widely appreciated that maximising· shareholders' wealth is 
not the same as maximising the company's total value. The difference is that shareholder 
wealth is maximised only by maximising the difference between the finn's total value 
and the total capital that investors have committed to it. 
If the above principle is accepted, that is, that the main fmancial objective of any 
company is to maximise shareholder wealth and Net Present Value (NPV) is the 
d~cision-making tool best suited to guide actions and strategies, then Economic Value 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Added (EV A) plays a key role in illustrating how the energies of operating people can be 
directed most effectively to maximising NPV. In essence, EVA is an estimate of a 
company's true economic profit. 
EV A examines the correlation between shareholder wealth and the use of a performance 
measure. An appropriate performance measure gauges how management strategy affects 
shareholder value as measured by the risk-adjusted return on the invested capital. The 
effectiveness of this given strategy must incorporate the required rate of return on 
invested capital, accurately measure the amount of capital used qy the company, and 
correlate highly with the risk-adjusted rate of return earned by the shareholders. 
The more effectively resources are deployed and managed the more robust economic 
growth. Any financial performance used in managerial compensation must be correlated 
highly with the changes in shareholder wealth and should not be subject to all of the 
'noise' inherent in a company's stock price. This dichotomy is the fundamental tension a 
good performance measure must resolve. Stewart (1991) recommended that managers 
should rather aim at maximising EV A instead of focusing on maximising the companies' 
profits. 
Research has shown that stock prices track EV A far more closely than they track earnings 
per share (EPS) or operating margins. The reason for this could be that EV A shows what 
investors are really concerned about - the net cash return on their capital - rather than 
some other type of performance viewed through the distorted lens of accounting rules. 
This can be illustrated by the following example: IBM's cash flow per share increased 
between 1984 and 1989, but the EV A of the company during that period gave a more 
realistic indication of what was really happening (Tully, S. 1993 :44). 
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Stewart also advocated the use of EV A for: 
"Setting goals, evaluating performance, determining bonuses, communicating with 
investors, imdfor capital budgeting and valuations of all sorts" (Stewart, G.B. 1991 :4). 
EV A is the only performance measure that is entirely consistent with the standard capital 
budgeting rule: Accept all positive and reject all negative NPV. EPS, on the other hand, 
will increase so long as new capital projects earn anything more than the after tax cost of 
borrowing, which is hardly an acceptable return. Furthermore, the main benefit of EVA is 
that it accounts for the opportunity cost of the capital used by a fum and the calculations 
used will show that EV A essentially focuses on the profitable use of the capital. 
EV A is both a measure of value and a measure of performance, these will be the central 
issues, which this thesis will address and will constantly question. EV A is the only 
measure that can link forward-looking valuation and capital budgeting procedures with 
the manner in which performance subsequently can be evaluated. 
As a point of departure, it should be borne in mind that Stem and Stewart advocate no 
one particular definition of EVA and it is accepted that for anyone company, the 
definition of EV A that is implemented is highly customised with the aim of striking a 
practical balance between simplicity and precision (Stewart, G.B. 1991 :86). 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of the study are divided into two categories. 
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1.2.1 Primary Objective 
The primary objective ofthis study is to determine whether EV A is indeed both a 
measure of performance and a measure of value. Determining this will answer the central 
question arising: EVA- Is this the essence to creating real wealth? In deriving this answer 
an empirical investigation was carried out involving three retail companies which have 
implemented the financial management system. The empirical investigation provided 
insight into the practical application of the theoretical framework and aids answering the 
arising question. 
1.2.2 Secondary Objectives 
According to Stewart (1994), one of EVA's most powerful properties is its strong link to 
( . a company's stock price. The validity of this statement will be researched by looking at 
past research covering this topic and forms the secondary objective of the study. The 
research on this topic is limited but sufficient for the purpose of this study. 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
The retailing industry has experienced a 'roller-coaster' ride over the past few years. 
Interest rates soared in 1998 and this severely hampered sales in the sector. However, 
interest rates have now declined. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Retail Index 
gained almost 50% in February and March in 1999 as investors took positions in 
consumer stocks expected to benefit from the decrease in interest rates. The index has 
also outperformed the JSE All Share index for the year so far. 
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In the Eighties, many retailers established competitive advantages by granting unsecured 
credit to customers, gaining exponential growth in market share and turnover. However, 
in recent years credit facilities have become common and consumers are aware of their 
debt burden. Today consumers are more concerned with value-for-money than credit 
facilities. The rules to success in a fiercely competitive industry have seen a number of 
changes. Retailers today must invest heavily in information technology (IT) to improve 
efficiencies, cut costs and build long-term relationships with high value customers. No 
longer can retailers compete on product and price alone. Rivals match their every move. 
Despite the turmoil in the industry, a number of companies have produced good earnings 
by rationalising, repositioning or taking other action to strengthen their groups position. 
As a result of this fierce competition, the retail industry more than any other industry is 
focused on increasing its EVA. As a result of the industry's desire to increase EVA, a 
trend has emerged which has seen the rise of retail stocks on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) as well as a rise within the Stem Stewart Top 200 index (See Appendix 
A). This study concerns itself with companies within the Stem Stewart Top 200 
companies in South Africa and focuses on companies which have performed well despite 
tough trading conditions in recent years. 
\ This study was limited to three major retail companies. Two of these companies have 
'fullY implemented the EV A financial management system. The third company has 
implemented the system in such a manner that only the highest management levels are 
involved with it and has been analysed for a comparison basis. The companies include: 
JD Group Limited and New Clicks Limited who have implemented the financial 
management system and Wooltru Limited. Wooltru Limited has an EVA financial 
management system implemented within the organisation, however the system is only 
understood and used in the top management levels. These companies were chosen 
because they all represent a new generation of management. Their management defies the 
traditional paradigms and they all have aggressive strategies to increase market-share in 
the increasingly competitive retail industry of South Africa today. 
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Interviews were held with members from each company to determine how the EV A 
financial management system has been implemented. The results obtained from each 
company were recorded and then compared to each other. 
1.4 Methodology 
The study made use of both primary and secondary sources of information. 
1.4.1 Secondary Sources 
A study was conducted of South African and international literature, both published and 
unpublished, on all the possible aspects pertaining to EV A. This was done by means of 
an examination of books, articles, documents, res~arch works, publications and other 
. relevant literature. A large percentage of the material examined was of international 
origin. The literature study was done to obtain insight concerning the present stage of 
research and applicati.on, both nationally and internationally, of the subject of the study. 
1.4.2 Empirical Research 
An empirical study was conducted to examine the present situation of application and 
(knowledge of the EVA financial management system within the companies of New 
Clicks Limited; JD Group Limited; and Wooltru Limited (refer to section 1.3). The 
information was gathered by means of personal interviews with senior management 
(usually the financial managers) of those organisations. A questionnaire was constructed 
and used to obtain the empirical data in a logical and efficient manner. Full use was made 
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of the literature study to develop a questionnaire, which would be most effective for the 
purpose of this study. 
1.5 Structure of the Study 
The Structure of presentation consists of the following chapters: 
Chapter l: Introduction 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the study. It comprises of the background to the 
study, as well as the objectives of the study, scope of the study, methodology and 
. structure of the presentation. 
Chapter 2: EV A Background and Analysis 
This chapter discusses the background of EV A. The history and background evolving 
EV A is elaborated on. The definition encompassing EVA is discussed. The advantages of 
the EVA performance measurement system are explained. The proble~s associated with 
using the EV A performance measurement are mentioned as wen as possible solutions. 
Implementing the EV A system can result in a number of challenges arising. A strategy 
for overcoming the problems associated with implementation of the financial 
management system is also included. 
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Chapter 3: The EVA Calculation 
This chapter presents an analysis on the elements involving the calculation of EV A. The 
necessary adjustments that must be made to a company's fmancial statements to correctly 
calculate this managerial performance measure are discussed with the aid of numerical 
examples. The aim of this chapter is to provide insight into the exact process of correctly 
calculating a company's EVA. This is done by including a comprehensive example 
showing the various steps in calculating it. The uses of EV A in the corporate world is 
also mentioned. 
Chapter 4: EVA: The Essence of a Good Financial Performance Measure 
This chapter sets out to determine that EV A is a good performance measure and that all 
the elements of a good performance measure are indeed encapsulated in it. The chapter 
measures EV A up against some of the more traditional financial performance measures 
and provides insight into why traditional measures of performance such as Residual 
Income (RI), earnings, earnings growth, EPS and dividends should be abandoned and 
why EV A is in fact better than this traditional financial performance measure. 
Chapter 5: The EV A Incentive Plan 
The EVA incentive reward plans forms part of the important uses of the EVA system. 
This chapter discusses these elements as well as the factors encompassing an EVA 
incentive plan. 
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Chapter 6: EVA's correlation with stock prices 
EVA and the company's share price are rumoured to bear a strong relationship to each 
other. This chapter seeks to investigate the exact relationship by means of investigating 
past empirical research. 
Chapter 7: Market Value Added (MV A) and comparison with EVA 
This chapter sets out to defme the concept Market Value Added (MV A). The emphasis of 
the chapter is to illustrate the connection/relationship between EV A and MV A. A section 
including the validity of these two performance measures is also included. 
Chapter 8: Findings of an empirical investigation of the present understanding and 
application of the EV A financial management system 'by three selected large retail 
companies in South Africa. 
The aim of this chapter is to report on the findings of the empirical investigation. It 
provides meaningful insight into the understanding and application of the EV A financial 
management system within the retail companies of New Clicks Limited and JD Group 
Limited who have fully implemented the system, and Wooltru Limited who has 
implemented the system at top management levels only, is compared to these two 
compames. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This final chapter includes the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
, " I. ,. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
1.6 Summary 
EV A is about looking at the value created by the company instead of just the profits. The 
organisation that fails to take this relatively new performance measure into account could 
be destroying shareholder wealth without even realising it. This study serves as an 
introduction to EV A management in selected large retail groups within South Africa and 
provides insight as to what exactly EV A entails. 
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Chapter 2 
EVA Background and Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic Value Added (EVA) has received unprecedented levels of pUblicity in recent 
years. Fortune magazine has called it "today's hottest financial idea and getting 
hotter,"(Tully, S. 1993) and the Harvard Business Review, has described EVA as a vital 
measure of the total factor productivity, one that reflects all the dimensions by which 
management can increase value. 
In this chapter, the history and background involving EV A is elaborated on. The 
definition encompassing EV A is presented. The advantages of the EV A performance 
measurement system are brought to attention. Furthermore, the problems associated with 
using the EV A performance measurement are mentioned as well as possible solutions. 
" 
Implementing the EV A system can result in a number of challenges arising. A section 
explaining the steps of becoming an EV A company is mentioned. 
This chapter intends to explain exactly how EV A has developed and evolved showing, 
that EV A truly is, "the real key to creating wealth." 
2.2 History and Background 
EV A represents a genuine revolution in management. It is a revolution because EV A is a 
new and fundamentally better answer to the age-old problem of how to align the interests 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
of agents with principles, of how to bind managers and employees to the will of the 
shareholders. 
EV A has become a widely used tool for assessing organisational and managerial 
performance. In excess of300 companies including many multi-national companies, on 
every continent (except Antarctica), with revenues approaching a trillion dollars a year, 
have implemented Stem Stewart's EVA framework for financial management and 
incentive compensation. EVA, in tum, has helped the managers of these companies 
create hundreds of billions of dollars in shareholder wealth (Ehrbar, A. 1998:5). 
Managers who run their businesses according to the precepts of EV A have hugely 
increased the value of their companies (Tully, S. 1999:99). Investors who know about 
EV A, and know which companies are employing it, have grown rich. Multi-national 
companies such as Coca-Cola, AT&T, South African Breweries (SAB), Quaker Oats, 
and Herman Miller, have been exceptionally strong performers since these corporations 
made the switch to EV A, far outpacing the overall market and other companies in their 
industry (Ehrbar, A. 1998:8). 
Roberto Goizueta, former CEO of Coca-Cola, credited the concept of EV A with boosting 
Coca-Cola market value from $4.3 billion in 1981 to $180 billion in 1997. The result of 
Coca-Cola's EVA implementation has resulted in Coca-Cola's EVA surging an average 
of27% annually for the early 1990's (Tully, S. 1993:39). 
EV A is helping to reshape South African business as the country' moves out from under 
the stifling blanket of trade embargoes and relearns how to compete in the global market. 
New Zealand is using EVA to invigorate its state-owned enterprises. Even the United 
States Postal Service is using EV A to improve efficiency and service and to motivate the 
largest civilian labour force in the world. EV A has gained broad acceptance in the 
academic community and the business press, and it is changing the way that Wall Street 
chooses stocks. Some of Wall Street's most prominent firms, including Goldman Sachs 
and Credit Suisse First Boston, have adopted EV A as a principle tool for valuing 
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companies, and many others in the United States, Europe, Asia and Latin America are 
following their lead (Ehrbar, A. 1998:68). 
Oppenheimer Capital, a capital and mutual fund with an exceptionally good track record 
(which manages 26 billion US Dollars), has a special affInity for EVA companies. 
According to Eugene Vessel, senior vice president of Openheimer Capital, "We like to 
invest in companies that use EV A. Making higher returns is how we look at the world." 
Oppenheimer has earned 1 7% annually on average over the past decade, well above the 
S&P 500. The California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), the leader in 
the shareholder activism movement, is now using poor EV A performance to identify the 
list of "focus" companies it selects each year as those most in need of governance reform 
(Blair, A. 1997:43). 
EV A resonates with so many constituencies because it entails much more than a fleeting 
emphasis on a single aspect of corporate performance. It is a rediscovery of the most 
fundamental elements of business management that brings a lasting change in a 
company's priorities, systems and culture. EVA has been proven to work virtually 
everywhere because it is the right approach f<?r all companies in all times and in all 
environments. It is the practical application of both modem fmancial theory and classical 
economics to the problems of running a business, an application that provides the most 
effective framework for corporate decision making in a period of remarkable change. 
U sing the EV A framework is a fundamental way of measuring and managing corporate 
performance. 
2.3 The EVA Definition 
The term EVA was coined (and trademarked) in the mid 1980's by Joel Stern and 
Bennett Stewart, founders of Stern Stewart & Co., a United States consulting flrm. 
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EV A is similar to conventional measures of profit but with two important differences: It 
considers the cost of capital, and it is not constrained by the generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) that govern corporate financial reporting. 
At its most basic, EVA, is a measure of corporate performance that differs from most 
others by including a charge against profit for the cost of all the capital a company 
employs. It is the financial performance measure that comes closer than any other to 
capturing the true economic profit of an enterprise. It will increase if the operating profits 
can be made to grow without tying up any more capital, if new capital can be invested in 
projects that will earn more than the full cost of capital and if the capital can be diverted 
or liquidated from business activities that do not provide adequate returns. 
On the other hand, it will be reduced if management uses funds on projects that earn less 
than the cost of capital or reject projects that are likely to earn more than the cost of 
capital. In this instance, it can be said that the most important reason for adopting EV A is 
that it is the only measure to tie directly to intrinsic market value. For example, the cost 
of new capital employed to finance the project is explicitly subtracted in the very 
calculation of it. Therefore, projecting and discounting EV A for an entire company 
automatically sums the NPV of the firm's past and projected capital investment projects. 
The sum accounts for the company's market value premium to capital employed. This 
means that a company for which the projected EVA discounts to R 100 million and 
which currently employs R 500 million of capital, has an intrinsic market value ofR 600 
million. This relation tells us that if its EVA is expected to be pO'sitive, a company has 
added value to the out-of-pocket cost of resources drawn into the firm; if EV A is 
projected to be negative, value has been destroyed: This facet will be discussed in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
EV A corrects the distortions caused by GAAP. Therefore, the user of EV A can abandon 
any accounting principles that are viewed as distorting the measurement of wealth 
creation. It is much more than just a measure of the performance. It is the framework for 
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the complete financial management and incentive compensation system that can guide 
every decision a company makes and that can help them produce greater wealth for 
shareholders, customers and themselves. 
The capital charge in EV A is what economists call an opportunity cost. It is the return 
that investors could expect to get by putting their money in a portfolio of other stocks and 
bonds and comparable risk, and that they forego by owning the securities of the company 
in question. The capital charge embodies the fundamental precept, dating all the way 
back to Adam Smith, that a business has to produce a minimum, competitive return on all 
the capital invested in it. This cost of capital, or required rate of return, applies to equity 
as well as debt. Just as lenders demand their interest payments, shareholders insist on 
getting at least a minimum acceptable rate of return on the money they have at risk. 
The capital charge is the most distinctive and important aspect of EV A. Under 
conventional accounting methods, most companies appear profitable but many in fact are 
not. Drucker (1998) explains the above example with the following viewpoint: "EVA is 
. based on something we have known for a long time. What we call profits, the money left 
to service the equity, is usually not profit at all. Until a business returns a profit that is 
greater than its cost of capital, it operates at an economic loss. Never mind that it pays 
taxes as if it had a genuine profit. The enterprise still returns less to the economy than it 
devours in resources; until then it does not create wealth, it destroys it." EVA corrects 
this error by explicitly recognising that when managers employ capital they, must pay for 
it, just as if it were a wage. Many corporate managers have forgotten this basic principle· 
because they have been conditioned to focus on the conventional accounting profits, 
which include a deduction for interest payments on debt but have no provision at all for 
the cost of the equity capital. 
,)Viewed another way, EVA is profit the way shareholders measure it. By taking all capital 
costs into account, including the cost of equity, it shows the monetary (rand) amount of 
wealth a business has created or destroyed in each reporting period. If the shareholders 
expect a 10% return on their investment, they "make money" only to the extent that their 
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share of after-tax operating profits exceeds 10% of equity capital. Everything before that 
is just building up to the minimum acceptable compensation for investing in a risky 
enterprise. 
Another factor of concern is that most managers concentrate on operating profits, which 
do not even have a charge for debt. True profits do not begin until the cost of the capital, 
like all other costs, has been covered. EV A is a measure of those true profits. 
Arithmetically, it is after-tax operating profits minus the appropriate capital charge for 
both debt and equity. What remains is the monetary amount by which profits in any given 
period exceed or fall short of the cost of capital used to produce those profits. This is the 
amount that economists refer to as residual income, which means exactly what it implies: 
It is the residue left over after all costs have been covered. Economists refer to this as 
economic profit or economic rent. Financiers call it economic value added. 
This is the highly simplified description of EVA, however, the actual calculation is 
somewhat more complicated. It first requires a number of decisions (which will be 
discussed in chapter 3) about how to properly measure operating profits, how to measure 
. capital, and how to determine the cost of capital. 
Stem Stewart Management Service uses the following equation to calculate EV A in its 
1 ,OOO-company database: 
EVA = (r - c*) x capital; 
Where: r = rate of return; and 
c* = cost of capital, or the weighted average cost of capital 
Then: EVA = (r x capital) - (c* x capital); 
EVA = Nopat - c* xcapital; and 
EVA = operating profits - a capital charge 
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The equation illustrates the importance of the spread between return on capital and the 
cost of capital in determining EV A. EV A also separates cash-based operating costs from 
capital costs in order to allow management to identify the value drivers in the fIrm. 
2.4 Advantages of EVA 
Most companies use an array of measures to express fmancial goals and objectives. 
Strategic plans often are based on growth in revenues or market share. Companies may 
evaluate individual products or lines of business on basis of gross margins or cash flow. 
Business units may be evaluated in terms of return on assets or against a budgeted profIt 
level. 
Finance departments usually analyse capital investments in terms ofNPV, but weigh 
prospective acquisitions against the likely contribution to earnings growth. Bonuses for 
line managers and business-unit heads are typically negotiated annually and are based on 
a profIt plan. The result of the inconsistent standards, goals, and terminology usually is 
incohesive planning, operating strategy, and decision making. 
EV A eliminates this confusion by using a single fInancial measUre that links all decision 
making with a common focus: How do we improve EV A? 
It is marked by Stem Stewart & Co. as an accounting-based performance measure which 
yields the same discounted present values as free cash flow, thereby retaining the focus of 
accounting profIt on matching of costs and revenues without losing value-relevance. The 
present value of a stream of future cash flows can be re-written as current book value plus 
the present value of future residual incomes. 
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EVA is a concept that can be implemented in virtually every type of company, public and 
private, from banks to heavy manufacturers and even government agencies. The 
calculation can be performed at any corporate level or any profit centre within an 
organisation. Consequently, the value added of an individual division, product line or 
even an individual customer can be calculated to determine whether shareholder value is 
being created or destroyed within the organisation. EV A can be enhanced if earnings can 
be increased more rapidly than invested capital (i.e. by making profitable investments) or 
if activities destroying value can be discontinued. 
It was developed to help managers incorporate two basic principles of finance into their 
decision making. The first is that the primary fmancial objective of any company should 
be to maximise the wealth of its shareholders. The second is that the value of a company 
depends on the extent to which investors expect future profits to exceed or fall short of 
the cost of capital. A sustained increase in EV A will bring an increase in the market value 
of a company'. This approach has proved effective in virtually all types of organisations, 
from emerging growth companies to turnarounds. This is because the level of EV A is not 
what really matters. Current performance already is reflected in share prices. It is the 
continuous improvement in EV A that brings continuous increases in shareholder wealth. 
EVA has the advantage of being conceptually simple and easy to explain to non-financial 
managers, since it starts with familiar operating profits and deducts a charge for the 
capital invested in the company as a whole, in a business unit, or even in a single plant, 
office or assembly line. By assessing a charge for using capital, EV A makes managers 
care about managing assets as well as income, and helps them assess the tradeoffs 
between the two. This broader, more complete view of the economics of a business can 
make dramatic differences. 
Figures for earnings and invested capital used to calculate EVA will generally not be 
those appearing in the fmancial statements as EV A focuses on economic earnings and 
I This is known as Market Value Added (MY A), and will be discussed and illustrated in Chapter 5. 
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economic capital rather than accounting earnings and capital. Because of the accounting 
convention of prudence, costs which are incurred from long term benefit of the 
organisation are often treated as current period expenses. Examples included research and 
development (R & D) costs, employee training and market development costs. In the 
calculation of EV A, items such as these are capitalised and amortised over the economic 
life, resulting in an adjustment to both the earnings and invested capital figures. 
Following the above section, EVA is innovative in three ways. First, because it is not 
bound by GAAP, its users are willing to make whatever adjustments are needed to 
produce more economically valid numbers. Secondly, proponents have been pushing. 
companies to bring EV A into lower levels of the organisation on the assumption that all 
employees, not just senior managers, must undertake their tasks with the overriding goal 
of creating shareholder value. Thirdly, EV A offers a means of measurement and 
communicating performance that can be used in the capital markets, for capital 
investment appraisal, and in the evaluation and compensation of managerial performance. 
Stem Stewart's argument for EVA rests on two propositions: 
1 ' Maximising the present value of EV A amounts to exactly the same thing as 
maximising intrinsic market value' (Stewart, G.B. 1991 :174). 
2. EVA 'connects forward looking valuation procedures with the subsequent evaluation 
of performance. No other measure can do that' (Stewart, G.B. 1991: 177). 
EV A is the only financial management system that provides a common language for 
employees across all operating and staff functions and allows all management decisions 
to be modelled, monitored, communicated and compensated in a single and consistent 
way - always in terms of the value added to shareholder investment which in essence is 
the central issue of any financial performance measurement. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
2.5 Problems Associated with EVA 
Despite EV A's advantages as a performance measure, there is only one shortcoming to 
its use. Unlike growth rates or rates of return, it is more difficult to compare amongst 
companies or business units of different sizes. But this deficiency is easily rectified. EV A 
can be standardised to reflect a common level of capital employed. 
To illustrate, assume a number of companies have their Rand results scaled to the 
assumption that each company started with RI00 of capital 5 years ago, that is at the . 
beginning of the 1994 fiscal year. Below (Table 2.1) are the results of one such company, 
Mandela Investments Ltd. 
Table 2.1 Mandela Investments Ltd. 
Scaled to Beginning Ca12ital 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1 Sales R487.5 643.6 907.0 1,215.5 1,572.7 
2 Sales growth 37.2% 32.0% 40.9% 34.0% 34.7% 
3 Capital R143.0 179.9 237.2 321.5 398.6 
4 NOPATr 24.2% 21.5% 23.2% 24.8% 25.2% 
5. WACC c* 13.6% 12.9% 11.0% 11.7% 12.6% 
6. Spread r-c* 10.6% 8.7% 12.3% 13.1% 12.6% 
7. x Beginning Capital RI00.0 R143.0 R179.9 R237.2 R321.5 
8. EVA RI0.6 R12.4 R22.1 R31.1 R40.7 
In each year standardised EV A is computed by taking the spread between the year's rate 
of return and cost of capital and mUltiplying it by the standardised capital outstanding at 
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the beginning of the year. Thus, the standardised EV A in the first year of the analysis 
(1994), will always be equal to the spread between that year's r (NOPAT/beginning 
capital) and c* (weighted average cost of capital) times RI00. 
Standardised 1994 EVA = 1994 (r- c*) x RI00 
= (24.2%- 13.6%) x RI00 
= RlO.6% x RI00 
= RlO.6 
So for the first year of the 5-year historical record, standardised EVA measures just the 
spread of the rate of return versus the cost of capital. This is no more revealing than 
r - c* . But in subsequent years standardised EV A will increase if there is an improvement 
in the rate of return on capital versus the cost of capital, if new capital is invested 
productively or if capital is withdrawn from uneconomic activities. 
Mandela Investment Ltd. standardised EVA grew to R40.7 by 1998, a change of R30.1 
over the four years. 
Standardised 1998 EVA = 1998 (r-c*) x 1998 standardised capital 
= (25.2% - 12.6%) x R321.5 
= 12.6% x R321.5 
= R40.7 
Shortcomings and distinctions show up more clearly when EV A i,s standardised in this 
way. Therefore, the level of standardised EV A by the end of an historical period of, say 5 
years and the change in getting there are measures that can be used to evaluate the 
performance of companies within an industry. 
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2.6 Challenges facing the EVA framework 
A question that arises is why have traditional accounting measures remained in place and 
often taken at face value? The answer to this question is as follows: accounting measures 
are easily understood. Most measures are comprised of readily available statistics 
(especially for public companies). Secondly, accounting measures are familiar to senior 
management and thirdly, the majority oftoday's back-office data systems already track 
monthly and quarterly accounting data. It is relatively simple to adapt incentive programs 
to the existing systems because of this. Fourthly, it is the general perception that stock 
exchanges base stock recommendations on quarterly EPS. 
Implementing the financial measurement system of EV A often results in a number of 
challenges arising. To implement EV A properly, it must be kept simple and accountable. 
To make it simple, EVA must become the focal point for managing the business. 
Concentrating on EV A is what it takes to unite and clarify decision making. The 
following section gives a detailed definition of a customised EV A. 
The implementation process consists of the following steps. The fust, and most crucial, 
of an EVA engagement is to develop a commitment to EV A amongst senior managers. 
This includes a thorough grounding in both the theory and the practicalities underlying 
EV A. This allows for a proper illustration of the concepts to improve performance 
governance and value. 
The second step is to work with a cross-functional team of staff and line executives to 
reach a customised definition of EV A that strikes a practical balance between simplicity 
and precision - one that meets the company's information needs, existing accounting 
data, organisation and management. For successful EV A implementation accountability 
is crucial. This is best achieved by paying managers for increasing EVA via the special 
bonus plan (outlined in chapter 4). Each compensation plan must be carefully fitted to a 
company's business and its individual culture in order to optimally balance the tradeoffs 
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between strong incentives, the risk of loosing good people, and costs. Only then will 
managers think and act like owners because they are paid like owners and will have the 
incentive to use the EV A reporting, planning, and capital budgeting machinery instead of 
working around it. At this point, the appropriate cost of capital is also determined. The 
point of this is to inextricably fix together performance measurement, decision making, 
and compensation via EV A. 
Before implementation can commence, an optimal structure of EV A centres must be 
determined. EV A centres are units and sub-units for which EV A will be measured and 
managed on an ongoing basis. The consolidated company is the ultimate EV A centre, and 
the aim is to increase EV A at that level as much as possible. According to Ehrbar (1998), 
separating a company into cascading layers of EV A centres improves the line of sight of 
its managers and forges a closer link between decision and outcome and between pay and 
performance. 
At this stage the appropriate "centre" for which individual EVA's will be calculated on 
an ongoing basis is catalogued. EV A Drivers analysis, which is a set of diagnostic tools 
that traces the creation of EVA to individual financial and non-financial performance 
variables and helps managers throughout the company to appreciate how they can 
influence value, is also implemented. To measure EV A in a way that encourages 
continuous improvement and teamwork between interfacing units such as manufacturing 
and marketing is incredibly challenging. Most companies get the interfaces wrong. One 
reason for this is that cost accounting dogma creates perverse incentives for 
manufacturing and other internal sourcing centres. Such units aretypically allowed to 
recover only their costs through the charges they pass onto downstream revenue-
generating units, and to break even. There is little incentive for them to aggressively 
pursue efficiencies, because any cost reductions are simply passed to downstream 
entities. By establishing a formula for sharing efficiency gains, new transfer pricing 
methods are becoming available to rescue internal sourcing units from the purgatory of 
cost recovery treatment and transform them into legitimate EV A centres. 
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Possessing a skeleton on which to work the EV A system, the next decision is to 
determine an optimal way to measure EV A. This requires a number of accounting 
adjustments (as discussed in section 3.4) to accurately determine the economic costs 
incurred during a specific financial period. 
It is vital to train all company employees in the basics of EV A so they will know how it 
is defmed, what it means, and how their day-to-day decisions affect shareholder value. To 
facilitate this learning, Stem Stewart & Co. have developed The EVA Game™, a 
computer simulation that vividly demonstrates the difference between EV A analysis and 
conventional accounting-based decisions. According to Stem Stewart & Co., line 
managers are trained, who in turn train the people reporting to them. They fmd that 
"learning from the boss" is much more effective than training from the finance staff or 
outside consultants. 
2.7 Practical Applications of EVA 
Companies of all sizes are using EV A as the centrepiece of a financial management 
system that encompasses planning and budgeting, capital investment decisions, 
acquisitions and divestitures, the setting of goals and objectives, internal and external 
communications and, most important of all, incentive compensation. 
EV A is not just for public companies. Many middle-market companies implement EV A 
as well as public companies with significant family or management ownership. Even 
though closely held companies do not have the stock market as a means to reflect value 
added or destroyed accurately, they are no less motivated to enhance shareholder value. 
After all, they must fund growth through internally generated funds or debt. Improving 
EVA helps ensure that financing sources will be adequate to grow. 
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Middle-market companies generally have fewer lines of business and a sharper focus than . 
larger companies. Stern Stewart & Co. has developed a middle-market implementation 
process which is elaborated on in the section to follow. 
2.8 A Strategy for overcoming the Implementation Process 
For the EVA financial management system to work effectively it needs to be 
implemented correctly. This is one of the biggest challenges facing companies wishing to 
implement it. To follow is a table that proposes a five-step checklist for successful 
implementation of EV A: 
Step 1: Establish buy-in at the board and top management levels. 
Step 2: Set up a steering committee that will make the major strategic decisions on the 
EVA program (subject to board approval). 
Step 3: The Steering committee formulates a strategy. 
What functions will be tied to EV A? 
Compensation 
Strategic planning 
Operating Budgets 
Capital budgets 
Investor relations 
How far down the hierarchy will EVA be calculated? 
Management compensation 
Who will be covered? 
How will the bonus plan work? 
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Relation to non-financial measures 
Step 4: The steering committee appoints a working committee to 
the strategy. 
Step 5: Set up a training program. 
(source: www.sternstewart.com) 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the concept of EV A. It indicates that the concept 
of EV A developed by Stem Stewart & Co. has received great praise and acceptance from 
the business press as well as from hundreds of companies and a number of multi-national 
companies throughout the world. It represents a genuine revolution in management 
because it is a new and fundamentally better answer to the age-old problem of how to 
align the interests of agents with principles, of how to bind managers and employees to 
the will of the shareholders. 
EV A is similar to conventional measures of profit but with two important differences: It 
considers the cost of capital, and it is not constrained by GAAP which governs corporate 
financial reporting and it adjusts the valuations of GAAP. Therefore, the user of EV A can 
abandon any accounting principles that are viewed as distorting the measurement of 
wealth creation. It is the framework for the complete financial management and incentive 
compensation system that can guide every decision a company makes and that can help 
produce greater wealth for shareholders, customers and themselves. 
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Many companies are using an array of measures to express fmancial goals and objectives. 
EV A eliminates this confusion by using a single financial measure that links all decision 
making with a common focus. It is a concept that can be implemented in virtually every 
type of company, public and private, from banks to heavy manufacturers and even 
government agencies. 
Despite EVA's advantages as a performance measure, there is only one shortcoming to 
its use .. Unlike growth rates of return, it is more difficult to compare companies or 
business units of different sizes. This deficiency is easily rectified. EVA can be 
standardised to reflect a common level of capital employed. 
A number of challenges exist with regard to implementing the EV A fmancial 
management system. Traditional accounting measures have remained in place and are 
often taken a t face value. The reason for this is that accounting measures are easily 
understood, they are familiar to senior management, the majority of back-office data 
systems already track monthly and quarterly accounting data, and it is the general 
perception that stock exchanges base stock recommendations on quarterly EPS. 
To implement EVA properly, it must be kept simple and accountable. To make it simple, 
it must become the focal point for managing the business. Concentrating on EVA is what 
it takes to unite and clarify decision making. 
F or successful implementation of the EV A financial management system, a framework 
consisting of five steps needs to be followed and adhered to. Following these steps eases 
the resistance experienced when new systems are implemented and results in a more 
efficient financial management system. 
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Chapter 3 
The EVA Calculation 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis on the elements involving the calculation of EV A. The 
necessary adjustments that must be made to correctly calculate this financial performance 
measure are discussed with the aid of numerical examples. 
A number of adjustments need to be made to a company's GAAP financial statements 
when calculating EVA. These adjustments are referred to as EVA-tailored GAAP and are 
discussed in some detail. 
A comprehensive example showing the various steps in accurately calculating EV A is 
presented. The uses of EV A in the corporate world are also mentioned. 
3.2 Calculating EVA 
To expand on the equation presented in chapter 2 (section 2.3), in calculating EVA, one 
evaluates the annual performance of management by comparing the firm's net operating 
profit less adjusted tax (NOPLAT) derived from the income statement to the firm's total 
cost of capital including the cost of equity (rental charge for the use ofthe firm's assets) 
in rand terms, derived from the balance sheet. In this analysis, if the firm's NOPLAT 
during a specific period (normally a fmancial year) exceeds its monetary (rand) cost of 
capital, it has a positive EV A for the year and has added value for its stockholders. In 
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contrast, if the EV A is negative, the fIrm has not earned enough during the year to cover 
its cost of capital and the value of the fIrm has declined. Notably, NOPLAT indicates 
what the fIrm has earned for all capital suppliers and the monetary (rand) cost of capital is 
what all the capital suppliers required - including the fIrm's equity holders. 
The following summarises the major calculations: 
EVA = 
(A) Adjusted Operating ProfIts before Tax 
Minus (B) Cash Operating Tax 
Equals (C) Net Operating ProfIts Less Adjusted Tax (NO PLAT) 
Minus (D) The Monetary Cost of Capital 
Equals EVA 
In turn, these items are calculated as follows: 
Operating ProfIt (after depreciation and amortisation) 
Add: Implied Interest on Operating Leases 
Add: Goodwill Amortisation 
Equals (A) Adjusted Operating ProfIts before Tax 
Income Tax Adjustment 
Income Tax Provision 
Less: Increase in Deferred Taxes and Creditors for taxation 
= Cash Tax Payable 
Add: Tax BenefIt of Interest Expense 
Less: Tax on Non-Operating Income 
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Less: Tax Effect of Unusual Items 
Add: Tax on Non- Operating Items 
Equals (B) Cash Operating Taxes 
30 
(A) minus (B) equals: (C) Net Operating Profits Less Adjusted Tax (NOPLAT) 
Capital Equals: Net Working Capital (current assets less non-interest bearing liabilities) 
Plus: Other Assets 
Plus: Goodwill 
Plus: Present Value of Operating Leases 
Equals: Capital 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (W ACC) 
= (B90k Value of DebtiTotal Book Value). (Market Cost of Debt)(1- Tax Rate) 
+ (Book Value of Equity/Total Book Value). (Cost of Equity) 
Note: Cost of Equity is based on the market value 
(D) MonetarylRand Cost of Capital = Capital x W ACe 
(E) Economic Value-Added (EVA) = (C) Net Operating Profits Less Adjusted 
Taxes (NO PLAT) - (D) Rand Cost of Capital 
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3.3 Explanatory Adjustments to the EVA Calculation 
3.3.1 Interest Expense 
Interest expense is treated as a non-operating expense in the EV A evaluation. It is 
1 removed from the NOP AT calculation since the interest is related to fmancing activities 
and therefore shown in the cost of capital. Interest income is generally included in 
NOP AT because it is offset by a charge on the cash on the balance sheet that generates 
the interest. Separating operating decisions from the financing decisions avoids the 
tendency many companies have to confuse the two. By focusing on operating profits and 
operating investments, we avoid the risk of evaluating an operation on how it is financed. 
Although interest on debt is excluded from NOPAT to ensure that NOP AT reflects only 
operating performance, the financing benefit of interest is recognised by EV A. The tax 
benefit gained from interest paid is reflected as a reduction in the Cost of Capital (Stem, 
J., Stewart, G., and Chew, D. 1995:34). 
3.3.2 Provisions and Subjective Reserves - Bad Debt 
EVA uses gross accounts receivable and recognises only actual write-downs due to 
defaults not accrued bad debt expense. The adjustment for this is presented as follows: 
Net Income 
+ Increase in Doubtful Debt Provision 
= NOPAT 
Capital Employed 
Doubtful Debt Provision 
= CAPITAL 
25500 
3000 
28500 
155000 
23000 
178000 
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In doing this adjustment, the actual write-downs of receivables correlates with what is in 
NOP AT. At the same time, gross receivables is used to calculate the capital charge 
(Stewart, G .. B. 1995: 117). 
3.3.3 Goodwill Adjustment 
This adjustment is best explained using the following numerical example: 
After buying a new business, a business is left with R45 million in goodwill, which will 
be amortised over 15 years, at R3 million per year. Amortisation of goodwill is not 
incorporated for EVA calculations. Therefore, the adjustment is as follows: 
Net Income 25 500 
+ Goodwill Amortisation 3 000 
= NOPAT 28500 
Capital Employed 155000 
+ Cum. Goodwill Amortisation 9 000 
= CAPITAL 164 000 
In doing this adjustment, the amount of Goodwill in capital will always equal R45 
million, because as the net book value goes down as a result of the amortisation, the 
Cumulative Goodwill Amortisation grows to offset it (Stewart, G.B 1995:118). 
3.3.4 Asset Disposal 
Consider the following scenario: 
• A company's business is not that of trading infixed assets. 
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• As a result, allowing the effects of spikes on the sale of fixed assets to affect NOPAT 
would distort the measure of sustainable improvements in operating profit from one 
period to another. 
• Managers should not be discouraged from disposing of an asset when it is in the 
interest of the firm to do so. Therefore, gains and losses on disposal of fixed assets are 
treated as capital allocation decisions. 
This is best explained using the following numerical example: 
The asset disposal at a loss is an unusual item, so the impact of it is capitalised. 
Assume an asset has a book value of 60 000 and is sold for 20 000. This results in a loss 
ofR40 000 that is normally expensed in the income statement. Assume a 30% tax-rate. 
Add back loss on Disposal to NOPAT 
Add Cumulative After-Tax Loss to Capital (70% of 40 000) 
40000 
28000 
Therefore, the cash.brought in as a result of the sale is the amount that we reduce capital 
by (R60 000 - R28 000 = R32 000): the R20 000 that we sold the asset for and the 
R12 000 in tax that we avoided paying due to the loss, i.e. a total ofR32 000. 
This treatment of gains and losses on disposals is Stem and Stewart's most radical 
departure from GAAP. It should not be mistaken for the practice of simply taking such 
items directly to reserves, thereby excluding them from profit. For Stem and Stewart, the 
focus is on the entity's total 'invested capital' and not on the corresponding component 
assets. This is a radical departure from GAAP (Stem, 1., Stewart, G., and Chew, D. 
1995:39). 
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3.3.5 Extraordinary Items 
Extraordinary items, such as plant close downs and restructuring costs that occur on a 
once-off basis, and that are expected to yield benefits in the future, are treated not as an 
operating expense in the current period, but rather as an investment (or disinvestment) in 
the business. The adjustment is similar to the Loss on Disposal exaniple above, except 
that the Losses on Disposal are included in calculating operating profit in the Income 
Statement, whereas Extraordinary Losses are generally shown 'below the line'. Assume a 
tax-rate of 30%. 
Exclude Extraordinary Loss from NOPBT 
Add Cumulative After-Tax X-Items to Capital (70% of 40000) 
40000 
28000 
3.4 EVA-tailored GAAP: adjustments to the GAAP financial Statements 
If GAAP distorts the measurement of capital or operating income, it can be adjusted as 
necessary. Most of the adjustments are in the fonn of "equity equivalents." Equity 
equivalent reserves gross up the standard accounting book value for a common equity to 
its economic book value (Stewart, G.B. 199117). 
The logic behind "equity equivalent" adjustments is that when companies apply GAAP, 
certain items are charged to income, which artificially - and misleadingly - reduce stated 
capital. Unless these charges are restored to equity, capital charges will be understated, 
and operating income will be misstated. In computing the rate of return, equity 
-equivalents are added to capital and the period-to-period change is taken into NOPAT. 
These adjustments turn capital into a more accurate measure of the base upon which 
investors expect their returns to accrue and make NOPAT a more realistic measure of the 
actual cash yield generated for investors from recurring business activities. 
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Therefore, accounting conventions (GAAP) do not defme the true economics of a 
business. The rationale for making the adjustments is to (Ehrbar, A. 1998: 164): 
• Better r~flect value creation and motivate the right value creating behaviour. 
• Separate operating from non-operating and financing items. 
• Extend the matching of revenues and expenses. 
• Minimise the opportunities for management to manipulate reported performance. 
A number of EVA adjustment guidelines are presented by Stem Stewart & Co. These are 
summarised as follows (Stewart, G.B. 1994:72): 
Materiality: Is the adjustment financially significant, or will it be in future? 
Motivational Impact: Does the adjustment encourage behaviour which will enhance 
EV A and highlight accountability? 
Data Availability: 
Understandable: 
Is the necessary information available in a cost efficient manner? 
Can managers understand the nature of the adjustment with 
reasonable levels of training? 
EV A adjustments fall into four general categories. These categories are listed with 
descriptions that follow: 
1. Accrual to Cash: GAAP accounting misstates cash flow. EV A is an economic 
measure, and seeks to emphasise actual cash events. Reserves are established to 
conservatively estimate the net value of assets, or to establish provisions that estimate 
future costs. Changing from the accrual basis is appropriate where these 
contingencies are established pro rata and serve as a performance buffer. Converting 
performance to a cash basis is better correlated with performance and less susceptible 
to gaming. 
Examples: Bad debt provision, inventory provisions, sundry accruals and provisions 
2. Cash to Economic: Accounting conservatism treats many investments as current 
expenses. EV A views them as investments in the future, and accounts for them as a 
capital cost rather than a current period expense. This treatment does not discourage 
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such value-adding investment when it may adversely impact current earnings. It also 
improves the matching of expenses with subsequent economic benefits. 
Examples: Start-up costs, R&D, advertising, goodwill, economic depreciation 
3. Non-recurring Events: EVA is a tool that measures sustainable improvement in 
economic profitability. Non-recurring events distort period performance. They are 
therefore capitalised for EV A purposes. The impact of unusual items is typically 
treated as an investment, normally permanent, in the business, rather than as a period 
expense. This converts the performance measurement from recognising successful 
efforts to recognising its full cost. The cash value of the events is captured, but 
without profit peaks and valleys distorting the period to period results. 
Examples: Restructuring charges, gains on losses on asset disposals 
4. Non-operating Items: EVA is a tool to assist operating managers, and therefore does 
not include non-operating items. They are either not necessary for the on-going 
operation of the business, or are non-operating by virtue of being financing related 
items. Investment and operating decisions must be evaluated and managed 
independently of financing decisions. Non-operating items include amounts in capital 
and operating profit which are not involved in the normal course of business and for 
which either unusual or strategic circumstances would make measurement on an EV A 
basis undesirable. This explains the reason why in the calculation of NO PLAT within 
the calculation of EV A, a combination of Operating Profits and Cash Flow is used. 
Examples: Marketable securities, excess cash, income from non-operating investments, 
interest expense. 
A possible 160 adjustments exist. These include adjustments to: LIFO Reserve, 
Discontinued Operations, Post-Retirement Benefits, Interest Expens~, Goodwill, 
GainfLoss on Asset Sale, Accrued Wages, Product Liability /Reserve, Dividends Payable, 
Investment Income, Restructuring, Off-Balance Sheet Commitments, Operating Taxes, 
Strategic Investments, Construction-In-Progress, Warranty Reserve, R&D Expense, 
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Operating Leases, Employee Training, Sales Return, Joint Ventures, Marketing and 
Advertising, and Quality Programs (Stewart, G.B. 1991 :119). 
The potential number of adjustments is practically limitless. But most companies that use 
EV A make between five and fifteen adjustments for fear that the evaluation and reward 
system based on EVA would become impossibly complicated (Stewart, G.B. 1991:120). 
Stem and Stewart's approach is to work with the gain of conventional accounting 
practise. Their 'tailoring' of GAAP is intended to discourage managers from behaving 
short sighted. 
3.5 The EVA Calculation - Comprehensive Example 
Given: The Income Statement and Balance Sheet of Tea-Time (see below) 
Aim: To calculate Tea-Time's EVA 
Assume: 
• Tax Rate is 30% 
• R&D has a useful life of five years 
• All extra-ordinary items are taxed at the full marginal rate 
Income Statement 1999 
Net Sales 2600 
Cost of Goods Sold -1000 
Gross Profit 1600 
Operating Expenses -739 
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Selling, General & Admin -139 
Research & Development -10.0. 
Depreciation -50. 
(Gain)lLoss on Sale of Fixed Asset -40.0. 
Sundry -50. 
Operating Profit 861 
Restructuring Charge -40.0. 
Net Interest Ex ense -52 
Interest Income 8 
Interest Ex ense -60. 
Profit/CLoss) Before Interest & Tax 40.9 
Provision for Taxes -123 
I 
Current -23 
Deferred -100. 
Profit After Taxes 286 
Balance Sheet - Employment of Capital 1999 1998 
Operating Cash 296 80. 
Marketable Securities 
Net Stock 100.0. 70.0. 
Gross Stock 120.0. 80.0. 
Provision For Obsolescence -20.0. -10.0. 
Net Debtors 250. 160. 
Gross Debtors 30.0. 20.0. 
Provision For Doubtful Debts -50. - 40. 
Current Assets 1 546 940. 
Creditors 50.0. 60.0. 
Tax Payable 50. 40. 
Accrued Expenses 50. 40. 
Short Term Debt 50. 10.0. 
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Current Liabilities 
Net Current Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Gross Fixed Assets 
Accumulated Depreciation 
Net Assets / Employment of Capital 
Balance Sheet - Capital Employed 
Ordinary Share Capital 
Non-Distributable Reserves 
Retained Earnings 
Opening Balance 
Profit per Income Statement 
Goodwill 
Shareholders' Funds 
Deferred Taxes 
Long-Term Debt 
Capital Employed 
39 
650 
896 
350 
750 
-400 
1246 
1999 
80 
80 
... ",-
IJU 
650 
286 
-200 
896 
150 
200 
1246 
780 
160 
900 
1800 
-900 
1060 
1998 
80 
80 
650 
250 
500 
-100 
810 
50 
200 
1060 
NOPAT is calculated by adjusting accounting profit. Therefore NOP AT is: 
• Current period measure of sustainable operating profit, from permanent operating 
capital. 
• The after-tax cash operating profit, net of depreciation, as if the company were debt 
free. 
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• Calculated from an income statement, with the assistance of a balance sheet, cash 
flow statement and footnote information to make economic adjustments. 
Capital is calculated by adjusting the Balance Sheet. Therefore capital is defmed as: 
• A historical, economic measure of shareholder capital invested and under 
management's control. 
• The sum of net working capital, net fixed assets, other assets, capitalised charges and 
capitalised unusual losses. 
• The sum of debt, equity and their equivalents (alternatively) 
• Calculated from basic balance sheet information, with some economic adjustments. 
EVA Calculation 
NOPAT 1999 
Net Sales 2 600 
Cost of Goods Sold 1 000 
Gross Profit 1 600 
Selling, General & Admin 139 
Research & Development 20 
(R&D has a useful life of 5 years: 100 -;- 5) 
Depreciation 50 (See Income Statement) 
(Gain)/Loss on Sale of Fixed Asset 
(Increase) in Provo For Obsolescent Stock -100 
(Increase) in Provo For Doubtful Debts -10 
Sundry 50 
Operating Expenses 
Operating Profit 
Restructuring Charge 
149 
1451 
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Net Interest Expense 
Interest Income 
Interest Expense 
41 
8 
8 
NOPBT(Net Operating Profit Before Tax) 1 459 
Cash Operating Taxes 305 
NO PAT (Net Operating Profit After Tax) 1 154 
Cash Operating Taxes 
Provision. For Taxation 
- Increase in Deferred Taxation per BIS 
+ Tax Benefit of Interest Expense 
+ Tax Benefit for R&D Expense 
+ Tax Benefit from Extra-Ordinary items 
1999 
123 
100 
18 (60 x 0.3) 
24 (80 x 0.3) 
240 (comprises a structuring 
charge of 400 and a loss on disposal of 400 therefore: 800 x 0.3) 
Cash Operating Taxes 305 
Capital Statement 1999 1998 
Operating cash 296 80 
Marketable Securities 
Net Stock 1000 700 
Provo For Obsolescence 200 100 
+ Gross Stock 1200 800 
Net Debtors 250 160 
+ Prov. For Doubtful Debts 50 40 
Gross Debtors 300 200 
Gross Current Assets 1 796 1080 
Creditors 500 600 
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Tax Payable 
Accrued Expenses 
Short Term Debt 
42 
50 
50 
40 
40 
NIBCLs(Non-Interest Bearing Current Liabilities)600 680 
Net Gross Current Assets 
Gross Fixed Assets 
-Accumulated Depreciation 
Net Fixed Assets 
Cumulative Goodwill w/o 
Cum. Extra-ordinary Items After Tax2 
Net Research & Development 
Capital 
Therefor: 
NOPAT 
1998 Ending Capital 
1999 Ending Capital 
1999 Average Capital 
x Cost of Capital 
Capital Charge 
EVA (1154 - 386) 
1 154 
1400 
2462 
1 931 
20% 
386 
768 
1196 
' 750 
400 
350 
30 
560 
56 
2462 
400 
1 800 
900 
900 
100 
1400 
2 Comprises a restructuring charge of 400 and a loss on disposal of 400, all after tax 
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NOPAT/Average Capital 60% 
- Cost of Capital 20% 
= Spread 40% 
x 1999 Average Capital 1 931 
EVA 768 
Note: According to Stem Stewart & Co. South African companies have an average cost 
of capital of 18% for the year 1999 (Stem Stewart & Co. South Africa). 
3.6 Uses of EVA 
The calculation of EV A can be performed at any corporate level or any profit centre 
within an organisation. Consequently, the EVA of an individual division, product line or 
even an individual customer can be calculated to determine whether shareholder value is 
being created or destroyed within the organisation. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter explains the mechanics behind the calculation of determining whether a 
company has added value or destroyed value over a specific period (usually a financial 
year). EVA is a company's after tax profits from operations minus the cost of capital 
employed to produce those profits. What makes EV A so revealing is that it takes into 
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account a factor that no other conventional measures includes: the cost of the operations 
capital - not just the cost of debt but the cost of equity capital as well. 
A number of adjustments need to be addressed to correctly calculate EV A. Interest 
expense is treated as a non-operating expense in the EV A calculation. It is removed from 
the NOPAT calculation since the interest is related to financing activities and therefore 
shown in the cost of capital. Interest income is generally included in NOPAT because it is 
offset by a charge on the cash on the balance sheet that generates the interest. EV A uses 
gross accounts receivable and recognises only actual write-downs due to defaults not 
accrued bad debt expense. In doing an adjustment for this, the actual write-downs of 
receivables correlates with what is in NOPA T. At the same time gross receivables is used 
to calculate the capital charge. Amortisation of goodwill is not incorporated for EV A 
calculations. Stem and Stewart's most radical departure from GAAP is the treatment of 
gains and losses on disposals. For Stem and Stewart, the focus is on the entity's total 
'invested capital' and not on the corresponding component assets. This is a radical 
departure from GAAP. Extraordinary items, such as plant close downs and restructuring 
costs that occur on a once-off basis, and that are expected to yield benefits in the future, 
are treated not as an operating expense in the current period, but rather as an investment 
(or disinvestment) in the business. The EVA framework needs to make a number of 
adjustments to the GAAP financial statements. These adjustments fall into four general 
categories. The categories include: 1) Accrual to cash which involves bad debt provision, 
inventory provisions, sundry accruals and provisions. 2) Cash to economic which 
involves start-up costs, R&D, advertising, goodwill, and economic depreciation. 3) Non-
recurring events which involves restructuring charges, and gains' on losses on asset 
disposals. 4) Non-operating items which involves marketable securities, excess cash, 
income from non-operating investments, and interest expense. The potential number of 
adjustments is practically limitless but most companies that use EV A make between five 
and fifteen adjustments. 
A comprehensive example is included which numerically shows all the adjustments made 
to calculate EVA correctly. The example assumes a 20% cost of capital which seems to 
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be extremely high however, the average cost of capital for South African companies is 
18% in the year 1999 (Stem Stewart & Co. South Africa). 
The EVA framework can be used in just about all companies at all levels. 
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. Chapter 4 
EVA: The Essence of a Good Financial Performance Measure 
4.1 Introduction 
What exactly does a good financial performance measure entail and does EV A fulfil an 
the conditions of such a performance measure? This chapter sets out to determine that 
EV A is a good performance measure and that all the elements of a good financial 
performance measure are indeed encapsulated in it. 
The chapter measures EV A up against some of the more traditional financial performance 
measures to determine that it is in fact better than these financial measures. 
4.2 What is a Good Performance Measure 
EVA is a company's profits (NOPAT) minus the opportunity cost (capital charge). This 
amount that is left over is basically what counts and is referred to· as EV A. This section 
presents an analysis of the ability of EVA to predict abnormal return (what is left over) 
and of the contemporaneous correlation between EV A and abnormal return. 
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4.2.1 Strategy, Value, and the choice of Performance Measure 
An appropriate performance measure to gauge the effectiveness of a given strategy must, 
incorporate the required rate of return on invested capital, accurately measure the amount 
of capital used by the company and correlate the risk-adjusted rate of return earned by 
shareholders. EV A incorporates all these elements. 
4.2.2 Invested Capital, Strategy and Value 
Figure 4.1 (to follow) illustrates the components of firm value. The most transparent 
component of a firm's value is its physical assets in place: plant and equipment, real 
estate, and working capital. Another component is the net present value of the firm's 
current and future investment opportunities. This component value is less tangible that its 
physical assets, is driven significantly by the firm's strategy and is sizeable for many 
firms. The total value of the firm is the sum of these two components of value. The 
question is how to determine these values? 
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Figure 4.1. The Components of Value 
Net Present Value of 
Current and Future 
Investment 
Opportunities 
Assets in Place 
48 
Econom c Book 
Value of Assets 
Market alue 
of Firm. 
Table 4.1. Market-Value-Based Balance Sheet 
Assets 
Market value of assets 
Total Market Value of Assets 
Liabilities and Net Worth 
Market value of debt (including leases) 
Market value of equity 
Total market value of debt and equity 
. The market value of assets can either be above or below the economic book value of 
assets in place. This follows that if the firm executes a poor strategy in the opinion of the 
market or it does not possess the human resources needed to implement a good strategy 
successfully, the market will lower the value ofthe firm's assets, perhaps below the 
economic book value of the assets in place. 
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4.2.3 Capital Invested in the Firm 
A good financial perfomiance measure should ask how well a finn has generated 
operating profits, given the amount of capital invested to produce those profits. The idea 
is that the company's fmanciers are free to liquidate their investment in the company and 
invest the liberated capital elsewhere. Financiers must therefore earn at least the 
opportunity cost of capital on the invested capital. This condition implies that the cost of 
capital must be subtracted from operating profits to gauge the company's fmancial 
perfonnance. 
For that very reason EVA defines net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and subtracts a 
capital charge for the economic book value of assets in place (which is the measure of the 
capital provided to the finn by its financiers), but this amount does not truly represent the 
capital used to generate the operating profit since the capital commitment of the 
company's financiers is represented by the total market value of the company and not 
simply the economic book value of the assets in place. Therefore, for the company to 
create a true 'operating' surplus in a given period, its operating profit at the end of the 
period must exceed a capital charge based oil the total market value of the capital used at 
the beginning of the period. It is this 'investment' in the company in any given period, 
which constitutes the capital that the company has used to produce its profits. 
4.2.4 Operating versus Trading-Based performance 
Measures of shareholder wealth creation focus on the finn's stock price perfonnance and 
seek to detennine how much shareholders increase their wealth from one period to the 
next based on the dividends they receive and the appreciation in the finn's stock price. 
This type of measure of shareholder wealth creation is called a trading-based measure of 
perfonnance. These trading-based perfonnance measures assess how well an investor 
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would have done if he had purchased a share of stock at the beginning of the period and 
sold it at the end. 
In contrast, EV A focuses on the firm's operating performance from the standpoint of its 
fmanciers . An operating measure of current performance focuses solely on the 
performance of the firm in a given period; a trading based measure of performance 
captures revisions in the market's beliefs about the firm's entire future stream of 
operating performances. If stock markets are efficient and we examine a sufficiently long 
term horizon, these two measures will converge. Performance is usually assessed over 
shorter horizons therefore any operating measure of performance will diverge somewhat 
from a trading-based measure of performance. In practice a trading-based performance 
measure is not used for compensating all managers, particularly those at lower levels of 
the organisation, whose decisions have less impact on the stock price. However, a 
measure of performance which is a 'barometer' of shareholder wealth creation against 
which we can judge efficiency of any operating performance measures is desired. 
Shareholders earn a return on investment in two ways: through dividends and through 
capital gains. Over any period of time, t, the shareholder return for firm j can be specified 
as: 
Dj.t + (Pj.t - Pj .t-I) 
Rj.t = Pj.t-I 
Where Dj.t is the dividends paid during this period t-1 to t and Pj.t is the price of the 
shares at the end of period t. 
A number of factors influence Rj.t, most notably, the risk of investment, the interest rates 
prevailing in the capital markets (particularly important in countries like South Africa 
which has high and changeable interest rates), and the expertise of the firm's managers. 
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The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) captures the fIrst two factors by specifying that 
the expected rate of return on a stock investment is: 
Where: 
= the risk-free bond yield at time t 
= fIrm j' s beta, a measure of the fIrm's systematic risk 
= the expected equity market risk premium, usually taken as the 
long-run, average realised return on the market in excess of risk 
free bond returns 
The CAPM therefore helps to determine the abnormal"return fmn j earned in period t. 
The question is: What operating measure of performance correlates highly with this 
measure of shareholder wealth creation? The answer is EVA because it is fundamentally 
better than traditional performance measures. 
4.3 EVA as opposed to Residual Income (RI) 
Various new methods of value-based management for measuring corporate value added 
have recently been advocated for measuring both corporate and divisional performance. 
Such methods are generally based on comparisons between corporate market value and 
corporate accounting book value and on residual income (RI) measure. RI equals annual 
accounting profIts minus an interest charge on the book value of assets. This appears / 
almost identical to the defInition of EV A and raises the question as to whether EV A is 
simply another name for RI. There are however, some important differences. In general, 
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RI does not adjust accounting earnings or accounting assets in calculating the level of RI 
generated by an organisation during a given time span. 
RI, which was first used earlier this century by General Motors, is basically EV A, in an 
old-fashioned guise. Therefore, EVA is a variant ofRI however, EVA corrects the 
criticisms ofRI (Birchard, B. 1994:32). 
The following example highlights the difference between residual income and EV A using 
just one adjustment for research expenses: 
Example 
The following results relate to Stellenbosch Ltd. For the year ended 31/12/1998 
Profit and loss account for the year ended 31112/1998 
R'OOO 
Turnover 
Gross Profit 
Operating Profit 
Interest 
Net Profit before Taxation 
Taxation (at 36 %) 
Net Profit after Taxation 
Dividends 
Retained Earnings 
Cost of Capital 
Balance Sheet Extract 
Fixed assets 
Current assets 
5000 
3000 
1 500 
(200) 
1300 
(600) 
700 
300 
400 
10% 
1 500 
300 
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(200) 
1600 
Calculation of RI R'OOO 
Net profit after taxation before interest 828 
(700 + [200 - 0.36(200)]) 
Cost of Capital (1600 x 10%) 
Residual income (828-160) 
Calculation of EVA 
Net Profit after taxation 
Adjustment for interest after taxation 
160 
668 
R'OOO 
700 
128 
Adjustment for research and development 450 
Adjusted profits 1 278 
Net Capital Employed 
- per balance sheet 1600 
Adjusted for research and development 450 
Restated capital employed 2 050 
Cost of capital (2050 x 10%) 205 
EVA (1278 - 205) 1073 
(see Note 1) 
(see Note 1) 
Note 1: Included in operating profit is a charge for research costs 'ofR500 000. These 
research costs have been written off immediately, however other development costs have 
been deferred and are written of over 10 years. 
This company (Stellenbosch Ltd) has generated an EV A of Rl 073 000 and residual 
income ofR668 000. 
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Criticisms of residual income were of two sorts. Firstly, charging interest on fixed 
investment is not likely to enhance the quality of production decisions since investment 
outlays are sunk costs. Moreover, in the presence of capital rationing, pushing major 
investment decisions down the organisational hierarchy can result in loss of value 
through the neglect of interactions. EV A enthusiasts tackle this criticism of residual 
income, arguing that many modern companies have grown too large to be managed 
centrally. They propose empowering managers in a way that turns them into quasi-
owners (see chapter 5). Therefore, charging interest on sunk costs is seen to be a positive 
feature of residual income. Owners cannot escape the cost of earlier capital commitments, 
and so managers must not be allowed to either. This is an important attraction ofEV A. 
A second, long-standing criticism of reward systems based on the residual income of a 
single period is that they can result in short sighted behaviour. There is the danger that 
the failure of the accounting system to reflect economic reality (including the non-
recognition of certain important assets) might cause the business to run without proper 
. regard to the long-term . 
. It has long been recognised that economic value ultimately depends on future cash flows., 
This does not mean that periodic free cash flow is a satisfactory measure of operating 
performance. Negative free cash flow could result from a high level of investment in 
profitable projects, the recent record of cellular telephone companies providing an 
example. 
4.4 Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
The myth that increasing earnings or EPS is an appropriate indicator of the firm's 
performance, must be abandoned. Many senior executives believe that the market wants 
earnings, and wants them now, despite the fact that little convincing evidence exists to 
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substantiate this claim. Expenses that should be deducted to save taxes are deferred. 
Valuable acquisitions are avoided if a large amount of goodwill must be amortised. Worst 
of all, hefty earnings growth is sustained by over investing in mature and expensive 
businesses. 
What the market really wants is not earnings now, but rather value now. EPS is such a 
popular measure of corporate performance that it warrants further attention. 
Consider an acquisition in which a company selling for a high PIE multiple buys a firm 
selling for a low PIE ratio by exchanging shares. Because fewer of the high PIE shares 
are needed to retire all the outstanding low PIE shares, the buyer's EPS will always 
increase. Many think that is good news for the buyer's shareholders, yet it will happen 
even if the combination produces no synergies. 
To determine how inappropriate a preoccupation with EPS is, reverse the transaction so 
that now the low PIE firm buys the high multiple company through a share exchange. 
This time the buyer's EPS must always decrease and a greater number of low multiple 
shares will have to be issued to retire all the high multiple ones. Many think such EPS 
dilution signals bad news for the buying company's shareholders and advise that it be 
avoided at all cost. 
However, regardless of which company buys or which company sells, the merged 
company will be the same, with the same assets, prospects, risks, earnings, and value. 
The transaction can not be desirable if it is consummated in one direction but not the 
other and that is exactly what accounting EPS suggests. 
Consider the following example. Assuming that two companies each currently earn Rl a 
share and have 1 000 shares outstanding, and that one firm sells for 20 times earnings 
while the other sells at 10 times its earnings, the facts are presented below in table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 The EPS Acquisition Fallacy 
Mbeki Buys Leon Buys 
Mbeki* Leon" Leon Mbeki 
No. shares 1000 1000 1500* 3000" 
Total Earnings RI000 RI000 R2000 R2000 
Total Value R20000 RIO 000 R30000 R30000 
Share Price R20.00 RI0.00 R20.00 RI0.00 
EPS Rl.OO Rl.00 R1.33 RO.66 
PIE ratio 20 10 15 15 
*Mbeki must issue 500 shares at R20 to retire alII 000 of Leon's RIO shares. 
"Leon must issue 2 000 shares at RIO to retire alII 000 of Mbeki's R20 shares 
To make the example simple, assume that there are no synergies and that the buyers pay 
precisely market price for the seller's shares. With fair value paid for value acquired, a 
proponent of the economic model would expect the acquisitor's stock price to remain 
constant. Yet, when Mbeki buys Leon, EPS increases to R1.33; and when Leon buy, 
Mbeki EPS falls to RO.66. Preoccupied with EPS, accounting enthusiasts may see a good 
deal and a bad deal when in fact the two transactions are the same: Leon-Mbeki is just 
Mbeki-Leon with a two-for-one stock split. 
EPS does not matter because, in the wake of an acquisition, a company's PIE multiple 
will change to reflect a deterioration or improvement in the overall quality of its earnings. 
In the above example, no matter which fIrm buys and which fIrm sells, the combined PIE 
multiple of 15 (the consolidated value ofR30 000 divided by the consolidated earnings of 
R2 000). Put simply Mbeki's 20 PIE must fall, and Leon's 10 PIE must rise. Mbeki must 
give up part of its PIE multiple to acquire relatively more current earnings from Leon, 
and Leon must surrender part of its current earnings to purchase Mbeki' s more promising 
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future growth prospects and a higher multiple. PIE counters EPS, therefore rendering it a 
meaningless measure for the acquisition's merits. 
In the economic model, what is important is the exchange of value, and not the exchange 
of earnings which is so popular with the accounting fraternity. The exchange of value is 
exactly what EV A concentrates on. 
"4.5 Spin-Offs 
A spin-off is a pro-rata distribution of the shares of a subsidiary unit to the shareholders 
of the parent. It is the reverse of a stock -for-stock acquisition, and is prone to the similar 
accounting errors as EPS. However, instead of acquiring a lower-multiple company to 
boost EPS, the accounting fraternity recommends spirining one off to increase the parent 
company's PIE multiple. 
Refer again to the example presented in figure 4.2. Suppose Mbeki did acquire Leon to 
form Mbeki-Leon Ltd., a company that sells for a PIE multiple of 15, an even ratio of 
Mbeki's 20 multiple and Leon's 10 multiple. The question now is, why not spin-off Leon 
to leave behind a company that sells for Mbeki's PIE of20. The increase in PIE cannot by 
itself benefit Mbeki-Leon's shareholders. They are still stuck with their pro rata share of 
the low-multiple business after it is spun off. The spin-off merely takes Leon's earnings 
from Mbeki-Leon into a separate company where they are capitalised at Leon's multiple 
of 10. 
The increase in multiple that attaches to Mbeki's earnings is offset by the diminished 
multiple the market places on Leon's share of the consolidated profits. According to 
Stewart (1991), spin-offs can have a number of positive implications but, the merits of a 
spin-off and other financial restructurings simply cannot be judged by the accounting 
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model of value. EV A on the other hand is able to gauge the implications of spin-offs 
more accurately than the traditional accounting model of value. 
4.6 Earnings and Earnings Growth 
Earnings is a misleading measure of corporate performance because, they are diminished 
by accounting entries which have nothing to do with recurring cash flow. To make 
realistic judgements of performance and value, accounting statements must be recast 
from the liquidation perspective of a lender to the going-concern perspective of 
shareholders. The balance sheet must be reinterpreted as the cash invested in the capital 
account and not as the value of "assets." To do this, all of the investments a company 
makes in R&D, along with accounting provisions that 'hide-away' cash from operations 
(for deferred tax reserve, warranty reserve, bad debt reserve, inventory obsolescence 
re~erve, and deferred income reserve), must be taken out of earnings and put back into 
equity capital. . 
Earnings growth is also a misleading indicator of performance. Although companies that 
sell for the highest stock price multiples are generally growing, rapid growth is no 
guarantee of a high multiple. 
To illustrate this fact, consider two companies, A and B. They have the same earnings 
and are expected to grow at the same rate. Therefore, both companies should trade for the 
same price and PIE multiple because they are identical. 
Suppose now that A must invest more capital than B to sustain its growth. In this case, B 
will demand a higher share price and PIE multiple because it earns a higher rate of return 
on the new capital it invests. A merely spends its way to the growth that B achieves 
through a more efficient use of capital. 
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In summary, rapid growth can be a misleading indicator of added value because it can be 
generated simply by pouring capital into a business. Earning an acceptable rate of return 
is essential to creating value. Growth adds to value only when it is accompanied by an 
adequate rate of return. If returns are low, growth actually reduces value which, as 
mentioned a number of times is the primary objective of any corporation. 
4.7 Dividends 
That EV A should not have a direct relation with total shareholder return is consistent 
with the longstanding academic assertion first formulated by Nobel laureates Merton 
Miller and Franco Modiglianni in a 1961 paper, 'that dividends do not matter'. Assume 
that a company pays a dividend. How does this affect MY A, the measure of shareholder 
wealth? The answer is that it does not. The book value of the firm's equity falls by the 
reduction in retained earnings triggered by the dividend payment. The value of the 
company's shares falls by the amount of the dividend, once the shares go "ex-dividend" 
(otherwise there would be arbitrage profits). As the academic theory asserts, shareholders 
cannot become wealthier by receiving a dividend if it means that they must end up 
holding a share worth less than otherwise in the amount of the dividend. Stewart (1994) 
argues that as long as management focuses actions and strategies on increasing the 
present value of EV A, the wealth of the shareholders will be maximised, and the rate of 
return will take care of itself. 
In a world of daily market measurement, paying dividends is rather an admission of 
failure to find attractive investment opportunities to use all available cash. Companies are 
traditionally valued for what they do, not what they do not do. By paying dividends, 
management has less money available to fund growth. 
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If management chooses to raise debt or equity to replace the dividend, then current 
shareholders' interests are diminished by introducing new claims on future cash flow. 
Such a policy makes a company incur transactions costs for unnecessary financings. 
Companies that have attractive investment opportunities should forego dividends and will 
be doing investors a favour by investing in cash at a return that is higher than the investor 
can achieve by investing in equally risky alternatives. It is rather the company's ability to 
pay dividends that is critical to the creation of value, and the actual payment of dividends 
is unimportant. 
4.7.1 The Evidence on Dividends 
Definitive academic research is needed to decisively answer the question of dividends as 
an important corporate measure of performance. 
A study done by Professors Fischer Black and Myron Scholes (1979), tested whether the 
.total returns achieved during the period 1936 to 1966 from 25 carefully constructed 
portfolios depended upon the dividend yield or dividend payout ratios of the underlying 
stocks (Black, F.; Scholes, M. 1979: 1). Their analysis revealed that the return to investors 
was explained by the level of risk and was not at all affected by how the return was 
divided between dividends and capital gains. They found that within a given risk 
category, some stocks paid no dividends, some paid modest dividends, and some paid a 
lot of dividends, but all experienced the same rate of return over a period of time (Black, 
F.; Scholes, M. 1979:21). 
Black and Scholes (1979) concluded that investors will do best by assuming that 
dividends do not matter and by ignoring both payout and yield in choosing their stocks 
(i.e., they should worry about risk, diversification, taxes, and value, but not dividends per 
se). Their advice to corporate managers is no less important than it is to investors: Do not 
formulate dividend policy in an attempt to influence shareholders' returns. Instead, set 
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dividend policy in the context of the company's own investment needs and fmancing 
options, and then carefully explain to investors (Black, F.; Scholes, M. 1979:22). 
4.8 Summary 
What constitutes superior managerial performance in any particular period is a complex 
matter. This chapter has provided an overview into the understanding of what indeed a 
good performance measure entails. The chapter further revealed that EV A is indeed the 
essence of a good performance measure. EV A measures more important fmanciaI 
elements and can tell management more than other performance measures. 
Despite the enthusiasm with which many companies have embraced EV A, it is not a new 
idea. EV A is a basically a variant of Residual Income, however Residual Income is 
criticised for a number of reasons, whereas EV A corrects these earlier criticisms 
launched at Residual Income. 
EPS, Earnings, and earnings growth are misleading measures of corporate performance. 
EPS at best measures only the quantity of earnings, but the quality of earnings reflected 
in the PIE multiple is also important. Earnings are diminished by accounting entries that 
have nothing to do with recurring cash flow, and are charged with such value-building 
capital outlays as R&D, all in an attempt to win over lenders' desire to assess liquidation. 
Quick earnings growth can be manufactured by pouring capital into substandard projects, 
however, earning an adequate rate of return is far more important than growing quickly. 
Paying dividends does not enhance the total return received by investors over a period of 
time. But, paying dividends may deprive worthwhile projects of capital or may force the 
company to incur unnecessary transaction costs. Because top decision-makers in a 
company are unwilling to cut dividends, dividends become an additional and unnecessary 
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fixed cost of running the business. If interest rates rise, so will shareholders' expectations 
of what constitutes a reasonable reward for risks they are taking with their capital. 
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Chapter 5 
The EVA Incentive Plan 
5.1 Introduction 
An important aspect of many managers' jobs is making investment decisions that will 
affect cash flows in multiple future periods. Since managerial income is typically based 
on accounting income, managers can generally affect their future compensation by 
altering investment levels. The question that arises in this context is whether managers' 
private incentives to choose investment levels result in efficient investment levels from 
the perspective of shareholders. Therefore, the objective of incentive reward systems is to 
encourage optimal corporate investment selection by divisional managers and to 
encourage them to act as if they were independent owners of their divisions sharing a 
proportion of all losses and all profits. EVA incentive reward plans form part of the 
important uses of the EV A system. These elements are discussed in the preceding chapter 
as well as the factors encompassing an EV A incentive plan. 
5.2 Motivation for incentive systems 
Shareholder activism has reached unprecedented levels and has led to increased pressure 
on firms to maximise shareholder value consistently. The basic idea is that if managers 
are offered compensation contracts that are tied to shareholder wealth changes, their 
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incentives will be better aligned with those of shareholders than is the case for other types 
of contracts (Delves, D. 1999: 61). 
5.3 Factors Encompassing an EVA Incentive Plan 
An economic value incentive can be a powerful tool or just fancy pay. EV A measures 
more important financial elements and can tell management more than other performance 
measures. EV A has tremendous potential to drive performance. The way in which a 
company incorporates EV A into an incentive plan and the degree to which it takes the 
characteristics of its people - both senior management and lower level workers - into 
account is critical. 
To instil both the sense of urgency and long-term perspective of an owner, cash bonus 
plans that cause managers to think like and act like owners because they are paid like 
owners are designed. Basing incentive compensation on improvements on EV A is the 
source of the greatest power in the EV A system. Under an EV A bonus plan, the only way 
managers can make more money for themselves is by creating even greater value for 
shareholders. This makes it possible to have bonus plans with no upside limits. 
By fixing manager's share on EVA in advance and not changing it in the light of 
subsequent performance, the managers will be given a tremendous personal incentive to 
devise and execute extremely aggressive plans. In this case, just achieving planned 
performance levels can produce extraordinary bonuses for them; performance in relation 
to the plan itself is not used in any way to determine their reward. 
The absence of bonus caps is made possible by holding back part of the bonus earned in 
very good years and making it subject to loss if EVA subsequently falls. This "banking" 
feature, genuinely having something at risk, is what transforms managers into owners. 
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Therefore if bonuses drive the budgets, instead of the other way around, better and 
altogether more aggressive plans and performance are likely to be forthcoming from the 
key operating people. 
Decentralising decision making along with incentives has become all the more imperative 
as the pace of new market development and the fragmentation of markets have 
accelerated and as computing power has proliferated. Recognising these trends, the new 
fmancial model emphasises management by motivation and not by mandate, by 
empowerment and not by punishment (Brossy, R., Balkcom, J.E. 1994:18). 
From the above it can be deduced that a truly effective incentive system is one that 
solidly aligns the financial interests of employees with that of the shareholders, improves 
motivation and morale, and creates an atmosphere in which managers constantly strive to 
create more wealth. It is an incentive system that makes managers think like and act like 
owners of the portions of the business they influence most directly. 
To see why EVA bonus plans are so much more effective than anything else in use today, 
it is important to understand the dynamics of incentives and the reasons why 
conventional plans fail. Compensation plans typically have four key objectives: 
1. To align management and shareholder interests by giving managers the motivation to 
choose strategies and make operating decisions that maximise shareholder wealth. 
2. To provide sufficient leverage, as measured by variability of potential rewards, to 
motivate managers to work long hours, take risks, and make unpleasant decisions. 
3. To limit retention risk, or the risk that valued managers will 'bolt' for a better offer. 
4. To keep shareholder costs at a reasonable level. 
Where do conventional incentive plans go wrong? The most obvious failure is in 
alignment. Using the wrong performance measure in the bonus plan guarantees that a 
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company will learn the incorrect managerial behaviour and company performance will 
leave much to be desired for (Finegan, P.T. 1989:29). The latest incentive compensation 
survey by the Conference Board shows that the vast majority of corporations base their 
bonus payments to top corporate management on achieving targeted levels of earnings, 
earnings per share, operating profits, return on equity (ROE), or return on assets (ROA) 
(Ehrbar, A. 1998:97). Bonuses for business-unit managers are usually determined by the 
performance of the business unit itself, measured in either after-tax earnings or operating 
profits, with some additional weighting for overall corporate results. The alignment in 
these plans is feeble because, among other things earnings make no provision for the 
opportunity cost of equity capital and the impact of balance sheet management on the true 
bottom line, with the result that some actions that increase accounting earnings actually 
destroy shareholder wealth. 
EV A bonus plans do just the opposite. By using EV A as the measure of performance, 
they solidly align the goals with the creation of shareholder wealth. An unlimited upside 
potential gives the managers a continuous incentive for continuous improvement, an 
uncapped monetary motivation to identify and successfully carry out actions that create 
. additional wealth. Another essential feature of these bonus plans is that targets for EV A 
improvement are automatically reset by a formula. The combination of the 'bonus' bank 
and the automatic resetting of target improvements has the effect of extending a 
manager's planning horizon and encouraging him to evaluate investments in terms of 
their impact on EV A, and bonuses, not just this year but in future years as well. 
These features work well together to create two characteristics ofEV A bonus plans that 
are crucial to their effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism: Managers know 
that the only way they can make themselves better off is by creating more wealth for the 
shareholders and they also know that they will share in any wealth they do create. 
According to Stewart (1991 :7) most compensation consultants miss this point and fear 
that unlimited bonuses could result in unacceptably high shareholder costs. What they 
miss is that extraordinary bonuses come only with extraordinary increase in EV A and as 
a result, correspondingly high returns to shareholders. 
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The essential goals of the EV A bonus system, which build on the four fundamental 
compensation objectives previously discussed, are: 
• To link performance incentives more closely to increases in shareholder wealth. 
• To provide a single focus for operations management, capital budgeting, planning, 
performance measurement, and incentive compensation. 
• To promote a culture of high performance and ownership by management, in which 
managers take the initiative to create value. 
The key elements in Stem and Stewart's EVA bonus plans solve those problems 
associated with conventional bonus plans. Those elements are listed below and will be 
briefly discussed (Stewart, G.B. 1991:225): 
• Pay for increasing EV A 
• No thresholds or caps 
• A target bonus 
• A bonus bank 
• Performance target set by formula instead of negotiations 
5.4 Remuneration linked to increasing EVA 
This is the most reliable way to link the size of the bonus to the amount of wealth that 
management creates for shareholders, and is a precondition for making managers think 
and act like owners. To raise EV A, managers will cut wasteful costs and raise profit 
without raising any more capital. They will convert non:..productive assets to cash that can 
be reinvested or distributed to shareholders. They will invest capital to fuel profitable 
growth and they will select financial strategies that minimise the cost of capital. 
Managers are remunerated with an unlimited share of EV A improvements but bonuses 
can also be negative. 
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5.4.1 The Target bonus 
A target bonus is a competitive bonus based on peer company compensation practises. 
An EV A target bonus is larger than a conventional target bonus for two reasons. Firstly, 
real incentives require more leverage. Most companies put too much of a manager's 
compensation in the fixed portion of the pay package and too little in the variable portion. 
Secondly, EVA target bonuses should be higher because the potential for negative 
bonuses makes EVA plans inherently riskier. 
5.4.2 The Bonus bank 
There are several variations as how the bonus bank works, but the intent is always to 
filter bonus swings and to defer the impact until it can be ascertained that the bonuses are 
associated with permanent changes in shareholder wealth. 
The bonus bank performs a number of vital functions. Firstly, it ensures that managers 
collect bonuses for only sustained improvements in EV A. Bonus banking is also the 
principal mechanism for lengthening the planning horizons of managers, since they know 
that ensuring short-term performance will not do them any good if it harms longer-term 
results. 
Banking smoothes out bonus payments in that manager's build up bank balances in good 
years and draw down on them in poor years. Finally the bonus bank acts as a set of 
"golden handcuffs" for highly successful managers because any uncollected bank balance 
is forfeited if a manger resigns or is bought over by other companies. 
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5.4.3 Performance targets set by a formula 
Managers earn their target bonus when the rand increase in EV A is equal to expected 
improvement. This is similar to the performance target in conventional plans, but with 
two crucial differences. Firstly, the annual amount of expected improvement typically is 
present for periods for five years or so instead of being negotiated annually. Secondly, the 
base to which expected improvement is added is automatically reset up or down each 
year in line with actual experience. 
The simplest bonus formula states that the EV A target is the EV A generated in the prior 
year. This means that if EV A is just maintained at its current level, the managers will 
earn a target bonus award each year. This is not unreasonable because EVA may not be 
growing even though the business is. Sales, earnings, and assets may all be expanding, 
but profit is expanding just fast enough to provide investors with the total return they are 
seeking on any new capital they put into the business, and that is not bad. If EV A rises, 
managers will qualify for an exceptionally good bonus. By doing so they also force the 
EV A target to be reset that much higher for the next year without argument or debate. 
Even with this simple formula the only way that managers can continuously qualify for 
exceptional bonus would be to continuously increase EVA. 
What every company wants is a culture of continuous improvement, responsibility, and 
accountability. Enlightened companies today also want all of their employees to feel 
involved, to be creative, and to welcome change. In other words, they want to instil an 
ownership culture that eliminates the need to constantly control behaviour from above. 
To achieve that, every company needs an incentive system that clearly, objectively, 
predictably, and continuously rewards managers for creating shareholder wealth and 
penalises them for destroying it. That is exactly what EV A bonus plans do. 
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5.5 Summary 
EV A has tremendous potential to drive performance. The way in which a company 
incorporates EV A into an incentive plan and the degree to which it takes the 
characteristics of its people, both senior management and lower level workers, into 
account is critical. Seeking ways to make their incentive plans more effective, 
compensation professionals today are considering the EV A framework because it works. 
A key feature of this incentive approach is the emphasis on empowering managers by 
allowing them to run their divisions as separate business enterprises. 
What every company wants is a culture of continuous improvement, responsibility, and 
accountability. Companies today also want all of their employees to feel involved, to be 
creative, and to welcome change. In other words, they want to instil an ownership culture 
that eliminates the need to constantly control behaviour from above. To achieve that, 
every company needs an incentive system that clearly, objectively, predictably, and 
contInuously rewards managers for creating shareholder wealth and penalises them for 
destroying it. This is exactly what EVA incentive plans do. 
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Chapter 6 
EVA's Correlation with Stock Prices 
6.1 Introduction 
EVA and the company's share price are reported to bear a relationship to each other. This 
chapter investigates the exact relationship as proclaimed by past empirical research. 
6;2 EVA's correlation with Stock Prices Investigated 
Since value is a primary concern to investors, proponents claim that EV A is the only 
performance measure that ties directly to a stock's intrinsic value (Stewart, G.B. 1991). It 
has been asserted that stock prices and EV A show a remarkable tendency to move up and 
down together. As commented by the Chief Financial Officer (CPO) of AT&T's long 
distance unit, "We calculated our EVA back to 1984 and found an almost perfect 
correlation with stock price" (Tully, S. 1993:40-41). This section provides insight into the 
exact correlation with the aid of past empirical research and forms as the secondary 
objectives of the study. 
The relation between corporate financial performance and stock price performance is a 
confusing proposition. For example, EVA does not directly tie to total shareholder 
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returns. The reason being that EV A ties to a more important measure, shareholder wealth, 
which is related to shareholder returns. 
The dual concepts of maximising shareholders' wealth and using net present value as a 
principal planning and decision tool are fundamental. Internal rates of return, or IRR are 
often introduced in corporate finance as a useful adjunct to the NPV rule. IRRs indicate 
whether a project is worthwhile, in that an IRR above the cost of capital is a positive 
NPV project, and an IRR less than the cost of capital is associated with a negative NPV 
project. Therefore, operating managers often fmd it convenient to calculate a project's 
IRR as an indication of its merit that is easily communicated and compared with the IRRs 
of other projects. Therefore, shareholder wealth is maximised when NPV, and hence the 
present value of EV A, is maximised. 
MY A effectively measures the stock market's estimate of the NPV of a firm's past and 
expected capital investment projects. Theoretically, a firm's MY A at a given point in 
time is equal to the discounted present value of the yearly EV A it is expected to generate. 
Studies show that a company that has a positive EV A year after year will see its MY A 
rise. Conversely, a persistently negative EVA will lead to a lowered MY A because the 
market will have no confidence that the company ~an produce a good return on its 
invested capital. As a result companies can appear in completely different positions in the 
respective rankings for EV A and MY A. 
The question that needs addressing at this stage is: How do EV A and MY A relate with 
stock performance - a well established market measure of perfopnance. 
EV A is related to MY A, in that a growing EV A will be rewarded by the market. But the 
two measures do not move in random, for share prices reflect expectations rather than 
present circumstances alone. When there is an increase in MY A, the market in effect is 
anticipating future increases in EV A. 
A study in the U.S consisting of241 large companies was performed by Lehn and 
Makhija (1996). Data was collected on EV A and MY A that Stern Stewart & Co. had 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
published in various sources for four years: 1987, 1988, 1992, and 1993. For each firm, 
\
SiX performance measures for each of the four years was computed. These six 
performance measures consisted of: three accounting rates of return (ROA, ROE, and 
ROS); stock returns; and EV A and MY A, both expressed as returns on equity value. 
Using the relation of a measure with the stock returns as a test of the effectiveness of the 
measure, the study found that all six measures are positively correlated with stock 
returns. The study deduced that, even though not by a large difference, the correlation of 
EV A with stock returns is higher than the correlation of any other five measures with 
stock returns, providing the EV A with an edge as a performance measure (Le~ 
Makhija, A.K. 1996:38). 
,--
However, further research done by Chen and Dodd (1997) asked the question; whether 
the correlation between a company's EVA and stock return was as perfect as claimed by 
EVA advocates (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:318). 
A sample selection of 566 firms was taken from the Stem Stewart 1 000 database that had 
complete data for the time frame 1983-1992. The 1992 Stem Stewart Performance 1 000 
is an EV A database complied by Stem Stewart Management Service. 
Table 6.1: Association of Stock Return with EV A Variables 
A: Correlation's: 
1 2 
1. Return (stock return) 14.82 
2. EV APS (EV A per share) 0.449* 
3. STDEVA (Change of EVA ) 0.275* 0.017 
4. ROC (return on capital) 0.491 * 0.371 * 
5. SPREAD (ROC x Cost of capital) 0.511* 0.386* 
6. GROWTH (capital growth) 0.419* 0.260* 
* P < 0.01 
3 4 5 
0.258* 
0.255* 0.976* 
-0.064 0.476* 0.463* 
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B: Regression 1 
Variables Coefficient t-Value p-Value VIP 
EVAPS 0.584 8.33 0.0000 1.2 
STDEVA 0.027 6.71 0.0000 1.1 
SPREAD 0.315 5.44 0.0000 1.6 
GROWTH 0.251 6.83 0.0000 1.3 
R2 = 0.415 R2 a = 0.411 F = 99.56 p = 0.0000 
VIF= Variance Inflation Factor 
C: Coefficients of Partial Determination 
~EVAPS = 0.110 r2 STDEVA = 0.074 r2 SPREAD = 0.050 r2 growth = 0.077 
Source: Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997. Journal of Managerial Issues. Vol 9. Issue 3. 
Table 6.1 shows the relationship between stock return and the EVA variables. The 
correlation's in Panel A reveal a significant association of stock return with all of the 
\' EV A variables, suggesting that the EV A metrics yield information perceived important 
. \ by the stock market, a rightful claim by EVA proponents. However, different from 
implications of past reports, the relationship between RETURN and the EV A measures is 
far from perfect. A correlation of 0.449 between RETURN and EV APS indicates that 
increasing EVA alone is not all that matters in the marketplace since only 20% of the 
variation in stock return can be explained by the measure. While an individual company 
may find a better link between EV A and stock return, or even a nearly perfect one 
claimed by EV A advocates, the proposition cannot be generalised to a large cross-
L / sectional sample (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:325). 
/ Not only are the EV A variables associated with stock return, most ofthem are also 
interrelated at a level of significance less than 1 %. To further explore the association of 
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stock return with EVA variables, a regression was estimated in Panel B. Due to the nearly 
perfect correlation between SPREAD and ROC, only SPREAD is included in the model. 
Substituting ROC for SPREAD results in a qualitatively identical model as the one 
presented in Panel B. This is true for all the regressions containing the variable SPREAD. 
The four independent variables represent different dimensions of an EV A system, with 
EV APS measuring the level of, STDEV A the change of, and SPREAD and GROWTH 
the principal drivers of EVA performance (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:325). 
The F-statistic (99.56), p-value (0.0000), and R2 (0.415) suggest that the model is highly 
significant with 41.5% of the variation in stock return explained by the four EV A 
variables. Although R2 is not as high as past EVA stories imply, it suffices to 
demonstrate the importance of the EVA metrics in such a large cross-sectional study. 
Examination of the variance inflation factor (VIF), residual plot, and normality plot 
reveals no serious violations of regression assumptions (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:326). 
From the above results the following observations were made by Chen and Dodd (1997). 
Firstly, consistent with the correlations in Panel A of table 4.1, all four independent EVA 
variables are highly significant in explaining stock return. Collectively they provide a 
better explanation of stock performance than any single variable. Since the four variables 
capture different aspects of EV A performance, it was concluded that the use of an EV A 
system, rather than any single EVA measure, should contribute significantly more 
towards explaining a company's stock return (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:326). 
v 
Secondly, the relative importance of each EV A variable was assessed by comparing the 
coefficients of partial determination in Panel C of Table 4.1. Given the other three 
variables already in the model, adding EV APS reduces unexplained variation in stock 
return by 11.01 %, which is the largest incremental contribution amongst the four 
variables. Increasing EV A over time (STDEV A) and managing capital growth 
(GROWTH) contribute similarly as suggested by the coefficients (7.44% and 7.67%). 
Relatively SPREAD is less important in the model with a partial r equal to 5.01 % (Chen, 
S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:326-327). 
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Therefore, even with the EV A variables, over 50% of the variation in the stock return 
cannot be explained by the model (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:327). This suggests that 
companies should lower their expectations of results form implementation of an EV A 
system. Although improving EVA measures will likely lead to a better stock return, the 
payoff may not be as dramatic as promised by EV A supporters. 
According to Chen and Dodd (1997), even if EVA is a superior measure vis-a.-vis simple I 
accounting earnings, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is the single best. 
internal performance measure that drives stock price (Chen, S.; Dodd, J.L. 1997:320). 
Stock prices can be quite volatile and reflect market psychology rather than the impact of 
management decisions. In addition, not every company is publicly traded, nor is every 
stock actively traded. Many years of stock market research seem to suggest no single 
determination on which one can rely to profitably predict the market (Foster, G. 1986). 
6.3 Summary 
It has been asserted that stock-prices and EV A show a remarkable tendency to move up 
I and down together. But studies reviewed for the purpose of this chapter reveal conflicting 
results, and Chen and Dodd (1997) claim that although improving EVA measures will 
likely lead to a better stock return, the payoff may not be as desirable as promised by 
EV A supporters. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
Chapter 7 
Market Value Added (MY A) and comparison with EVA 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to define the concept Market Value Added (MY A). The emphasis of 
is to illustrate the connection/relationship between EV A and MY A. A section including 
. the validity of these two performance measures is also included. 
7.2 Market Value Added (MY A) defined 
EVA and the company's share price bear a strong relationship to each other. Stem and 
Stewart defines a measure of the stock market's assessment of a company: Market Value 
Added (MY A). The following paragraph encapsulates the definition of MY A: 
"Measured as the difference between market value and capital employed, MY A is the 
stock market's assessment of how much cumulative value the firm has created or 
destroyed for its shareholders." (Finance Week 200, March 18-24, 1993:28). 
In this sense, capital not only encompasses what accountants define as shareholders' 
equity but also a number of items that either represents an investment by the firm on the 
shareholders' behalf, or equity equivalents that are exposed to the same residual risks as 
the claimants. Goodwill is an example of the former caSe as the purchase price of 
acquisitions of on-going concerns represents funds invested by managers on behalf of 
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shareholders. Reserves for loan losses are examples of the latter case. These reserves 
represent funds that have been set aside from retained earnings for expected future 
losses, thus managers are required to earn a return on this form of capital. 
Capital represents investments required to support 'rainy days', or losses that are both 
expected and unexpected. Several other adjustments are also made to shareholders' 
equity to determine the amount of capital invested in the business. 
In contrast to EVA, which generally is an evaluation of internal performance, MV A, is 
the best assessment of the external performance of a company or rather, how the market 
evaluated the firm's performance in terms of the market value of debt and market value 
of equity compared to the capital invested in the firm. MV A provides a more accurate 
view of a company's profitability and prospects that can be derived from the record of its 
share prices or per-share earnings. Therefore, it objectively measures how well 
management is performing its task of maximising shareholder wealth. 
A prime component of computing a company's MV A is-its share prices, which is why 
cycli~al swings in an industry can be a significant determinant of MV A. 
7.2.1 How is MV A calculated? 
Firstly, all capital a company took in over its span of existence is identified including 
equity and debt offerings, bank loans, and retained earnings, and the amounts are added 
up. Then, some "adjustments" are made to capitalise certain past expenditures, like R&D 
spending as an investment in future earnings. This adjusted capital amount is compared to 
a firm's total market value, which is the current value of a company's stock and debt to 
get MVA or the difference between what the investors can take out (total market value) 
and the amount that investors put in (invested capital). 
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Following the above description, MY A is calculated as follows: 
Market Value Added (MV A) = [ (shares outstanding x stock price) + Market 
Value of Preferred Stock + Market Value of Debt ]-
Total Capital in Balance Sheet 
Market value of the fIrm is the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of 
equity, while total capital supplied is the sum of the book values of debt and equity. Put 
another way, MY A is the difference between the resources provided by the lenders and 
shareholders to the business (cash-in) and the market value, which could be realised for 
the business (cash-out). Therefore MY A is the company's accumulative economic value 
added over a period of time. 
The example below shows the MY A calculation in practice: 
Calculation of Market Value Added (MY A): 
Share Price # Shares 
Market: R25.00 50'000 Rl 250000 Equity Market Value 
Market: R40.00 10000 R 400000 Preference Market Value 
Market Value of Debt R 300 000 Debt Market Value 
Book Value: Rl1.10 50000 R 555000 Economic book value* 
* Sum of Total Capital in Balance Sheet 
Therefore the MY A is: Rl 350000 - R555 000 = R795 000 
The book value of debt is used in the calculation of total market value for the following 
reasons (Gapenski, L.C. 1996:56): 
• The purpose of the analysis is to assess the addition to shareholders wealth; 
• Determining the market value of most corporate debt issues is difficult because they 
are not actively traded; 
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• Debt market values are usually relatively close to book value; and 
• The market value of an organisation's debt is more'closely tied to interest rate 
movements than managerial actions that influence shareholder wealth. Essentially, 
the assumption is made that the market value of debt equals its book value. 
The relationship between MY A and EV A is reflected by the fact that EV A deals with the 
crucial ingredient in fmancial performance which is the extent to which the return on 
capital exceeds or lags the cost of capital in any given period. The excess or shortfall is 
multiplied by the capital available, which produces the EV A figure. 
The increased interest in EVA, MY A, and related performance measures reflects a 
heightened awareness by corporate managers that their task is indeed to create value for 
shareholders. Corporate managers have had a legal duty to maximise shareholder value 
since the advent of the corporate form in the 1800's. In recent years, various market 
mechanisms have evolved to discipline managers who stray from this goal in favour of 
other goals such as maximisation of size, earnings, earnings growth, earnings per share, 
and market share. 
Although MY A is the best measure of wealth creation, it cannot be used as a measure of 
/ operating performance for units of the firm below the level of listed consolidated entity, 
L nor can it be used for privately used firms. This makes MY A impractical to use as period 
to period measure of performance for the firm's managers. 
7.2.2 MV A Illustrated 
To illustrate MY A as a measure of financial performance, the following example 
considers the performance of two organisations. 
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Organisation ABC and Organisation XYZ. In 1998, Organisation ABC's total market 
value was RI5.8 billion, while investors had supplied R9.4 billion in capital. Therefore 
ABC's MV A was RI5.8 billion - R9.4 billion = R6.4 billion. The R6.4 billion represents 
the difference between the funds, including retained earnings that ABC's investors put 
into the corporation since its founding and the cash value they could get by selling the 
business. By maximising this spread, management maximises the wealth of the 
organisation's equity investors in relation to other uses of their capital. 
While the managers of ABC have done an· excellent job of maximising the wealth of their 
shareholders, XYZ's managers have not done so well. In 1998, XYZ's total market value 
was R4 billion. However, its investors had supplied it with R4.I billion of capital, so 
XYZ's MV A was negative RIOO million. 
Therefore XYZ's shareholders were left with only RO.98 of equity value for every rand 
they put up, whereas ABC had turned Rl.00 of shareholder investment into Rl.68 of 
wealth. 
7.2.3 MV A and Net Present Value (NPV) 
There is a direct link between MY A and the NPV capital budgeting rule. NPV measures 
the amount that a project can be expected to add to (or subtract from) MV A. For 
example, an organisation might retain RIO million in earnings for investment in a project 
for which the market projects the present future cash flows to be R8 million. Investment 
in the project may cause the total market value of the organisation to be R8 million 
greater than if the earnings had been paid out as dividends, yet shareholders' wealth will 
have been reduced by R2 million. This loss occurs because shareholders did not have the 
opportunity to invest the RIO million in alternative investments that would have a present 
market value of at~teast RIO million. With RIO million added to the capital invested in 
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the organisation but only R8 million added to its total market value, the organisation's 
MV A would fall by R2 million, registering the erosion in shareholder wealth. Moreover, 
the project would have a NPV of negative R2 million. 
By the following NPV rule (i.e., accepting only projects that have positiye NPV's), 
managers can avoid investing in projects that are forecast to generate negative MV A's. 
However, after the investment is made, there is no guarantee that a positive MV A will 
ensue. Organisations with high MV A's, such as organisation ABC, have done a very 
good job of connecting with high-NPV projects, which produced their high MV A's. 
Therefore MV A, whether for the entire fInn or just a single capital investment project, 
equals the present value ofthe future EVA's. Viewed in this way, one can see that fIrms 
use EV AIMV A to evaluate capital investment proposals because these measurement tools 
will yield the same answer as NPV. This means the same terminology that companies use 
to communicate with shareholders can also be used internally for decision-making. 
7.2.4 Is bigger better?- the concern ofMV A 
A MV A ranking recently measured the largest US fInancial institutions on the difference. 
between their stock market capitalisation and the amount of capital invested by 
shareholders (Shih, A.; Kantor, C. 1998:21). 
lP Morgan, the 7th largest fmancial institution with $262 billion in assets only ranked 22nd 
in terms of shareholder wealth creation. In contrast, American International Group ranked 
9th in terms of asset size and number one in terms of market value ($76 billion), yet it 
created the most wealth for its shareholders with $39 billion in MV A (Shih, A.; Kantor, 
C. 1998:22). 
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Typically companies that create shareholder wealth over time have consistently earned a 
return in excess of their cost of capital. While MV A measures cumulative performance, 
EVA provides a period to period report of a firm's success. However, MV A and EVA 
reflect two sides of the same coin, measuring shareholder value creation either from a 
balance sheet or stock standpoint (MV A) or from a periodic or flow standpoint (EVA). Is 
the company worth more than what the shareholders have historically invested in the firm 
(measured by MV A)? Has the firm generated after-tax earnings in excess of the 
minimum amount for which shareholders should have been compensated by investing in 
companies of similar risk (measured by EV A)? 
A question that is often raised is why shareholders and managers should be concerned 
about MV A? Firms can always increase their market value by investing additional 
capital, as long as the capital invested earns a positive return, even though the return may 
not be sufficient to compensate shareholders for the risks assumed. By taking the 
difference between the market value of the firm and the amount of capital that 
shareholders have historically invested into the firm, MV A captures the extent of wealth 
creation. 
For comparability, the standardised MV A measure, MV A divided by invested capital, is 
used to adjust for differences in the capital base when evaluating the shareholder wealth 
creation performance of different financial institutions. 
7.3 Wealth Created on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
One of the surest indicators that EVA has moved from fmancial innovation to accepted 
practice is the rate at which the world's premier "buy" and "sell" side money managers 
and investment banks are adopting EV A as the basis for evaluating businesses and as a 
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primary evaluation tool. A growing number of international (Morgan Stanley, CS First 
Boston, Goldman Sachs, etc.) and South African local stockbroking firms are turning to 
EV A as an evaluation tool that helps cut through the 'misleading' information set out in 
South African GAAP to get unique insights into value creation and destruction. 
A look at the bottom ten MV A performers (see Appendix A) will show a number of new 
entrants specifically Anglovaal Ltd at 191 (1997 position was 21), Anglovaal Industries 
at 193 (1997 position was 33), De Beers at 196 (1997 position was 40) and Minorco at 
197 (1997 position was 40). 
Absolute rank is not everything. Anglo American lost R21 bn of MV A in moving down 
from number 1 in 1997 to number 2 in 1998 and Sasollost R6.5bn of MV A in going 
from number 5 to number 8. Minorco had a double decline in share price and 48% 
increase in capital. The top five losers by value lost R74bn in MV A. 
1997 was a good year for US markets and a disaster for Asian markets. What happened to 
South Africa? Three trends emerge. Firstly, aggregate MV A, i.e. the sum of the MV A's 
·ofal} 200 companies, is down from R314bn in 1997's ranking to R152bn in 1998's 
ranking. This is the first time that there has been a decline in aggregate MV A since the 
FW/ Stern Stewart Performance 200 ranking was first published. The year on year 
increase in the all share index was only 2.6% in 1998, but the gold index dropped by 
43%. Commodity stocks were negatively effected with the decline in commodity prices, 
resulting in wiping out large amounts of MV A. 
The second trend is the decline in the breakeven point (the point at which MV A is equal 
to zero), which occurs at position number 120 in 1998 (Cashbuild), against position 
number 149 (MacPhail) in 1997. This means that only 60% of companies created wealth 
in 1998 versus 75% in 1997 and 80% in the 1996 ranking (www.stermstewart.coml). The 
explanation for this decline is linked to the prevailing high rates of interest in South 
Africa. Value is a function of corporate returns and the required rate of return. The higher 
the required rate of return, the higher the corporate returns needed to deliver the same 
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value. The single biggest driver of the required rate of return is the prevailing yield on 
long term government bonds. With the yield on the R150 currently around 13%, it means 
that the average cost of equity using the weighted average cost of capital (W ACC) is 
about 19%. This is an extremely high return that projects/investments must yield. It is 
interesting to note that the break-even point in South Africa has declined further and the 
break-even point is now at position 86 (Fralex Ltd.) according to the 1999 ratings devised 
by Stem Stewart &Co. This means that only 43% of the top 200 quoted companies 
created wealth in1999. 
The high interest rates are crowding out private sector investment. How does this 
compare to other countries? In the US, the premium or long dated government bonds 
over the inflation rate is around 3.8%. In South Africa it is a 7% premium, taking the 
inflation rate at 6%. The additional 3% point premium is the country risk in 1998 
(www.stemstewart.com) that global investors perceive and this does not attract the 
necessary foreign investor sentiment needed in South Africa. However, the South 
African market does also have a number of attractions. 
Since the beginning of 1994 the financial and industrial index of the South African 
market has grown at a compoUnd annual rate of 14%, however, the Rand has declined 
against the dollar at about 9% per annum. Given that stock market returns are measured 
globally in US dollars, this means that South Africa is offering global investors an annual 
return of 5%. This is compared to the 30% returns earned on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
The third trend is the rise of the technology stocks. Dimension Data moved into the top 
ten MV A performers at number 3 (1997 position was 14), as did Persetal Q-Data at 
number 10 (13). Looking at the top 5 winners in absolute increase, Bidvest came out top 
with an increase in MV A ofR4.8bn and Dimension Data second with an increase of 
R3.6bn, followed by Pepkor at Rl,93bn, ABI at R1.85bn and New Africa Investments 
Ltd at Rl. 77bn. moving up the ranks is also not everything. Altech was the top rank 
climber going from number 175 to number 65, a gain of 113 positions due to a 180% 
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increase in share price. More revealing though is to look at the 5-year change in MV A, 
which shows a decline of R311 m. 
Because the rankings reflect performance at a specific instant, it is more revealing to look 
at the five-year trends in MV A and EVA, and relative movements and positions of 
compames. 
Looking at trends counters the effects of market-wide factors, which affect share prices, 
and therefore the MV A of most companies. The five year winners on MV A increase are 
South Africa Breweries at Rl4bn, Sasol at R13.8bn, Anglo American at R9.8bn, 
Dimension Data at R9bn and Bidvest at R6.7bn. It is important to note that Anglo's five 
year performance is despite its big slump in 1997. 
The five year losers on MV A losses are De Beers at R7.5bn, Sappi at R6.8bn, Minorco at 
R6.8bn, Engen at R4.9bn and Gencor at R4.6bn (www.stemstewart.com/). The Gencor 
result must be interpreted in the context of the separate listing of BiIIiton and the Gold 
Fields merger. 
The MV A rankings show conclusively that size is not everything. Out of the top ten 
companies ranked by Total Capital, five are in the Top ten ranked by MV A (Anglo, 
Sasol, Billiton, SAB, Rembrandt) and four in the bottom ten (De Beers, Minorco, AMIC, 
Sappi). Size does not guarantee wealth creation, but nor does it constrain it. Dimension 
Data at number 3 on the MV A rank (1998) has tied up only R2.4bn of investor capital. 
Employing capital effiCiently is important, but capital intensity comparisons are more 
relevant within an industry than between industries. 
An increasing number of South African companies have adopted innovative programmes 
to increase their EVA's in order to maximise returns to shareholders and boost their 
MV A's. They have absorbed the point that Roberta Goizuetta, CEO of Coca-Cola crisply 
put to the US magazine Fortune in 1994: "you only get richer if you invest money at a 
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higher return than the cost of that money to you. Everybody knows that - but many seem 
to forget it." 
7.4 How Valid are MVA and EVA? 
A fmancial performance measure is only effective if it leads managers on an on-going 
basis to consistently make correct decisions, i.e. invest in businesses that create value, 
and divest of those that destroy it. 
7.4.1 The Case for EVA and MV A 
EV A is a superior measure of performance because it charges management for using 
. capital at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate and it eliminates financial and accounting 
distortions to the extent it is practical to do so. Besides being a superior measure of 
performance, EVA is also a superior measure of value. The final link in the chain of 
reasoning that provides the conceptual basis for EV A is this all important relation: the 
NPV of a project, strategy, or acquisition candidate, and what amounts to the same thing, 
the contribution to the MV A of the company, is by defmition equal to the present value 
of the EVA it can be expected to generate in the future (Stewart, G.B. 1994:74). 
The advantage of MV A is that it measures the cumulative value added or lost since the 
inception of the company. As a measure of the shareholders' cumulative return, it is 
unaffected by the particular historical period in which the market first recognised that 
value would be created or destroyed. 
MV A is a measure that captures the dynamics of corporate performance. It is the 
difference between cash in (what investors have contributed) and cash out (what they 
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could sell their claims for on any particular day). It represents the stock market's 
assessment as of a particular time of the net present value of all the company's past and 
projected capital projects. It reflects how successful a company has invested capital in the 
past and how successful it is likely to be at investing new capital in the future. 
The problem with MV A (and NPV) is that it is a "stock" or "wealth" measure; it is not a 
"flow". As mentioned, before it measures the total amount of wealth that is expected to 
be created from undertaking an investment or activity, not performance. Managerial 
performance is evaluated over periods of time. Because NPV and MV A are equivalent, 
and MV A is the present value of future EV As, EV A becomes the means by which the 
stock measure of MV A (or NPV) is converted into a flow. 
EV A in contrast, is not a measure of wealth creation. EV A is a measure of the amount by 
which profits exceed or fall short of the cost of capital in any period. Although, EV A 
does not measure wealth directly, it is an invaluable guide for management because it 
correlates better than any other measures with changes in MV A. Unlike traditional 
valuation measures, the EV A methodology explicitly examines the three fundamental 
. principles of value creation: cash flow, risk, and the sustainability of returns. 
Therefore, a company's EVA is the fuel that fires up its MV A. EVA, because it is 
defined to be operating profits net of a capital charge, implicitly subtracts the cost of 
existing capital and new capital investment when it is projected and discounted to a 
present value. What is left over from the operating cash flow is the net present value of 
all capital projects, past and future. EV A is the internal measure, which leads to the 
external consequence of building a premium (or discount) into the market value of the 
company. 
Furthermore, Stern Stewart & Co., contends that EV A is the sole measurement that can 
be correlated with a firm's stock price. However this is disputed by a study conducted by 
Chen and Dodd (1997)(see section 5.4). 
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The level of EV A per se is not what really matters. What counts most is the changes in 
EV A. Continuous increases are rewarded with increases in MV A, while declining EVA is 
punished with declining MV A. Therefore, it can be deduced that EV A and MV A are 
corresponding internal and external measures of performance. 
7.4.2 Criticisms of EVA and MV A 
EV A does not account for real options (growth opportunities) inherent in the investment 
decision. The market value of a firm's securities reflects the markets perception of the 
value of those growth opportunities. EV A does not reflect this information, therefore, 
when using EVA to analyse the performance of a company, it must be kept in mind that 
focusing on year-to-year changes in EV A will be better for firms with substantial assets 
in place in mature industries with few growth opportunities. For firms with fewer assets 
in place and substantial growth opportunities, however, year-to-year changes in EVA are 
less likely to explain changes in firm value. This problem can be avoided by refocusing 
the firm on the present value of expected future EV A instead of year-to-year changes in 
EVA. However, doing this eliminates the simplicity of EVA (a primary reason for using 
EVA instead ofNPV). 
To capture the growth opportunities inherent in companies, managers also should focus 
on MV A. Because MV A is calculated using the market value of the firm's securities, it 
reflects the markets expectations of future opportunities of the firm. Using both EVA and 
MV A to evaluate performance allows companies to account for both the year-to-year and 
long term changes in value. 
The empirical research of academics to date has been limited, and the results have been 
inconclusive. In a study of241 firms over the period of 1987 -1993, Kennth Lehn and 
Anil Makhija (1996) found "that EV A and MV A are significantly positively correlated 
with stock price performance attesting to their effectiveness as performance measures." 
(Lehn, K.; Makhija, A.K. 1996: 34-38). The James Dodd and Shimin Chen (1996) study 
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of 566 companies for the years 1983 -1992 showed (see chapter 6) that stock returns 
were correlated with EV A, but "the alignment is not nearly as perfect as suggested by 
recent articles" these authors also observed that residual income (RI) explained about the 
same variation as EVA and, therefor, similar stock returns will result from performance 
measurement systems using EV A and RI performance measurements. Therefore the 
adjustments to operating income necessary to calculate EV A may not pass a prudent cost-
benefit analysis. 
Relating an operation's profit to its capital is not as innovative as EVA advocates believe 
it to be. It has long been a standing practice of performance measurement in management 
accounting. 
7.4.3 The Three Dimensions of Financial Innovation Acceptability 
Three dimensions of understanding are necessary before a financial innovation such as 
EV A can be termed acceptable. 
The first dimension is the conceptual level among serious academic scholars who assert 
both its theoretical and empirical validity. The point for the academic is whether the 
innovation is a variant of existing practice, a mere fad or a verifiable breakthrough with 
lasting value. 
The second dimension is the innovation's practical applicability:' does the concept work 
in the real world, is it limited to non-cyclical manufacturing firms or is it uniformly 
applicable across the business spectrum? 
The third dimension is its acceptance by money managers and investment analysts as a 
tool for measuring performance and for making actual buy and sell decisions for client 
portfolios. 
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The question is therefore whether EV A fulfils these criteria. The answer is yes. The 
reason for its acceptance is that EV A and the ultimate criterion in accounting and fmance, 
net present value (NPV), offer identical answers to value analysis, but EV A offers the 
added advantage of having a memory and therefore making it a contemporaneous, 
period-by-period measure of performance. 
7.4.4 Other Performance Measures 
Although this thesis concentrates solely on EVA, other performance measures do exist, 
such as NPV, Cash flow return on investment (CFROI), TRS (total returns to 
shareholders) and RI, to name just a few. CFROI is a rate of return measure calculated 
by dividing inflation-adjusted cash flow from the investment by the inflation-adjusted 
amount of cash investment. While CFROI does adjust for inflation, it fails to account for 
risk and the appropriate required return on the project. In a sense, CFROI is similar to the 
internal rate of return (IRR),therefore it measures the investment's return as opposed to 
the wealth created or destroyed by the investment. 
EV A comes closest in theory and construct to NPV. The information requirements for 
both techniques are literally the same. For both techniques you need an appropriate risk-
adjusted cost of capital. To determine the NPV of an investment decision, you need 
estimates of expected future cash flow. Similarly, to determine the economic value of the 
decision, you need the present value of the expected future EV As that are based on 
expected future cash flows of the firm. Therefore, the NPV of an: asset is simply the 
present value of the expected future EV A from the asset and the notion of increasing or 
maximising EV A each year is consistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximising. 
EV A will generally yield the same value as discounted future cash flow (FCF), but is 
fundamentally better because it clearly connects forward-looking valuation procedures 
with subsequent evaluations of performance. No other measure can do that. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
92 
7.5 Summary 
While EV A is an evaluation of the companies internal perfonnance, MY A is the best 
assessment of the external perfonnance of a company. MY A is a significant summary 
assessment of corporate perfonnance, one that shows how successful a company has been 
in allocating, managing, and re-deploying scarce resources to maximise the NPV of the 
enterprise and the wealth of its shareholders. 
According to the 1999 ratings devised by Stem Stewart & Co. South Africa only 43% of 
companies in the Stem Stewart Top 200 created w0alth ill J ~. However, an increasing 
number of South Africa companies have adopted innovative programmes to increase their 
EVA's in order to maximise returns to shareholders and boost their MY A's. 
Continuous increases in EVA are rewarded with increases in MY A, while declining EV A 
j :iS punished with declining MY A. Collectively, the results drawn from the study of this chapter suggest that EV A and MY A are effective perfonnance measures that contain 
infonnation about the quality of strategic decisions and serve as signals of strategic 
change. 
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Chapter 8 
Findings of an empirical investigation of the present understanding and application 
of EVA by three selected large retail companies within South Africa 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes how three selected large retail companies within South Africa, 
understand the concept of EV A and how these enterprises apply the EV A financial 
management system in their organisations. This information was obtained by means of an 
empirical investigation through personal interviews with senior managers (usually the 
financial managers) of these organisations. These interviews were conducted' by means of 
a structured questionnaire based on tP,e previous chapters. (See Appendix C for an 
example of the questionnaire). A pre-test of the questionnaire was done with Investec 
Bank Limited. The questionnaire was modified as a result of this interview. A total of 
three retail companies were chosen. These included; New Clicks Holdings Limited and 
the JD Group Limited who have fully implemented the EV A financial management 
system throughout the respective organisations and, Wooltru Limited who has 
implemented the management system at top management levels only. 
This chapter provides background on each company included in the study. The EV A and 
MV A of the various retailers, as calculated in the Stem Stewart Top 200 Companies (See 
Appendix B) is also reported on. To facilitate the analysis of the questionnaire the chapter 
is divided into a further five main sections. The first section deals with the general EV A 
orientation within the chosen retail groups. The second section deals with performance 
related issues. This section provides insight as to what measures of financial performance 
the companies included in the study are using. The third section deals with managerial 
issues and seeks to establish how the EV A financial management system aids decision-
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making. The fourth section deals with compensation incentive issues within these various 
companies. The fifth section deals with analysing the 'EVA-culture' within the groups 
concerned. The chapter is closed with a summary of the main fmdings of the empirical 
investigation. 
8.2 Company Profile 
This section provides an overview of all three retail groups included in the study. 
8.2.1 JD Group 
The JD Group is a mass consumer fmancier. It is South Africa's leading furniture and 
appliance retailer, operating through five chains that cover the spectrum of consumer 
needs. These chains include; Russells, Joshua Doore, Electric Express, Bradlows and 
ScorelPrice 'n Pride. The group is a global company and as of 1 July 1999, owns a 10% 
equity stake in a small chain of stores operating in Poland. It is listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in the Retail sector. 
While each chain has its own identity, merchandise range and market profile, they all 
concentrate on offering customers a wide range of value for money, quality furniture, 
appliances and home entertainment and consumer finance products supported by a high 
level of personal service. The JD Group serves the mass market through 678 stores in 
urban and rural areas across Southern Africa, generating annual revenues in excess of 
R2,4 billion (1999), and an annual cash inflow of some R3 billion (1999) from trading 
activities. 
The group is ranked 7th in the retail sector according to total market capitalisation on the 
JSE. It has a market capitalisation ofR4 368 million. For the financial year of 1999 the 
group had a pre-tax profit ofR345 million and a net profit ofR278 million. In 1999 it had 
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an earnings per share (EPS) of 204 cents which was an increase of 21.8% on 1998 
figures. The dividend per share (DPS) in 1999 was 62 cents. return on assets (ROA) was 
13.9% and return on equity (ROE) was 19.1%. The gearing ratio for 1999 is 31.8%. 
The JD Group is ranked number 28 on the Stern Stewart 200 Top Performance 
Companies for the year of 1999 (See Appendix B). It has increased its position from the 
1998 ranking where it was positioned number 33. The company has destroyed wealth 
over the past year and has an EV A of negative R28 million for the year of 1998 (EV A 
figures for 1999 were not available at the time of writing and the 1999 ranking is 
therefore dependant on 1998 EV A results - see Appendix B). The company has an MV A 
ofR1 235 million. The market value of the company is R3 286 million and total capital 
employed in the group amounts to R2 051 million. It has a profit index average (over the 
past 5 years) of 0.8. The group's beginning capital was R1 804 million. The company's 
NOPAT was R324 million for the year of 1998. For the financial year of 1998, the 
group's cost of capital was 19.5% and the corresponding return on capital was 17.9%. 
Furthermore, the 5-year average return on capital is 19.2% and the 5-year average actual 
capital growth of the company is 24.3%. The 5-year change in EVA and MV A is not 
available as the group only has returns reported using the EV A system for 4 years.--
8.2.3 New Clicks Holdings Limited 
New Clicks Holdings Limited, is an investment holding company. It is made up of 
businesses operating in the discount retailing of health care, beautY, home-ware and 
recorded music merchandise on a cash basis. The company is listed on the JSE, and its 
trading operations are currently spread throughout Southern Africa and Australia. The 
group has its origins in the Clicks chain. 
New Clicks Holdings consists of six divisions comprising of 536 stores. The trading 
brands, or retail chains, of Clicks, Diskom and Priceline operate in the health, home and 
beauty market, Musica and the ~ompact Disc Warehouse make up the music retail 
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division, and the corporate services division provides a range of shared specialist support 
services to the trading division. 
New Clicks is ranked 11th in the retail sector on the JSE according to total market 
capitalisation and has a corresponding market capitalisation ofR2 289.8 million. The 
group had a turnover in the 1998 financial year ofR2 342.2 million and a pre-tax profit of 
R120.2 million. Furthermore, the company reported a R96.3 million net profit in 1998. 
The Group reported an EPS of 34 cents and a DPS of 11 cents for 1998. The ROA was 
10.5% and the ROE was 17.8% for the financial year ending September 1998. 
New Clicks Holdings Limited is positioned at number 30 on the Stem Stewart Top 200 
performance companies for the year of 1999 (Se Appendix B). This is a significant 
increase from position number 48 in 1998. The Group's EVA for 1998 is R24 million 
(figures for 1999 not available at the time of writing and therefore the ranking for 1999 is 
based on 1998 EVA results - see Appendix B) and the 5-year change in EVA is R16 
million. The MV A of the company for 1998 is Rl 063 million and the 5-year MV A 
change is R445 million. The market value of the company is Rl 753 million and the total 
. capital employed in the company is R690 million. The group has a profit index (5-year 
average) of 1.1. The company's beginning capital was R479 million. The NOPAT of the 
firm in 1998 was R119 million. In 1998 the cost of capital for the Group was measured at 
19.8% and the return on capital for that year was measured as 24.8%. The 5-year return 
on capital is 21.3% and, the 5-year average actual capital growth of the group is 31.0%. 
8.2.3 Wooltru Limited 
Wooltru is a leading retail and wholesale group, based in South Africa, invested in retail 
and retail related companies which operate 1,144 stores; trade through 39 franchised 
stores; trade through 491 outlets with 457 members through its buying group, Shield; and 
have invested in 93 stores in Zimbabwe through a minority investment in an associated 
company. 
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These stores are mainly in South Africa, but also in Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Kenya, Bahrain, Dubai, Mauritius, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and the United States of America. 
28 919 staff are employed in its trading divisions, as well as its property, fmance and 
technology companies. Wooltru Limited consists of: Woolworths, Truworths 
International, Massmart, CNA, Affinity Logic, Topics, Wooltru Properties, and Wooltru 
Finance. 
Wooltru is ranked 3rd in the retail sector of the JSE according to total market 
capitalisation with, a corresponding market capitalisation of R5 187.1 million. In 1998 . 
the Group had a turnover ofR13.6 billion and a pre-tax profit ofR1.2 billion. The net 
profit for the same year was R291.4 million. The company had an EPS in 1998 of 74 
cents and a DPS of 199 cents. ROA for 1998 was 18% and ROE was 23.2%. 
Wooltru Limited is ranked number 29 according to the Stem Stewart Top 200 companies 
for 1999 (See Appendix B). This position is a: significant decrease of the 1998 position of 
number 15. However, despite this downward movement, EVA for 1998 is r~ported to be 
an increase ofRlOO million (results for 1999 were not available at the time of writing and 
therefore the 1999 ranking is based on the 1998 EV A figures) and the 5-year change in 
EV A is an increase of R81 million. The MV A for the company is Rl 202 million 
however, the 5-year change in MV A has been reported by the Stem Stewart Top 200 
Performance Companies as negative Rl 780 million. The market value of the group is R3 
900 million and the total capital employed is R2 697 million. The 5-year average profit 
index is 1.3. The 5-year return on capital is 26.1 % and the 5-year average capital growth 
is 19.9%. The company's beginning capital is R3 056 million and the 1998 NOPAT for 
the company was R729 million. In 1998 the cost of capital was 20.6% and the return on 
, capital for that year was 23.8%. 
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8.3 Company EVA Orientation 
This section concerns itself with determining the understanding and commitment of the 
EVA financial management system by the companies involved in the study. 
A commitment to EV A should be backed by a commitment from the organisation, 
especially senior management, to the concepts and elements involving the EV A system. 
A method of observing such a commitment is answered by fmding out how the company 
uses EV A, what priority the organisation places on the EV A policy and how the company 
defines EV A. 
Both the JD Group and New Clicks have fully implemented the EV A financial 
management system proposed by Stern Stewart & Co. throughout the organisation. 
Wooltru however, has only implemented the EVA financial management system at senior 
management level. 
The JD Group, New Clicks and Wooltru all define EVA as a measure of corporate 
performance that comes closer than any other to capturing true economic performance by 
subtracting a capital charge from the company's operating profits. The EVA calculation 
is believed to analyse whether a company is adding wealth to its shareholders or 
subtracting it. This is a universally accepted defmition for EV A and it shows that senior 
management within all three of the companies understands the essence of EVA. 
The JD Group and New Clicks use the measure for decision making, as a measurement 
aid and as an incentive based scheme aid. Therefore planning and budgeting, internal and 
external communications, setting goals, capital investment decisions and, acquisitions 
and divestitures decisions are all made using EV A as a benchmark. EV A issues are given 
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the highest level of priority within these two organisations. Wooltru in contrast uses EV A 
for decision making and most importantly as a measurement aid. The use of EV A i~ 
Wooltru is purely by the senior financial managers and not by any of the operating 
managers within the group. 
The JD Group implemented the EV A financial management system in 1996 (4-years ago) 
and New Clicks implemented the system in 1995 (5-years ago). Wooltru implemented the 
financial management system in 1997 (3-years ago). A number of barriers needed to be 
overcome before the EV A system could be used as a fmancial management tool. The 
New Clicks group reported that all employees needed to be educated and trained with . 
regard to the EV A financial management system. Education regarding this took place 
from top management to the lowest levels of decision-makers. Computer software needed 
to be adapted to facilitate the new financial management system. This resulted in major 
costs which needed to be substantiated before implementation of the measurement system 
could take place. These costs were substantiated when top management learnt that the 
EV A financial management system offered the company improved transparency as to . 
whether the company or a division of the company was indeed adding shareholder wealth 
or destroying it. 
Both New Clicks and the JD Group experience no barriers presently in using the EVA 
financial management system for performance assessment and other managerial functions 
because these companies both have had the system successfully implemented for a 
number of years. The reasons for the implementation of the EVA system by the JD Group 
and New Clicks is similar. Both companies believed that the fundamental reason for the 
implementation of the financial management system was that it would result in an 
improvement in the managing of the company for the long-term. Both companies were 
attracted to a measure that took into account the cost of capital. This is one of the main 
attractions to the EV A system. 
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8.4 Performance Related Issues - EVA as a Performance Measure 
This section deals with detennining what measures of financial perfonnance the 
companies involved in the study use. 
All three companies use EVA exclusively to measure financial perfonnance. Wooltru 
reported that the biggest problem they associated with EV A as a financial perfonnance 
measure was determining the company's weighted average cost of capital (WAC C) 
accurately. 
Despite the enthusiasm with which these companies embrace EV A, the financial 
statements do not report on the system. This shows that although these companies use 
EV A to measure value created or destroyed by management during a financial year and 
as a financial management tool, the concept is still not widely accepted in standard 
company financial reporting. All three companies accepted that because standard 
company financial reporting did not recognise the EV A concept, traditional measures 
including price earnings ratios (PIE's), EPS, and DPS were used in circular financial 
reports to shareholders. The short-comings of these traditional measures have been 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
The most important reason to adopt EV A as the main corporate financial goal, is that it is 
the only measure to tie directly to intrinsic market value. The capital budgeting 
prescription to accept all positive net present value (NPV) projects is therefore restated as 
follows: accept all investment opportunities which will produce a positive discounted 
EV A. The financial management of all three-retail companies comprehends that 
maximising shareholder wealth, (i.e. maximising the respective companies EV A) is not 
the same as maximising the company's total value. The difference is that shareholder 
wealth is maximised only by maximising the difference between the finn's total value 
and the total capital that investors have committed to it. This difference is the company's 
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MV A. All three companies seem to have a clear understanding of the concepts of EV A 
and MV A and of how they essentially differ. 
As a result of the top management of all three companies understanding the concepts of 
EV A and MV A, it can be further deduced that management understands that an increase 
in EVA will bring about an increase in the MV A of the respective company. Both EVA 
and MV A are measures that are used by New Clicks, the JD Group, and Wooltru to 
measure financial performance. However, the JD Group mentions a fundamental short-
coming of the MV A performance measure in South Africa. The reason for this short-
coming is that MV A can be used as a performance measure in efficient markets with a. 
greater degree of success than in less than perfect markets. The JSE is not however 
efficient and the market takes time for information to filter through before it reacts. This 
results in a time lag and the performance measure loses its validity. This results in MV A 
being used successfully in efficient capital markets only, whereas EVA always works and 
is in no way dependent on the market mechanism. 
8.5 'Management Issues - EVA as a Management System 
The most fundamental duty any manager has to perform is create value for the 
shareholders. There is good reason why value creation should be the number one rule -
basic macro-economics and corporate finance theory promotes that the prime financial 
objective of any firm should be to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Managing for 
value has a number of spin-offs and serves the interests of society at large. 
Corporate reports of the late nineties are filled with references to value. The quest for 
value is the corporate goal of this decade. The quest continues though as, not all of the 
strategies aimed to create value have succeeded. This section provides insight on whether 
the companies included in the study have managed their organisations using EV A to 
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create shareholder wealth. The section provides evidence that managing a company using 
the EV A fmancial management system results in better management throughout the 
organisation. 
8.5.1 Determining the decision-making process within the organisation 
Consistent answers were reported from all three respondents regarding company decision 
making. All staff members with any authority within the company (from top management 
to store management level) are in the position to make decisions regarding their 
immediate department. More important decisions, which affect shareholder wealth are 
made by the board of directors in all three of the companies. Deployment of scarce 
resources is done on a centralised and a decentralised basis depending on the value 
content of the resource in question. 
The senior management of the companies involved were questioned as to whether 
decision-makers understood the Net Present Value (NPV) concept. This is an important 
.question and it is vital that management understands this concept when dealing with EV A 
as a financial management system as EV A is the only perfonnance meaSure that is 
entirely consistent with the standard capital budgeting rule. This rule accepts all positive 
and rejects all negative NPV investments. (EPS, on the other hand will increase so long 
as new capital investments earn anything more than the after-tax cost of borrowing, 
which is hardly an acceptable return). It appears that the management of the companies 
concerned in the study make decisions with the aim of increasing EV A and that decisions 
are made using EV A as the primary benchmark. This provides conclusive evidence that 
the NPV concept is well understood by the decision makers within the concerned 
organisations. 
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8.5.2 The Importance of Technology as a value-adding driver within the 
organisation 
It was unanimously agreed by all the companies involved in the study that technology is a 
major EVA driver. Senior managers traditionally have a negative opinion of the 
relationship between information technology (IT) and business performance. They are 
often dissatisfied with the investments and practices of IT and fail to see the real benefit 
of technology within their organisation. However, with the implementation of the EVA 
financial management system, information needs to be gathered and distributed from all 
levels of the organisation before the company's EVA figure can be accurately calculated. 
All three companies reported having an internal computer communication network 
(,intranet') which is used exclusively for communication between employees throughout 
the organisation. The New Clicks group reported that. their intranet system, which has 
been implemented since inception of the EV A financial management system has meant 
fewer meetings as discussions and decisions are now mainly executed electronically. The 
group's retail mindset is focused clearly on supply chain management. As an ongoing 
strategy supply chain management complements EV A as it requires maximum efficient 
use of capital to obtain the desired return on investment. It is through managing the 
supply chain, with the focus on achieving increased stockturns, improved margins, 
operational efficiencies and cost controls that the group will achieve its primary aim of 
increasing EVA. In pursuit of the goal ofjust-in-time inventory, the group is moving 
towards centralised distribution and automatic stock replenishment. The supply chain 
management programme has now evolved to the stage where projects generated by it 
now have a momentum of their own, pointing to an important and growing link between 
the groups staff and the way they are using technology. 
The JD Group goes one step further than the New Clicks group and mentions that for 
value to be truly added in an organisation, knowledge within the organisation needs to be 
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effectively managed. According to the JD Group, knowledge management is a 
management discipline that treats intellectual capital as a managed asset. The primary 
tools applied in knowledge management are organisational dynamics, process 
engineering and technology. These work together within the JD Group to streamline and 
enhance the capture and flow of the organisation's data, information and knowledge and 
to deliver it to individuals and groups engaged in accomplishing specific tasks. 
Knowledge management principles are used to sift out what is important. According to 
the group these individuals are the most vital resource in the company. The primary goal 
of knowledge management is to deliver the intellectual capacity of the firm to the 
individual knowledge workers who make the day-to-day decisions that ultimately 
determine the EV A added or subtracted to the business. Knowledge management is 
therefore about partnering technology with a corporate culture and business processes 
and using it as a vehicle to manage and deliver the business information and the expertise 
of fellow workers to the most fundamental driver of value; the knowledge worker. 
All three companies believe that the technology network within the business referred to 
as a Digital Nervous System (DNS) by Microsoft, enables their businesses to act and 
react speedily, making them more effective in the market place and therefore able to add 
more economic value to the organisation. A DNS is not a technology even though 
technology does enable one. It is a process of managing information throughout an 
organisation effectively, at high speed. All three retail companies involved in the study 
acknowledge that technology has positively affected the business performance of their 
company thereby adding EV A and, is a vital element in the EV A financial management 
framework. 
In order to continue to improve EV A, companies need to understand and interpret 
information. This ensures that scarce resources are allocated in such a way that EV A is 
not destroyed. However, for this to happen information needs to be effectively managed. 
In the past a company's worth would have been measured by its tangible assets. These 
days a more accurate measure is information, which is considered by many executives to 
be a true barometer of an organisation's worth. The real value of information lies in how 
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it is used. The critical processes for every enterprise involves capturing the daily flood of 
data about markets, customers, competitors, consumer trends and internal processes. Data 
must be stored and organised so that employees can access it easily and intuitively and 
act upon the findings effortlessly. This has been made possible through knowledge 
management solutions created through the concept of the DNS. 
Technology as shown above, has greatly aided these companies in improving EVA. 
Senior management throughout all three organisations understands that technology is a 
major EVA driver. 
8.5.3 Other Value-drivers introduced by Management 
Despite the acceptance that technology is one of the major EVA drivers, the New Clicks 
group pointed out a number of core business improvements which they have 
implemented and believe to be EV A drivers. These include projects designed to improve 
or revitalise aspects of the existing business in pursuit ofEV A. Such projects include 
customer loyalty programmes, exclusive brand development and improved store formats. 
Exclusive brand development is achieving steady improvements in operating margins 
which is paramount to the increase in EVA. The group believes that there is an on-going 
potential for further development in exclusive brands, especially with regard to health 
products. The trend is towards smaller-format stores with higher trading densities. These 
add new life to a trading brand and can generally be rolled out faster. The Clicks 
ClubCard loyalty programme, a savings card which rewards customer loyalty, is one of 
the most successful customer retention programmes of its kind. It was introduced in 1996 
at a time when many competitors opted for private label credit cards, the ClubCard is a 
classic example of how information from technology can be used in powerful business 
applications, such as direct marketing and data mining. The group believes that the 
ClubCard loyalty programme has lifted the base of their business onto a new level and 
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added significant value to the company. The ClubCard currently has 1.8 million 
members. 
8.5.4 Organisation Investment Decisions 
Future company capital investments are all analysed on the basis of the economic value 
which they could add to the company. It was found that throughout these companies the 
benchmark used in determining whether capital investments were executed or not was 
determined on whether the investment would result in a positive impact on the 
companies' EVA. Despite the fact that the impact on EV A is one of the primary 
concerns, it is not the only measure used in analysing an investment project. The more 
traditional measures of net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) are 
measures that are used in conjunction with EVA in the New Clicks and Wooltru groups. 
Wooltru also uses other measures including: calculating the contribution to earnings that 
a project/acquisition makes, the impact on headline e8.rnings and the impact that the 
project/acquisition has on EPS. Wooltru mentioned that these are the present measures 
, 'used and that it did intend in future to use the EVA benchmark exclusively. The JD 
Group uses EVA exclusively for decisions regarding future capital investments and 
believes that this is effective and leads to fewer complications as one performance 
measurement is used instead of an array. 
According to New Clicks, EVA analysis has also been crucial in evaluating potential 
acquisitions (so far no major ones have passed the test) as well as the feasibility of the 
group's internal expansion plans. The JD Group also uses the EVA model to determine 
whether or not potential acquisitions are advisable. However, the effect of potential 
acquisitions on the EV A over a period of three years as a benchmark in determining 
whether or not the capital expenditure is indeed desirable is used. The balance sheet is 
also considered before capital investments are made as the companies in question are 
forced to keep track of their gearing ratios. A company's gearing ratio is determined by 
taking the company's net interest bearing debt and dividing it by shareholders funds. All 
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three companies have a gearing ratio presently below 32% (JD Group: 31.8% (1999), 
New Clicks:25 % (1999), Wooltru 26%(1999)). 
From the above comments, it stands to reason that all the companies in the study 
understand the essence of the EV A model and the importance of relating it to future 
capital expenditure. 
8.5.5 Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements in Calculating EVA 
Should GAAP distort the measurement of capital or operating income, it is adjusted as 
necessary. The logic behind these adjustments is that when companies apply GAAP, 
certain items are charged to income, which misleadingly reduce stated capital. Unless 
I 
these charges are restored to equity, capital charges will be understated and operating 
income will be misstated. In computing the rate of return, these adjustments are added to 
capital and the period-to-period change is taken into NOPAT. The adjustments turn 
capital into a more accurate measure of the base upon which investors expect their returns 
to accrue and make NOPAT a more realistic measure of the actual cash yield generated 
for investors from recurring business activities. In doing this research, it was vital to 
determine whether the companies involved made particular adjustments to more 
realistically calculate operating income and measure capital. 
According to Stem Stewart & Co. a possible 160 adjustments exist but most companies 
make between five and fifteen adjustments. All three respondents'were of the impression 
that the amount of adjustments made varied from year to year but that the average annual 
number of adjustments made to the GAAP statements to more realistically determine 
capital charges and operating income was between five and seven. The respondents 
mentioned that the key to using EV A was its simplicity and that too many adjustments 
would overcomplicate the measure. It must be emphasised that the EV A measure is 
somewhat simplified in practise in these companies and involves far less detail than the 
model presented in the literature review. The reasoning behind simplifying the model is 
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best explained by the New Clicks group. They believe that by implementing the EVA 
financial management system everybody who works in the company needs to understand 
the mechanics behind the actual calculation. Fewer adjustments results in less 
complication and greater understanding amongst management at all levels throughout the 
company. Greater understanding of the measure results in a greater commitment to the 
actual improvement of the company's EVA. 
All the respondents make adjustments for interest expenses, leases, goodwill, gain/loss on 
asset sales, restructuring costs and employee training. The New Clicks group reported 
making further adjustments for: operating leases, marketing and advertising, R&D 
expenses and investment income. The JD Group makes further adjustments for: accrued 
wages, marketing and advertising, warranty reserve and joint ventures. Wooltru reported 
making additional adjustments to sales returns and intangible investments to better 
reflect value creation and to motivate the right value creating behaviour. 
According to the companies included in the study, the adjustments are made following 
the guidelines presented by Stem Stewart & Co. Theses guidelines can be summarised as 
follows: 
• Material: Is the adjustment financially significant, or will it be in future? 
• Motivational Impact: Does the adjustment encourage behaviour which will enhance 
EV A and highlight accountability? 
• Data Availability: Is the necessary information available in a cost efficient manner? 
• Understandable: Can managers understand the nature of the adjustment with 
reasonable levels of training? 
The retail groups involved in the analysis all confirmed that the primary guideline for the 
making of an adjustment was whether it made sense according to basic principles of EV A 
i.e. whether the adjustment encourages behaviour which will enhance EVA and highlight 
accountability. The adjustments that are made by the company need to account for a more 
accurate EVA calculation, because the very essence of EVA is to highlight transparency. 
It is fundamental that the EV A calculation is kept basic and that it be used as a tool to 
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motivate everybody in the company. The adjustments must therefore be made keeping 
this factor in mind. These factors seem to be well understood by the senior management 
of the companies involved in the study and the primary reasons behind making these 
adjustments according to the ill Group is to minimise the opportunities for management 
to manipulate reported performance and to separate operating from non-operating and 
fmancing items. 
8.5.6 The Division of a Company into Independent EVA Units 
For the successful implementation of an EVA financial management system, an optimal 
structure of EV A units must exist. EV A centres are units or sub-units for which EV A will 
be measured and managed on an ongoing basis. The consolidated company is the ultimate 
EV A centre, and the aim is to increase EV A at that level as much as possible. Separating 
a company into cascading layers of EV A centres improves the line of sight of its 
managers and forges a closer link between decision and outcome . 
. Both New Clicks and the ill Group are well aware of the positive implications associated 
with dividing the entire company into individual EV A business units. The JD Group has 
divided the company up into EV A units from top management level all the way down to 
store management level. In total fourteen (14) EVA units exist and these units make up 
the entire Group. The company divides the group up into EV A units which make 
business sense for all practical uses of the EV A financial management system. 
The New Clicks group, in contrast to the JD Group, has a clear strategy for dividing the 
. group into individual EV A business units. Five categories of these units exist within each 
sub-group (i.e. subsidiary) of the group. Therefore five categories of EV A business units 
exist in the Clicks group, five in the Diskom group, five in the Priceline group, and five 
categories in the Music group. Twenty (20) EV A business units in total exist in the New 
Clicks group. The EVA units are listed below with an explanation of the composition of 
each: 
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Store: Each store is considered an EVA business unit. 
Region: A region comprises of 4-6 stores and is treated as an EVA business unit 
Area: An area consists of 4 or 5 regions and is treated as an EV A business unit. 
Chain: A chain consists of 4 or 5 areas and is treated as an EVA business unit. 
Group: A Group consists of 4 or 5 chains and is treated as an EV A business unit. 
Since early 1995, management within the New Clicks group has been setting EVA targets 
for each of the company's twenty business units as well as for the group as a whole. In 
many cases, EV A targeting goes down to sub-divisions within an EV A business unit. 
Wooltru group, in contrast to the JD Group and New Clicks, is not separated into layers 
of these units. Senior management realises that there are significant advantages in 
dividing the group into various units and again management intends to implement EV A 
.business units within the operating divisions of the organisation. 
Both the JD Group and the New Clicks group reported that managers of each EV A 
business unit receive monthly EV A reports, tracking performance against the target of the 
month, the year to date, and the prior year. Both companies believe that managers in each 
EV A business unit understand the utility of EV A as, it performs the duties of acting as a 
balance sheet and operating measure all in one. Continuous improvement and teamwork 
between interfacing units is vital for increasing the EV A in these two groups of 
companies. The staff members within the JD Group and New Clicks organisations are 
becoming increasingly aware of the drivers of EV A. Accordingly, there is better 
understanding of the business across the board of activities and the focus of the teams 
within the organisations has intensified. This results in a strong understanding of the 
implications of one EV A business unit on another which means that different EV A 
business units are now understanding the concept of improving performance by working 
together towards one common goal - the creation of economic value for the organisation 
as a whole. 
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8.6 Compensation Incentives - EVA as a' Motivator 
This section investigates whether the companies involved in the study understand the 
essence behind giving managers a bonus that is a share of the EV A added to the company 
over a fmancial period. 
The study questioned the participants as to whether bonuses were devised using 
traditional budgets or whether managers received bonuses based on EV A. Both the JD 
Group and New Clicks reported that EV A is the perfonnance measure used in 
detennining managerial incentive schemes. The JD Group emphasised EV A was the 
broad basis on which incentive schemes were based because it promoted consistency 
which is vital when devising incentive schemes. EV A as well as share incentive schemes 
are used as measures to motivate employees throughout the groups. Wooltru reported 
using traditional budgets for bonuses detennined largely by the perfonnance ofthe 
business unit itself, measured in operating profits, with some additional weighting for 
overall corporate results. The alignment in this plan is failing because earnings make no 
provision for the opportunity cost of equity capital and the impact of balance sheet 
management on true bottom line, with the result that some actions that increase 
accounting earnings actually destroy shareholder wealth. 
The EV A incentive system covers all salaried staff in the companies of the JD Group and 
New Clicks. This means that everybody within the organisation is dependant on whether 
or not value is created in the organisation. In 1995 New Clicks began its EV A incentive 
system. Senior management reported that some operating managers were sceptical about 
/ 
the move to EV A. Operating managers had learned how to succeed under the old system, 
which used after-tax earnings as the internal perfonnance measure. The new system was 
seen as a threat. Because of this uncertainty with which managers viewed the new 
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method, New Clicks let its operating managers take whichever bonus proved to be higher 
in 1995 (whether it be the EV A bonus or their bonus under the old system). Top level 
management did not have a choice, they went on EV A. As it turned out, the EV A bonus 
paid far more than the old incentive compensation. Because of the EVA's acceptance, a 
performance bonus system based on EV A has been extended to everyone in the group. 
The JD Group and New Clicks point out that the concept of being a stakeholder, that is of 
being responsible for and rewarded for adding economic value, is catching on right 
through the organisation. By using EV A bonus based incentives and EV A as a measure 
of performance, they solidly align the goals with the creation of shareholder wealth. 
EV A offers a means of measurement and communicating performance. The JD Group 
and New Clicks communicate such information on a monthly basis throughout the 
organisation. Presentations are made showing EV A creation to all members of the 
organisation. New Clicks reports that technology aids this process tremendously as a 
number of employees receive this information electronically via the internal company 
communication network. 
In theory, an EVA bonus plan makes managers one hundred percent accountable for the 
wealth created or destroyed within their particular business unit (Ehrbar, A. 1998). This 
means that if the EV A of a particular business unit is destroyed, (e.g. by a loss in the 
disposal of a fixed asset) this affects the economic value of the business unit and as a 
result EVA is destroyed. Therefore, there is an incentive compensation for what 
managers are directly accountable for and what they are not directly accountable for. The 
JD Group and New Clicks have incentives based on the above theoretical framework and 
emphasise that managers in their organisations know that the only way they can make 
themselves better off is by creating more wealth for the shareholders. They also know 
that they will share in any wealth they do create. 
Managers of the JD Group and New Clicks get an unlimited share of EVA 
improvements, but bonuses can also be negative. The absence of bonus caps is made 
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possible by holding back part of the bonus earned in very good years and making it 
subject to loss if EVA subsequently falls. This 'holding back part of the bonus' is the 
function performed by the 'Bonus-Bank', and ensures that managers collect bonuses only 
for sustained improvements in EVA. The 'Bonus-Banking' principal is a mechanism 
which lengthens the planning horizons of managers, since they know that ensuring short-
term performance will not do them any good if it harms longer-term results. Banking 
levels out bonus payments in that employee's build up bank balances in good years and 
draw down on them in poor years. Every employee is subject to this 'banking 
mechanism' in the New Clicks group but in the JD Group only managers at the highest 
corporate level adhere to the principle. The JD Group proclaims that the 'bonus-bank' 
acts as a set of "golden-handcuffs" for highly successful managers because any 
uncollected bank balance is fortified if a manager resigns. This "banking" feature 
genuinely having something at risk, is what the New Clicks and the JD Group believes 
transforms managers into owners. Because Wooltru does not use an EVA incentive 
compensation scheme, the above principle does not apply. 
An important aspect of EV A incentive systems is that performance targets are set 
according to a formula. Therefore, managers in New Clicks and the JD Group earn their 
target bonus when the Rand increase in EV A is equal to an expected improvement. This 
is similar to the performance target in conventional plans, but with two crucial 
differences. Firstly, the annual amount expected improvement typically is present for 
periods for five years instead of being negotiated annually. Secondly, the base to which 
expected improvement is added is automatically reset up or down each year in line with 
actual experience. The bonus formula that the JD Group and New Clicks use states that, 
the EV A target is the EVA generated in the prior year. Therefore, if EV A is just 
maintained at its current level, the managers will earn a target bonus each year. This is 
very fair because EV A may not be growing even though the business is. If EV A rises, 
managers will qualify for an exceptionally good bonus. By doing so they also force the 
EVA target to be reset that much higher for the next year. 
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As mentioned before, all employees in the JD Group have their bonuses determined by 
EVA and therefore one hundred percent of their bonus is variable. In the New Clicks 
Group however, although all employees are subject to bonuses based on EVA, the higher 
the management level the higher the stakes of having something at risk. Top management 
level has bonuses that are one hundred percent dependant on EV A and therefore their 
bonuses are totally variable. Lower levels of employees however, have 70% of their 
bonuses dependant on company EVA performance (and therefore variable) and 30% of 
the bonus is fixed. The interests of all stakeholders are aligned because a performance 
bonus system based on economic value has been extended to everyone in the groups of 
New Clicks and the JD Group. At Woolltru, all employees have their bonuses based on 
company performance, however company performance is based on budgets and not EV A. 
The JD Group and New Clicks wholeheartedly believe that their incentive schemes based 
on EV A ultimately lead to the attraction, retention and motivation of key executives 
which are vital for adding economic value to an organisation. Wooltru believes that their 
incentive schemes which involve stock options and other equity-linked compensation 
devices are equally attractive in attracting, retaining and motivating key executives 
1;towever, the interests of all stakeholders are not as effectively aligned as they are in the 
New Clicks group and the JD Group, emphasising the advantages of the EVA incentive 
based bonus plans. 
What every company wants is a culture of continuous improvement, responsibility, and 
accountability. Enlightened companies want their employees to feel involved, to be 
creative, and to welcome change. Companies want to instil an ownership culture that 
eliminates the need to constantly control behaviour from higher management levels. To 
achieve this New Clicks and the JD Group have implemented EVA incentive based 
bonus plans, which they believe, objectively, predictably and continuously rewards 
managers for creating shareholder wealth and penalises them for destroying it. 
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8. 7 EVA as a Mindset 
For an EVA fmancial management system to be truly successful, a value-adding culture 
must exist within the organisation, where each and every employee understands the 
essence of EV A and realises how he can positively influence it within the organisation. 
There is no use of having an innovative fmancial measurement implemented within an 
organisation if the employees do not know how it works. 
The concept of EV A needs to be simplified so that even the most junior employees 
within the organisation understand the essence of adding economic value, only then does 
an EV A culture exist within the organisation. Both the JD Group and New Clicks 
reported that the development of an EV A culture within the organisation has been a 
major factor ascribing to the success of the EVA financial management system within 
those organisations. This culture has been created by simplifying the essence of EV A and 
applying it throughout the organisation by training all staff to think in terms of creating 
economic value. A great deal of resources are spent on teambuilding and the joint 
. processing of decisions and issues throughout both organisations. The companies believe 
that the net result is an unleashing of creativity and initiative at all levels throughout the 
organisation, which in turn results in a value adding culture throughout the organisation. 
People development is another important element of organisational development 
throughout both organisations. Both New Clicks and the JD Group see people 
development as a wide-ranging, ongoing process. These organisations defme people 
development as equipping staff with the necessary skills and resources to do the job of 
creating value, but equally important providing the correct environment for them to 
develop themselves. The management style encourages this approach as it is based on 
involvement, respect and devolution of power. Within the JD Group managers as well as 
lower ranking employees are all empowered by giving them a balance sheet to manage 
and, as a result increase the organisation's EVA by improving the balance sheet which 
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they are assigned to manage. This concludes that the employees in the organisation are 
becoming increasingly aware of the drivers of EV A. 
The JD Group and New Clicks continuously set up workshops and training programmes 
to keep employees focussed on creating economic value. It is vital that all employees 
throughout the organisation understand the concept of EV A and the affects that they 
personally can have on it. The New Clicks group reported that conflict in corporate 
culture between different sub-units negatively affected value creation. Sub-units of the 
group often develop their own corporate culture. This becomes a problem when the main 
goal of the entire group (i.e. EV A) is jeopardised. It therefore becomes vital that all the 
sub-units within the group completely understand that the goal of increasing EV A is the 
central purpose of operation. To ensure that all sub-units have the same understanding, a 
philosophy referred to by the group as 'hands and brains' was implemented. This 
philosophy encourages suggestions and debates by employees. The programme consisted 
of three legs: 
1. A change in sub-group leadership occurred. 
2. A change of agents within the organisation occurred - this resulted in people emitting 
positivness and not negativness (this process brought about the same desired results 
as leg 1 above however, it is associated with lower management levels). 
3. Live television conferences to entire staffbody. 
Leg three involves top management within New Clicks emitting a live television 
broadcast on a monthly basis, to all employees of the entire group. This broadcast 
divulges all group information pertaining to EV A. Through this live television broadcast 
all employees are informed as to exactly how the group as a whole is performing against 
the monthly EV A target. This broadcast encourages employees to make suggestions and 
therefore results in greater participation at a strategic level. Furthermore, this exercise 
results in the ironing-out of problems associated with different cultures within the same 
group. Employees begin to see more clearly that different business units within the group 
are partners and not rivals. Synergies between companies within the business group have 
a number of important advantages in creating group EV A. This exercise clearly- illustrates 
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this concept to all employees and creates a culture with an obsessive need to 
communicate. 
Wooltru, in contrast to the other two companies does not have an EVA culture. The only 
employees that receive formal training involving the mechanics of EV A are the top 
financial managers, this is because EV A is an issue that only top management level deals 
with. The top financial team at Wooltru consists of four key members. These members 
have all undergone a formal theoretical training course however, they are the only 
members within the organisation who understand the essence and mechanics of EV A. 
The only communication of EV A changes within the group exists at board level. This 
results in a far more 'closed' organisation where mangers and employees are less 
informed. It would appear that the culture within W ooltru is such that issues involving 
value creation are only matters concerning the highest management level. Employees are 
uninformed and uneducated as to what exactly EV A is and how it could directly 
influence them. 
8.8 Summary 
This chapter served to focus on the present understanding and application of the EV A 
financial management system by three selected large retail groups (New Clicks Ltd, JD 
Group Ltd, and Wooltru Ltd.) within South Africa. This was done by focussing on five 
separate aspects concerning the system, namely: the general EV A orientation within the 
chosen retail groups, financial performance measures used, group managerial practices 
and issues, compensation incentive issues and an analysis of the EVA-culture within the 
selected groups. 
All three retail groups define EV A as a measure of corporate performance that comes 
closer than any other to capturing true economic performance by subtracting a capital 
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charge from the company's operating profits. This is a universally accepted definition for 
EV A and it shows that senior management within all the companies understands the 
essence of EVA.. Both the JD Group and New Clicks have fully implemented the 
fmancial management system throughout all levels of the organisation. Wooltru has only 
implemented the management system at senior management level. This indicates that 
although the management system is used by all three retail groups, greater priority is 
given to EVA financial management issues in the JD Group and New Clicks than in the 
Wooltru group. This concludes that the goal of EVA (i.e. greater shareholder wealth 
creation) is reached with greater ease in the JD Group and New Clicks. 
All three companies reported using EV A and MY A exclusively to measure fmancial 
perfonnance. They have a clear understanding of how these concepts differ. 
The third section of the study provided insight into how the companies have managed 
their organisations with the aim of improving EV A. It appears that managerial decisions 
are made using EVA as the primary benchmark. Technology has greatly aided these 
. companies in improving EV A and is seen as a major EV A driver. The benchmark used in 
detennining whether capital investments were executed or not was detennined on 
whether the investment would result in a positive impact on the EV A of the company in 
question. Despite the fact that the impact on EV A is the primary concern, it is not the 
only measure used in analysing an investment project. The more traditional measures of 
NPV and IRR are measures used in conjunction with EVA in New Clicks and Wooltru. 
The JD Group uses EVA exclusively in detennining whether projects are executed or not 
as it believes in using one perfonnance measure in deciding on capital investments as 
opposed to an array. Wooltu also reported using measures including: the investments 
contribution to earnings, the impact on headline earnings and the impact on earnings per 
share. New Clicks and the JD Group divide the entire group into independent EV A 
business units. The sole purpose of this is to manage the entire company through smaller 
units. This provides for greater transparency throughout the organisation, and indicates 
whether particular units are creating wealth or destroying it. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
The fourth section of the questionnaire dealt with issues relating to aspects of 
compensation incentives. A major initiative of the EVA financial management system is 
to revitalise and redirect managerial incentives. The EV A incentive bonus system covers 
all salaried staff in the companies of the JD Group and New Clicks. This means that 
everybody within these organisations is dependant on whether or not value is created in 
the organisation. The concept of being a stakeholder is catching on right through these 
organisations. By using EV A bonus based incentives and EV A as a measure of 
performance, they align the goals with the creation of shareholder wealth. Wooltru, uses 
traditional budgets for bonuses determined largely by the performance of the business 
unit itself, measured in operating profits, with some additional weighting for overall 
corporate results. The alignment in this plan is failing because, earnings make no 
provision for the opportunity cost of equity capital and the impact of balance sheet 
management on true bottom line, with the result that some actions that increase 
accounting earnings actually destroy shareholder wealth. 
For an EVA financial management system to be truly successful, a value-adding culture 
must exist within the organisation, where every employee understands the essence of 
EVA and realises how he can positively influence it within the organisation. Both the JD 
Group and New Clicks report that the development of an EV A culture within the 
organisation has been a major factor ascribing to the success of the EVA fmancial 
management system within those organisations. The result of creating an EV A culture 
throughout the organisation is an unleashing of creativity and initiative at all levels 
throughout the organisation. Wooltru, does not have an EV A culture, because EV A is an 
issue that only top management level deals with. The only employees that receive formal 
training involving the essence of EV A are the top financial managers. This negatively 
impacts the benefits of managing the company using the EV A financial management 
system. 
The EV A financial management system is a means of managing a company with the sole 
intention of creating shareholder wealth. This system is the key to creating real wealth 
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but for this to occur, it needs to be entrenched throughout the organisation and all 
employees, not just senior management must be aware of the value-adding drivers. 
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Chapter 9 
Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
9.1 Introduction 
The final chapter comprises of three sections. The first section provides a summary of the 
various chapters of this study, in which the main findings are given. The second section 
comprises a number of conclusions drawn from the literature and empirical investigation. 
The third and fmal section entails a number of recommendations for further study and. 
practical EV A financial management implementation. 
9.2 Summary 
The summary of the study is given in order of the chapters. 
9.2.1 Introduction 
Basic corporate finance and micro economic theory indicate that the primary financial 
directive of any firm ought to be to maximise the wealth of the shareholders. EV A is 
about looking at the value created by the company instead of just the profits. The 
organisation that fails to take this relatively new performance measure into account could 
be destroying shareholder wealth without even realising it. Based on this background this 
study was undertaken to examine EV A and the practical implementation thereof in three 
selected large retail groups within South Africa. 
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9.2.2 EVA Background and Analysis 
This chapter introduced the concept of EV A and provided some insight into the 
background and history. It indicated that EVA as a fmancial performance measure has 
received great praise and acceptance from the business press as well as from hundreds of 
companies, including many multi-national companies throughout the world. EV A 
represents a genuine revolution in management because it is a new and fundamentally 
better answer to the age-old problem of how to align the interests of agents with 
principles, of how to bind managers and employees to the will of shareholders. 
EV A is similar to conventional measures of profit but with two important differences: 
EV A considers the cost of capital and it is not constrained by the generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) that govern corporate fmancial reporting. EV A corrects 
possible distortions caused by GAAP and therefore the user can abandon any accounting 
principles that are viewed as distorting the measurement of wealth creation. EV A is not . 
another form of downsizing or the financial version of re-engineering. It is a fundamental 
way of measuring and managing corporate performance. Implementing the financial 
measurement system often results in a number of challenges. To implement EVA 
properly, it must be kept simple and accountable. To make it simple it must become the 
focal point for managing the business. 
9.2.3 The EVA Calculation 
This chapter explains the mechanics involving the EVA calculation. EVA is a company's 
after tax profits from operations minus the cost of capital to produce those profits. The 
concept of EV A is so revealing because it takes into account a factor no other 
conventional measures include: the cost of operating capital- not just the cost of debt but 
the cost of equity as well. To accurately calculate a company's EVA a number of 
adjustments need to be made to the company's GAAP financial statements. Interest 
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expense is treated as a non-operating expense in the EVA calculation. It is removed from 
the NOPAT calculation since the interest is related to financing activities and therefore 
shown in the cost of capital. Interest income is generally included in NOPAT because it is 
offset by a charge on the cash on the balance sheet that generates the interest. EV A uses 
gross accounts receivable and recognises only actual write-downs due to defaults not 
accrued bad debt expense. In doing an adjustment for this, the actual write-downs of 
receivables correlates with what is in NOPAT. At the same time gross receivables is used 
to calculate the capital charge. Amortisation of goodwill is not incorporated for EVA 
calculations. Stem and Stewart's most radical departure from GAAP is the treatment of 
gains and losses on disposals. For Stem and Stewart, the focus is on the entity's total 
'invested capital' and not on the corresponding component assets. This is a radical 
departure from GAAP. Extraordinary items, such as plant close downs and restructuring 
costs that occur on a once-off basis, and that are expected to yield benefits in the future, 
are treated not as an operating expense in the current period, but rather as an investment 
(or disinvestment) in the business. 
A comprehensive example is included which numerically shows all the adjustments 
made to correctly calculate EV A. 
9.2.4 EVA: The Essence of a Good Financial Performance Measure 
This chapter provided an overview into the understanding of what a good financial 
performance measure entails. The chapter further revealed that EV A is indeed the 
essence of a good performance measure. EV A measures more important financial 
elements and can tell management more than other performance measures. Many 
companies are using a number of measures to express financial goals and objectives. 
EV A eliminates this confusion by using a single fmancial measure that links all decision 
making with a common focus. It is a concept that can be implemented in virtually every 
type of company. 
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Despite the enthusiasm with which many companies have embraced EV A, it is not a new 
idea. EVA is basically a variant of Residual Income (RI), however RI is criticised for a 
number of reasons whereas EV A corrects these earlier criticisms launched at RI. 
Earnings, EPS, and earnings growth are misleading measures of corporate performance 
and EVA fulfils a number of their shortfalls. Earnings are diminished by accounting 
entries that have nothing to do with recurring cash flow, and are charged with such value-
building capital outlays as R&D, all in an attempt to win over lenders' desire to assess 
liquidation value. EPS at best measures only the quantity of earnings, but the quality of 
earnings reflected in the PIE multiple matters, too. Quick earnings growth can be 
manufactured by pouring capital into substandard projects, but earning an adequate return 
is far more important than growing quickly. 
Paying dividends does not enhance the total return received by investors over a period of 
time but paying dividends may deprive worthwhile projects of capital or force the 
company to incur unnecessary transaction costs, and because boards of directors usually 
loathe to cut the dividend except in the most dire circumstances, dividends become an . 
additional and unnecessary fixed cost of running the business. Returning excess cash 
through periodic share repurchases, or a large, one-time, special dividend is likely to be 
more rewarding than paying out a stream of dividends over a period of time. 
9.2.5 The EVA Incentive Plan 
EV A has tremendous potential to drive performance. The way in which a company 
incorporates EVA into an incentive plan (i.e. having bonuses based on the contribution to 
a company's EVA) and the degree to which it takes the characteristics of its people-
both senior management and lower level workers - into account is critical. Every 
company needs an incentive system that clearly, objectively, predictably, and 
continuously rewards managers for creating shareholder wealth and penalises them for 
destroying it. This is precisely what the EV A incentive plans do. 
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9.2.6 EVA's correlation with Stock Prices 
It has been asserted that stock-prices and EVA show a remarkable tendency to move up 
and down together. However, studies reviewed for the purpose of this chapter reveal 
conflicting result and Chen and Dodd (1997) claim that although improving EV A 
measures will likely lead to a better stock return, the payoff may not be as desirable as 
promised by EV A supporters. 
9.2.7 Market Value Added (MV A) and comparison with EVA 
This chapter revealed that whilst EVA is an evaluation of a company's internal 
performance, MY A is the best assessment of the external performance of a company. 
. MY A is a significant summary assessment of corporate performance, one that shows how 
successful a company has been in allocating, managing, and re-deploying scarce 
resources to maximise the NPV of the enterprise and the wealth of its shareholders. 
Continuous increases in EV A are rewarded with increases in MY A, while declining EV A 
is punished with declining MY A. Collectively, the results drawn from the study of this 
chapter suggest that used together, EVA and MY A are effective performance measures 
that contain information about the quality of strategic decisions and serve as signals of 
strategic change. 
9.2.8 EVA Financial Management: Empirical results 
In this chapter an analysis was provided of how three (New Clicks Ltd, JD Group Ltd, 
and Wooltru Ltd.) selected groups in the retail industry of South Africa, understand the 
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concept of EV A and how these organisations apply the EV A financial management 
system in their organisations. 
All three retail groups define EV A as a measure of corporate performance that comes 
closer than any other to capturing true economic performance by subtracting a capital 
charge from the company's operating profits. This is a universally accepted definition for 
EV A and it shows that senior management within all the companies understands the 
essence ofEV A. Both the JD Group and New Clicks have fully implemented the EVA 
financial management system throughout all levels of the organisation. Wooltru however, 
has only implemented the management system at senior management level. This indicates 
that although the management system is used by all three retail groups, greater priority is 
given to EVA financial management issues in the JD Group and New Clicks than in the 
Wooltru group. This concludes that the goals of EVA (i.e. greater shareholder wealth 
creation) are reached with greater ease in the JD Group and New Clicks. 
It appears that managerial decisions are made using EV A as the primary benchmark 
throughout all three of the groups. Technology has greatly aided these companies in 
improving EV A and is seen as a major EV A driver. The benchmark used in determining 
whether capital investments were executed or not was determined on whether the 
investment would result in a positive impact on the EV A of the company in question. 
Despite the fact that the impact on EV A is the primary concern, it is not the only measure 
used in analysing an investment project. The more traditional measures ofNPV and IRR 
are measures used in conjunction with EVA in New Clicks and Wooltru. The JD Group 
uses EVA exclusively in determining whether projects are executed or not as it believes 
in using one performance measure in deciding on capital investments as opposed to an 
array. New Clicks and the JD Group divide the entire group into independent EV A 
business units. The sole purpose of this is to manage the entire company through smaller 
units. This provides for greater transparency throughout the organisation, and indicates 
whether particular units are creating wealth or destroying it. 
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A major initiative of the EV A fmancial management system is to revitalise and redirect 
managerial incentives. The EV A incentive bonus system covers all salaried staff in the 
companies of the JD Group and New Clicks. This means that everybody within these 
organisations is dependant on whether value is created in the organisation. The concept of 
being a stakeholder, genuinely having something at risk, has caught on right through 
these organisations. By using EV A bonus plans in conjunction with EVA as a measure of 
performance, they solidly align the goals with shareholder wealth. Wooltru uses 
traditional budgets for bonuses determined largely by the performance of the business 
unit itself, measured in operating profits with some additional weighting for overall 
corporate results. The alignment in this plan is failing because earnings make no 
provision for the opportunity cost of equity capital and the impact of balance sheet 
management on true bottom line, with the result that some actions that increase 
accounting earnings actually destroy shareholder wealth. 
For an EVA financial management system to be truly successful, a value-adding culture 
must exist within the organisation, where every employee understands the essence of 
EV A and realises how he can positively influence it within the organisation. The JD 
. Group and New Clicks report that the development of an EV A culture within the 
organisation has been a major factor leading to the success of the EV A fmancial 
management system within those organisations. The result of creating an EV A culture 
throughout the organisation is an unleashing of creativity and initiative at all levels 
throughout the organisation. Wooltru does not have an EVA culture because this is an 
issue that only top level management deals with. 
9.3 Conclusions 
The major conclusions of the study include: 
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• All three companies have a good understanding of EV A and realise that their most 
important goal must be to increase their companies' EV A. The companies included in 
the research understand the short-comings of traditional perfonnance measures 
including: EPS, earnings, earnings growth, and dividends, and therefore do not use 
these measures when analysing the financial perfonnance of their companies. 
• As a result of the JD Group and New Clicks having fully implemented the EVA 
financial management system throughout the organisation, the company is able to set 
goals, allocate capital, evaluate perfonnance and detennine bonuses using EV A as a 
benchmark. This means that all actions are perfonned with the sole intention of 
increasing the company's EVA. Wooltru has only implemented the management 
system at senior management level and as a result, the organisation is less focused on 
making business decisions that purely improve EV A. 
• Despite the enthusiasm with which these companies embrace EV A, the financial 
statements do not report on the measure. This shows that although these companies 
use EV A as the measure of wealth created or destroyed by management during a 
financial year and as a financial management tool, the concept is still not widely 
accepted in standard company financial reporting. This detracts from the acceptance 
of the financial perfonnance measure as shareholders are not infonned of value 
created or destroyed over a financial year by the company. 
• All three companies have a good understanding of the concept of MY A and how it 
essentially differs from EV A. The companies included in the study use both MV A 
and EV A as measures of perfonnance. MV A does have one short-coming in the 
South African market. The market is not totally efficient and therefore time-lags 
exist which detract from the validity of the concept as a perfonnance measure. 
• In order to continue to improve EV A, companies need to understand and interpret 
infonnation. This ensures that scarce resources are allocated in such a way that EV A 
is not destroyed. For this to happen infonnation needs to be effectively managed. A 
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company's data must be stored and organised so that employees can access it easily 
and intuitively and act upon the findings effortlessly. Technology has greatly aided 
this process and as a result is seen as an EVA driver. 
• The JD Group and New Clicks use the EV A benchmark to analyse all capital 
investment decisions as well as potential acquisitions. This proves that the company's 
EVA is the main concern that drives each and every business decision. Wooltru uses 
traditional decision making tools to detennine what capital investments are made. 
These include: calculating the contribution to earnings that a project/acquisition 
makes, the impact on headline earnings and the impact on EPS. Wooltru, realises the 
limitations of these measures and intends using EV A as the benchmark in future. 
• Should GAAP distort the measurement of capital or operating income, it is adjusted 
as necessary by the organisations. A possible 160 adjustments exist according to 
Stem Stewart & Co. however making too many adjustments overcomplicates the 
measure and simplicity is the key to the success of the measure. All the respondents 
make adjustments for: interest expenses, leases, goodwill, gain/loss on asset sales, 
restructuring costs and employee training. The rationale for making the adjustments 
is to: better reflect value creation and motivate the right value creating behaviour, 
separate operating from non-operating and financing items, extend the matching of 
revenues and expenses and minimise the opportunities for management to 
manipulate reported perfonnance. 
• For the successful implementation of an EV A fmancial management system, an 
optimal structure of EV A units must exist. Separating the company into these layers 
has the effect of improving the line of sight of its managers and forges a closer link 
between decision and outcome. Furthennore the company achieves greater 
transparency and is able to determine which business units are creating shareholder 
wealth and which units are destroying it. Both New Clicks and the JD Group divide 
the entire company into individual business units. Wooltru is not separated into layers 
of EV A business units. 
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• A major initiative of the EVA financial management system is to revitalise and 
redirect managerial incentives. The JD Group and New Clicks believe that the right 
way to motivate managers is by giving them a bonus that is a share of EV A. They 
believe that this is the way to motivate them to create value and make them think and 
behave more like owners. The EV A incentive system covers all salaried staff in these 
companies. At Wooltru, all employees have their bonuses based on company 
performance however, company performance is based on budgets and not EV A. 
• The concept of EV A has been simplified throughout the organisations of the JD 
Group and New Clicks. Each and every employee including the most junior of 
employee's understands the essence of EV A. The development of an EV A culture 
within the organisation has been a major factor leading to the success of the EV A 
financial management system within those organisations. 
• The EV A financial management system is a means of managing a company with the 
sole intention of creating shareholder wealth. This system is the key to creating real 
wealth if employed at all levels throughout the organisation. 
9.4 Recommendations 
The recommendations of the study are as follows: 
• To effectively implement the EV A financial management system in a company, a 
commitment to EV A is required from senior management. This commitment should 
be translated into an EVA policy. This policy should not only drive future events but 
should assist in creating an EV A corporate culture. 
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• An EV A fmancial management system should be established in each organisation. It 
is a fundamentally better way of measuring fmancial performance and can be 
implemented effectively in all types of organisations. This system should be designed 
so that a company's value creating performance is regularly evaluated to determine 
whether in fact the organisation is fulfilling its primary goal of adding wealth to the 
shareholders. 
• Any attempts to embark on an EV A financial management strategy should be backed 
by a commitment to a total EV A improvement process at all levels of the 
organisation. It is therefore important to have ~e entire organisation divided up i~to 
individual EV A business units. This creates greater transparency throughout the 
entire organisation and makes it easier to determine which business units are creating 
wealth and which units are destroying it. 
• EV A and MV A are both performance measurements that should be used in 
conjunction with each other. It is vital that management understands how these two 
measures essentially differ as well as the short comings associated with MV A. 
• Management should have a clear understanding of all EV A drivers and use these to 
positively impact on the EVA of the company. 
• A number of adjustments need to be made to the GAAP financial statements of a 
company to accurately calculate a company's EVA. According to Stem Stewart & 
Co. a possible 160 adjustments exist but most companies mcike between five and 
fifteen. The key to using EV A is its simplicity, making too many adjustments 
overcomplicates the measure. This is fundamental when dealing with EV A. 
• Two reasons exist for making adjustments to GAAP: (1) conventions do not define 
the true economics of a business, (2) the rationale for making the adjustment is to: 
separate operating from non-operating and financing items, extend the matching of 
revenues and expenses, better reflect value creation and motivate the right value 
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creating behaviour and minimise the opportunities for management to manipulate 
reported performance. 
• A major initiative of the EVA financial management system is to revitalise and 
redirect managerial incentives. All companies that use this fmancial management 
system should employ the EV A based bonus plan. This is the right way to motivate 
managers to create value and think and behave more like owners. Managers get an 
unlimited share of EV A improvements, but bonuses can also be negative. This aligns 
the interests of management with the interests of the shareholders as managers realise 
that the only way that they will be better off is by adding EV A. 
• EV A offers a means of measurement and communicating performance. It is vital that 
companies using the financial management system communicate company 
performance on a monthly basis and compare it to targets as well as previous 
performance levels. 
• The study points out the numerous advantages of managing a company using the 
EV A financial management system. Companies wishing to develop an EV A financial 
management system should start such efforts without hesitation. 
Recommendations for further study include: 
• The study contains an analysis of how companies in the retail 'sector have 
implemented the EV A financial management system. An analysis of how companies 
in other industries implement and use the management system would provide a more 
comprehensive view of how various industries use the management system and 
would also provide a basis for comparison. 
• Determining the correlation between the company's EVA and share price would 
provide meaningful insight into whether or not there is a significant correlation 
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between the two in the local market (JSE). Little empirical research has been done on 
whether or not a correlation between the two exists and the research that has been 
done presents conflicting results. 
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APPENDIX A 
5 Year IiYoar SVDllr 
1998 1997 5YIIlIr 1197 1997 flYear Avarag& Average Av.r.lgII 
MVA MYA 1997 Changll IIIB1'k11t Toml 1997 Ohange Retumon Proflt CapItal 
Rank RanJc Company MYA MVA ValU& Capul EVA EVA CapItal Index Growth 
1 2 SA Breweries 25,626 14,095 44,769 19,142 a05 393 19.4% 1.2 18.3% 
2 1 Anglo American 12,500 9,770 53,523 41.022 N/A N/A NtA NlA 14.5% 
3 14 Dimension Data 9.173 B.990 11,596 2 ,424 N/A N1A NlA NlA 163.2% 
4 6 Rembrandt Group 7,211 (1,6f13} 20,354 13.153 (1,2BO) (865) 12.3% 0.6 15.8% 
5 43 Bidve!t Group 6,794 6.671 9,310 ~.51e (97) (98) 15.8% 0.9 54.8% 
6 NlA Blillten PLC 6,528 N/A 32,14B 25,620 N/A NlA N/A N/A NlA 
7 12 TlgarOals 6,267 1,774 11,B03 5.636 68 7 18.0% 1.0 10.1% 
8 6 SASOL 6.250 13,779 32,231 25,981 (590) 674 13.£1% 0,7 8.9% 
9 19 Imperial Holdings 6,105 U27 10,286 4,161 (83) (91) 21.8% 1.3 84.0% 
10 13 Persetel Q-Oata 5.318 NlA 8,314 2,998 N1A Nt" NlA NlA 627.7% 
11 16 Johnnies Industrial 4,935 N/A 8,048 3,113 (257) (3111) 11.6% 0.6 2.8% 
12 I!I Gold Fields 4,170 1,01B 8.039 3,869 N/A NlA N1A N/A 8.3% 
13 10 Nampak 4,092 1,646 1,110 3,616 52 82 19.5% 1.0 10.6% 
14 20 Adcock Ingram 3,948 2,340 5299 1,351 127 81 33.8"1.. 1,8 42.0% 
15 17 Woollru 3,791 3,030 B,843 3.052 43 66 25.0% 1.4 22.5% 
16 15 CGSmlth 3,744 1,454 16,607 12.864 (39) (10) 17.1% 0.9 9.7% 
17 24 CluirtarPLC 3,5D1 495 6,:m 2.717 283 315 21 .2% 1.7 3.9% 
18 S1 Pepkor 3,346 1,821 6,813 3,267 NlA N/A N1A NlA 8e.8% 
1Q 45 ShQPrtt$ HQldings 3,343 2.11$4 4,285 942 79 200 25.0% 1.5 26.80/. 
20 22 NaslDllllle PelS 3.328 NlA 4,920 1,592 (33) NlA 23.7% 1,4 40,6% 
21 27 MIH Holdinga · 3.313 NlA 3,717 405 601 NlA 156.3% 2.0 (79.1%) 
22 9 Anglo American Gold 3,236 782 4,507 ~.27' NfA NlA NlA NlA 6.0% 
23 56 Amalgamated Bev Ina 3.077 1.2il0 3,922 845 (8) (:25) 21.D% 1.2 12.2% 
24 4'1 Metro Ca&h 8. carry 3,029 2,660 3,geB 937 {14) (5) 17.7% 0.9 13.8% 
25 47 Pi;k 'n pay SlOre$ 2.741 1,373 3.418 fI77 61 66 22.B'I. 1.1 5.8% 
26 29 African Oxygen 2.687 378 4,531 1,844 74 60 21.0% 1.3 12.5% 
27 38 Cadbury Schweppe$ 2,624 1,092 3,272 648 13 1D 22.6% 1.2 17.7% 
28 3.4 Barlow 2,314 2.151 12,917 10,603 (480) 49 10.6% D.6 (1 .6%) 
29 28 PG & ShlitterpNfio 2,255 1,496 4,420 2,165 122 164 24.1% 1.4 14.3% 
30 48 PrtmedJa 2,201 NfA 4,433 2,232 N/A NfA NfA N/A 285.3% 
31 46 Tongallt Hulett Group 2,186 3,864 6,487 4,3D2 (210) 304 10.!W. 0.5 5.9% 
32 26 Edgars Stores 2,174 (35) 4,616 2,341 17 (68) 23.2% 1.4 18.5% 
33 68 JD Group 1,875 2.047 3,680 1,605 (36) (32) 19.7% 0.9 27.9% 
34 39 Foschini 1,847 (75) 3,229 1.383 (50) (92) 22.lr'k 1.3 1D.B% 
35 144 New Africa Investments 1,792 NlA 4,598 2,806 NlA NlA N/A N/A 213.5% 
36 59 PEP LimMd 1,152 257 2 ,852 1,070 (1) (50) 21 .9% 1,3 Hi.O'" 
37 31 Premier Group 1,776 (403) 5,287 4,511 (211) (84) 16.15% O.B 12.9% 
38 '!iT Trencor 1,696 (504) 3,628 1,932 (26) (37) 18.5% 1.1 18.4% 
39 53 Suncrush 1,498 476 1,807 309 (2) (19) 20.8% 1.1 9.2% 
40 NtA SuperGroup 1,421 NlA 2,514 1,093 (18) NtA 16.9% O.B 1585.S% 
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6 Year 5 Year 6Y.., 
1998 1997 $ Year 1891 1997 5 Year Av .... ge I\VI!Irage A~9\1 
MVA MVA 1997 Changa Mancet Total 1997 Chlll'lg$ Ret\lmon Profit CapHBI 
Rank RZlnk Company MVA MVA VIIlWl Capital EVA EVA Capital Index Growth 
41 81 Ellerine Holdings 1,421 1.369 2.393 972 19 1e 22.6% 0.2 20.2% 
42 57 Politi" f.365 N1A 4.043 2.687 50 N1A 22.5% 1.2 6.2% 
43 111 Protea Fumi5he~ 1.287 1.329 1.557 270 NIA NlA N/A N/A 24.3% 
44 104 lIIovoSugar 1.269 1.560 3.965 2.898 (0) 24 11.9% 0.1 22.3% 
45 54 CTP HDldings 1.226 1.213 1.825 599 e (3) 20.4% 1.3 16.5% 
46 NlA Datatec 1.191 N/A 1.4B2 291 (") NlA- 9.8% 0.6 525.1% 
47 85 MEGA' 1.142 449 1.750 61)7 6 1(1 82.2% 4.0 16.90/. 
46 60 New C5cks Holdillg$ 1.088 ~96 1.564 479 13 12 21.4% 1.1 26.5% 
49 18 Avmin 1.028 NlA 4.1gr 3.109 N/A NfA NlA NlA 316.2% 
50 NlA Rebhold 952 NlA 1.287 335 (9) N/A 12.6% O.B NlA 
51 NlA Avis South Africa 937 N/A 1.528 591 ~2 NlA 23.2% 1.8 20.4% 
52 n TlgerWhHIs 757 N/A 955 198 3 N/A 21.5% 0.6 18A% 
53 70 pta Port/and Cement 747 940 2.9~ 2.217 (175) 3 ".B% 0.6 5.2% 
54 60 M-Net 748 60 1.163 417 29 3 26.4% 1.6 33.4% 
55 79 Flntech 731 571 1.288 557 36 33 30.7% 1.5 37.3% 
56 50 ChromeCOTP Holdings 726 NIA 1.304 576 96 N/A 45.5% 1.0 41.0% 
57 62 Dia1ll1ers Corp 694 22Z 1.707 1,012 8 (1) 1B.8% 1.0 &.150/0 
58 137 Power Technologies 692 413 1.416 724 (38) 4 14.7% 0.7 8.7% 
59 52 Mccarthy RBtaJl 677 802 2.349 1.572 102 N/A 23.1% t.6 21.2% 
eo 35 tBM South AfriI:a 666 63D 969 291 39 1 30.5% 1.7 (0.2%) 
61 40 SA Ol'1.lggl$1& 667 83 1.999 1.332 22 54 16.3% 1.0 17.1W. 
62 176 Altech 618 (l11) 1.429 811 (21) (7) 15.2% O.B 8.4% 
63 41 Reunelt 612 (83) 1.887 1.275 (B8) (124) 20.5% 1.1 14.15% 
64- 85 Della Electrical I nd 598 285 862 264 26 20 25.6% 1.3 16.3% 
85 NlA Mustek 593 NlA 820 227 10 NlA 22.4% 1.2 NlA 
66 NlA Manex 644 NfA 721 171 (6) NlA 14.2% O.B 99.8% 
67 84 Chemical Servlce5 526 486 917 389 13 10 18.7% t.1 15.1t'~ 
66 NlA OTK Holdings 626 NlA 1.885 1.3116 (40) NlA 12.4% O.B NlA 
69 76 TirnesMedia 495 131 720 225 eo 39 36.7% 1.9 15.2% 
70 72 Pefllkorgroep 479 572 1.049 570 (15) (11) 18.1% 0.9 14.1% 
71 75 Unltran& 470 N/A 1.138 668 3 NlA 16.0% 0.6 (0.1%) 
72 109 Lelsurenet 455 NJA 7811 333 3 . NJA 19.1% 0.6 79.9% 
73 t2:l Mark.1s Group 452 50B 621 370 13 28 14.1% 1.0 13.8% 
74 97 Ocesna FIShing Group 370 305 582 213 44 41 31 .0"10 1.9 9.5% 
75 9S LTA 363 419 B99 537 14 8 20.50/, 1.1 24.0% 
76 53 Consol 2 352 (1.263) 2.233 , .8111 34 (38) 16.2% 1.0 B.4% 
77 134 TelJDY HoldingG 344 324 596 262 (12) (17) B.1~ 0.6 7.7% 
78 NIA Corpgro 339 N/A 612 174 19 N/A "0.7% 1.9 NlA 
79 88 Specialty Stores 321 308 716 396 (28) (30) 17.8% 1.0 27.0% 
60 75 ICS Holdins& 299 287 1,274 975 52 127 Hi.9% 0.9 8.8% 
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&Vear 5V .. r BV_ 
1998 1997 fiYear 1897 1997 5 Year AY8r.111111 Average Average 
MVA MVA 1997 Change IIbrket Total 1897 Change Ratumon Profit Capital 
Rank Rank Company MVA MVA ValUB Cllpltal EVA EVA Capital Indu' Growth 
81 71 SFW 298 697 ',405 1.107 (26) 3 13.3% 0.7 10.3% 
82 91 Hudaco Ind 294 11 "11 317 33 2:; 24.0% 1.4 2O.GQ/o 
83 25 Jel 274 NJA 4,972 4.699 N/A NlA NlA NJA 5.8% 
64 129 BrlL Am. Tobacco SA a 268 (17) 276 7 23 20 693.4% 10.2 NlA 
86 69 Medi-Clinic Corp 243 173 1.'127 985 (7) (5) 14.3% 1.0 43,6% 
86 N/A Macmtd HvaHh Care 242 N/A 365 122 6 !'of/A 24.7% 1A 116.5% 
117 N/A ChariDts 233 NlA ~20 287 17 NlA 28.1% 1.7 1452.&% 
88 101 Clinic Holdings 213 100 2 .105 1.891 (45) (67) 1S.1% 1..2 B2.9% 
89 147 Usko 213 N/A 465 252 10 N/A 24.6% 0,6 11.7% 
90 67 Kohler 210 NlA 1.819 1.409 (28) Nfl'. 15.5% 0.4 16.2% 
91 163 Ceramio Industries 206 NlA 357 152 (7) NlA 17e", 0.4 19,~ 
92 162 Portland Holdin", 188 261 aD7 319 38 27 26.7"" 1.6 16.8% 
93 NfA Grinaker Construction 182 NfA 604 4'12 (27) NlA 14.2% 0.7 NlA 
94 132 RhollX 181 227 376 197 N/A NlA NlA NlA 16,4% 
95 SA Ple9eey Corporation 165 NlA 802 697 (41) NlA 10.5% 0.3 53.8% 
96 NlA Basil Read Holdings 160 NlA 212 52 1 NlA 20.0% 1.1 (7.9%) 
97 81 City L.edge Hotels 151 (4) 500 349 3 N/A 17.6% 1.4 26,9% 
98 93 Newl/llit& 150 79 299 149 NlA. NlA NlA NlA (0.9%) 
99 90 Ozz 141l 147 454 305 (6) (10) 18.5% 1.0 21).1% 
100 og Foodcorp 149 (686) 1,474 1.325 (54) 18 14.0'" 0.8 4.7% 
101 121 Concor 144 176 380 237 (1) (2) 20.15% 1.2 28.9% 
102 148 WllGon Bayly Hlm-Ovc 141 NlA 310 168 e MIA 27.2% 0.7 14.7% 
103 102 Omnia Holdings 128 144 585 457 29 22 20.2% 1.3 11.4% 
104 140 Howden Africa Holdings 127 NlA 262 135 (6) N/A 18.4% 0.4 (23.6%) 
105 NlA Coestal Group 112 NlA 500 388 6 N/A 10.8% 1.3 1348.'7% 
106 117 Vortex Holdings 111 308 1.081 970 (57) 5 8.6'10 0.5 (1.4%) 
107 105 Bearing Man 99 108 267 188 7 9 24.9% 1.6 20.9% 
10B NlA Msatarfrillge 96 NlA 312 217 (6) NfA 15.8% 0.8 89.9% 
109 116 Telemetrix PLC 89 (354) 498 409 (57) (55) 20.2% 1.1 21.1% 
110 156 Indep, New!lpapers 89 NlA 1.002 91)4 (111) NlA 16.5% 0.9 84.9% 
111 125 VageistruisDUIt Metal 80 66 147 67 NlA N/A N/A NI" 3.6% 
112 130 Belt.oIe Br01hers 78 120 426 348 (43) 18 3.6% 0.2 (5.8%) 
113 124 Bateman Project 71 N/A 14& 79 10 NlA 3B.9% 1.0 48.1% 
114 N/A LlthO$8ver Syttem& 55 NlA 223 167 (1) NlA 18.1% 0.9 212.0% 
t15 160 Cullinan Holdings 46 169 209 163 (80) (9) (7.9%) (0.5) (6.7%) 
116 141 H~eI'lBtSA 44 N/A 1,004 960 (63) NlA 7.2% 0.2 12.8% 
117 133 UDII Match Co. 37 57 315 218 (11) (0) 18.4% 0.9 7.6% 
118 106 Sea Harvest Corp. 36 NlA 37~ 339 6 N/A 2:3.2% 1.2 10.7% 
119 145 TeHran 36 NlA 232 197 (7) NlA 16.4% 0.4 4 .0'/0 
f20 136 Cashbuild (0) (39) 117 117 (2) (5) 19.1% 1.2 28.8% 
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6 Year 6V.- SYear 
i9gs 1997 5 Year 1997 1997 G Year Average Averqe Average 
MVA MVA 1997 Cnange Market Total 1997 Change Return on Profit Capital 
Rank Rank Company MVA MVA Val~ Capital EVA EVA Capital In~lC Growth 
121 118 Edward L Bateman (5) (130) 351 356 (9) (18) 1U% 1.3 20.2% 
122 152 ChOioe Holdings (9) NlA 265 274 . (99) (99) 17.1% 1.4 184.9% 
123 NlA Sabveat (12) NlA 147 159 (8) NIA 13.80/. 0.6 168.6% 
124 N/A ConsoL Afex Corp. (15) Nt A 145 160 (1S) N/A 7 .0% 0.4 25.5% 
125 136 CrookesBrothers (20} 14 133 Hi3 (13) (11) 12.8% 1.3 11.9% 
126 NfA Fralex (22) N/A 269 290 19 Nt A 23.8% 1.3 (11.0%) 
127 103 Gri,.aker t-IoIding& (26) 78 600 625 (5~) 21 21.9% 1.1 7.4% 
126 161 Laser Transport Hlds (26) NfA 147 173 (6) (7) 11 .4% 0.8 40.0% 
129 126 Island View Holdings (29) NlA 281 310 (25) N/A 13.0% 0.15 0.4% 
130 89 Canadian Overseas Pkg (38) (182) 929 966 (124) (93) 9 .3% 0.5 13.7% 
131 131 A$$oo. 01'& & Metal Cor (40) 216 936 37(1 NlA NlA NJA NlA (2.3%) 
132 119 Bell Equipmltnt (40) .N/A 319 360 (9) NlA 13.5% 0.4 13.5% 
133 32 Mlllbllk (41) (1.476) 2.053 2.093 (542) (4l3) 14.0% 0.7 (6.2%) 
134 135 Gallagher Estate Hills (40) NlA 113 158 (64) N/A (21.3%) (0.9) (111.5%) 
135 49 Kersaf Investments (56) (1.557) 4,625 4.080 (265) (270) 16.8% O.B 9.7% 
136 165 Gubb and Ing9\> (57) 10 159 216 (i9) (15) 5.2% 0 .4 6.8% 
137 NlA Stocks Hotelll & Resorts (62) NlA 148 210 (25) NfA 6.9% 0.4 NfA 
13B 114 !"reaMed (133) (141) 214 2n (0) (2) 23.4% 1.5 64.0,," 
139 154 NEI Africa Holdings (68) 55 218 286 (17) 4 6.S% 0.3 7.8~ 
140 126 Bataman Industrial Corp (72) N/A 124 196 (19) NlA 0.4% 0.0 2.8% 
141 115 Lenco Holdings (73) (172) 411 484 (25) (40) 16.3% 1.0 17,4% 
142 180 Monteagle Soolete Ano (78) NJA 9B 175 (17) (10) 7.2% 0.4 17.6% 
143 !'I/A Don Group (83) N/A 101 184 (24} NlA (1.7%) (0.1) 39.9"'" 
144 82 DOlby! (89) B86 1,214 1,303 (121) 12 6.7% 0 .4 (1.3%) 
145 167 cementation 00. (Afri~ CSe) 25 89 159 (18) 5 6.D% 0.4 0.8% 
146 56 Siitelt (95) (349) 308 403 N/A NlA NIA NlA 10.2% 
147 171 Medex (107) NlA 168 286 (37) (24) 0.15% 0.0 16.7% 
1048 169 Soheorrtghul841n Holdings (108) (179) 301 409 1 (12) 26.7% 1.6 31.1% 
149 179 Toea Holdings (106) (119) 185 293 (25) (29) 8.15% 0.5 35.7% 
150 127 Group FiVe Holdings (111) 97 443 554 (51) (18) 8.9% 0.5 (1.7%) 
151 74 Grintek (112) (228) 519 631 (28) 0 27.9% 1.5 19.7% 
152 94 Langeherg Holdings (117) (954) 45B 576 (~) (92) 16.9% 1.0 B.3% 
153 159 Karos Hotel$ (12 8) (57) 205 334 (39) (19) 4.9% 0.3 11.7% 
154 182 Amalgamatlld Retail (136) 82 712 849 (57) (3) 7.5% 0.5 15.3% 
155 173 Bolton Ind. Holdi~1I (137) (156) 167 304 (34) 2 8.0% 0.4 10.6% 
156 170 Mettlir Inve!ltment$ (1a7) (56) 219 356 {7) (5) 19.1% 1.1 13.5% 
157 122 Boumat (143) (44) 226 369 (46) (35) 11 .0% 0.7 12.1% 
158 1S0 Conshu Holdings (176) (80) 175 350 (44) (39) 13.3% 0.8 5.7% 
1a9 167 T & N Holdin9\> (186) (100) 280 466 (16) (2) 17.6% 1.1 ~2.1!I% 
160 95 Consol. Metallurgical (189) (25) 526 714 (74) (33) 14.10/. 0.9 7.1% 
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S Year 5 Year 5 Year 
1998 1997 5 'fear 1997 1iB7 6 Year Average A~gD AftrAge 
MVA MVA 1997 Cnanll8 Mmm Tat;al 1997 Chane- RetllrTl on profit Capital 
Rank fWlk Company MVA MVA Value Capital evA EVA Capital Index Growth 
161 t74 Unlspln Holdings (193) (127) 224 417 (A7) 2S 6.0&% 0.3 1a.e% 
162 100 Bonnita Holdings (1S5) N/A 270 46-4 (40) NlA 15.0% 0.7 2.6% 
183 181 Gold Fields Namibia (212) (3) 34 245 N/A NlA NlA NlA (0.3%) 
164 176 Pillet> (219) (131) 87 305 (37) (34) 12.4% 0.6 14.4% 
185 183 Romatelt (219) 116 73 292 (B1) (21) 5.3% O.S (8.9"') 
11515 163 Stocks & Stoeks (221) (77) 625 846 (58) N/A 12.3% 0.8 23.6% 
167 184 De Gama Textile (228) (85) 120 348 (4(1) (25) 9.0&% n.s 4.0% 
168 112 Griffin Shipping Hide (234) NlA 8BO 784 15 N1A 17.0% 1.1 29.3% 
169 188 Assoc. FLlrnlture (245) (89) 270 515 (95) (SO) 10.29":' 0 .5 2.8% 
170 83 Irvin & JOhnson (246) (1 .093) 879 1.125 (46) (42) 12.6% 0.7 12.5% 
171 151 Grindrod Unicorn Group (260) (102) 910 1.171 3 29 14.3% 0.9 16.7% 
172 30 Lonrho PL.C (269) 3.649 14.806 15.075 (889) 614 7.3% 0.5 0.7% 
173 177 Koloeus Holding" (299) NlA 333 63:Z (:33) NlA 10.3% 0 .7 6.3% 
174 107 Housewares Group (336) NlA 129 465 (36) NlA 22.7% 1.1 67.6% 
175 172 Me1kor Group (350) 156 1,233 1.582 (97) 71 6.3% 0.5 1.1% 
176 186 Ooeana Investment (371) (656) 323 695 (~) (50) 3.4% 0.2 16.2% 
177 189 Slt2raellnvestment (512) (351) 1.178 1.890 (164) (135) 16.3% 1.0 49.6% 
176 191 Ralnbow Chicken (Ci14) N/A 907 1,421 (368) NlA (11 .3%) (0.7) 40.r-k 
179 86 Alphll (533) 88 1.767 2.300 (126) (64) 14.7% 0.8 6.0% 
1BO 186 Fo/Wara COlli. (634) (82) 1,412 1.946 (182) 130 7.2% 0.5 (6.8%) 
181 73 satmarine & Renr'lies (547) (2.911) 10.567 11.115 (502) (658) 14.9% 0.8 15.4% 
1B2 190 Haggle (645) (4115) 609 1.254 (125) (67) B.9% 0.5 6.2% 
163 139 BTRDunlop (675) (56B) 28~ 957 (75) (41) 11.0'h, 0.5 11.B% 
184 96 Sun IntemBtional (SA) (679) (2.615) 1,944 2.623 (151) (240) 18.1% 1.0 13.9% 
185 189 Hllnt L.euctum & Hepbur (728) (B31) 2.112 2.840 (241) (133) 7.8% 0.4 17.5% 
186 193 Consol. Frams Textiles (876) (72) 547 1",423 (165) 102 5.2% 0.3 7.7% 
187 194 M & R HDldings (971) (1.1OO) 4,226 5,197 (1.002) (921) 9.9% 0.5 7.3% 
18B 187 Engen (1.002) (4.941) 7 .467 8.469 (223) (277) 1S.3% 0.9 15.4% 
189 195 Toyota SA (1,019) (603) 1,a92 2.612 (1(10) (102) 11.5% Q.7 11.7% 
190 92 AECI (1 ,4111) 1.590 a .381 4.872 (183) 18B 10.4% 0.6 (0.2%) 
191 21 AnglovlIBl (1.583) (3.251) 9,972 11 .666 NlA NlA NfA NJA 14.0% 
192 7 Gencor (1 ,653) (4,609) 3.941 5.594 NlA NlA NlA NlA NlA 
193 33 AnglOVllallnd. (1,867) (4.248) 5.995 7.862 (401) (304) 14.8 .... 0.8 13.5% 
194 198 Highveld Steel (2.475) (290) 2,218 4.69~ (702) (314) 7.30/. 0 .4 11 .6% 
195 197 Delmonte Royal Food6 (2.811) (3.434) 2.444 5.255 (425) NlA 1B.4% 1.0 163.00/. 
196 4 OeEleer& (3.873) (7 .452) 37,885 41.55e N/A NlA NJA NlA 17.9% 
197 11 Minorco Socime AnD. (3.910) (6.7B7) 36.056 39.966 NfA NlA NlA N/A 36.2% 
198 196 AMIC (5,80:Z) (754) 17.081 22.882 (1.357) 105 1 [).6% 0.6 15.6% 
199 200 Sappi (7.745) (6.818) 14,479 22.224 (1 ,477) (698) 7.6% 0.4 26.D% 
200 199 Iscor (7.842) 3,050 5.155 12.996 (2.539) (429) 7.1% 0.4 (2.0%) 
1 CNA oeUo Aln",,*, MEGA 
2 Cc>MoI /IeI1*td '2197 
• Ulco HOIcIInga ",.1mIId BAlSA 
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~nk 
1999 ~ 
1 
2 
3 
~ 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1-1 
15 
16 
17 
18" 
19 
20 
21 
22 
2.1 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
-13 
~ 
45 
46 
47 
-18 
~9 
50 
Soatb Atrian Brewl!ries Ltd 
3 Dimension e.ta Holdinp Ltd 
10 Com!"'..". Holdiop Ltd (Old PQH) 
5 Bidvest Group Ltd 
4 RembnndtGroup Ltd 
7 Tir;er O .. ta Ltd . 
22 Anr;lo Amman Gold Inv Co Ltd 
23 ADuI"..m..ted Bevenr;e Indastries 
14 Adcock Inp;nm Ltd 
N/ A Rul Atria Holdinp Ltd 
18 Pepkor Ltd 
21 MlH Holdior;, Ltd 
19 . Sboprille Holdinp 
35 New· Atria Investments Ltd 
46 D"tallec Ltd 
9 Impen..1 Holdinp Ltd 
24 Metro Cuh &. c..ny Ltd 
Z7 c..dbtuy Sc:hweppes (SA) Ltd 
25 Pick 'n P"y Stores Ltd 
SO Rebhold Ltd· 
N/ A Sofdine Ltd 
40' Saper.Group. Ltd 
N/ A EdaationlnvestmentCorp Ltd . 
20 N ... pers Ltd· 
36 PEP Ltd 
52 Tir;er Wheels Ltd 
-13 Proium Ltd . 
33 JO Group Ltd 
15 Wooltna Ltd· 
-18 New CUcks Holdinp Ltd · 
i'O CiIxton Publi,hen .. Printers. Ltd 
61 Soath Atrian Draw..ta . 
54 ElemoaN: Medw Network Ltd 
N/ A MolopeGroup Ltd 
89 U,ko Ltd 
45 CTP Holdior;' Ltd 
26 Atrian Oxyr;- Ltd 
13 N .. m!"'k Ltd 
N/ A TrawortM In_tiD ... 1 Ltd 
N/ A Corpcom Ltd 
64 Delta EIectriaJ Jadastries Ltd 
N/ A MGX Holdiop Ltd 
N/ A P ...... dip lallenctive. Medw Ltd 
~ lIIowo Sa".... Ltd 
51 Avi. Soathem Atria Ltd 
is CoFp&lO Ltd 
65 MallekLtd 
86 MKJDed Health c....., Ltd 
63 Reaaert Ltd 
N/ A Woolworth. Holdiop Ltd 
CPX 
BVT 
RMT 
TIC 
AM(; 
ABI 
AOC 
RAH 
PEP ' 
IoUB 
SHP 
NAI· 
DTC 
IPL 
MTC 
CAS " 
PI](; 
RBH" 
SIT 
SPC 
EDC " 
NPN 
PEl 
T1W 
!'ON" 
JOG 
WLO 
NCL 
CXT 
SOC; 
MNS 
MOL 
USK 
CJl" 
AFX 
NPK 
TIm 
CPM 
DEL • 
MGX· 
POM 
!LV 
AVS 
CPC 
r.5l' 
MMD 
RLO 
WHL 
22,364' 
U.5OC 
11.203 
7,699 
5,604 
5,153 
3,761 
3;597 
3,3SC 
3,315 
31176 
3,1154 
2,889 
2,868 
2.757 
2.651 
2.623 
2.28% 
una 
1.805 
1,715 
1,50% 
1,486 
1,400 
1,37t 
1,278 
1.2'73 
1,.235 
1,20% 
1,1163 
I,m 
993 
934 
891 
878 
867 
80Z 
774 
76% 
758 
688 
662 ' 
616 
60S 
581 
576· 
569 
SC9 
547 
518 
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5Y.,.... 
Ch.nn 
2.015 
11.138 
N/A 
7.310 
(-1.935) 
(164) 
(ol.il3) 
1.709 
1.625 
N/A 
1.862 
N/A 
2.396 
N/A 
N/A 
1.625 
1.594 
714 
570 
N/A 
N/A 
NjA 
N/A 
N/A 
157 
NjA 
1.266 
N/A 
(1.780) 
4-15 
1.098 
160 
(172) 
N/A 
N/A 
&97 
(1.399) 
(2.502) 
N/A 
N/A 
361 
N/A 
N/A 
881 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
NjA 
(1.2&1) 
NjA 
43.383 
16.953 
16.226 
12.432 
20.864 
11.645 
5.312 
6.173 
4.812 
5.953 
7,336 
3.415 
4.435 
7.507 
7,361 
8.746 
3.T:>II 
3.150 
2.826 
2.789 
2.057 
3.288 
2.827 
3,115 
2.384 
1.782 
2.482 . 
3.286 
3.900 
1.753 
1.719 
2.520 
861 
1;042 
1.356 
1.553 
2.823 
4.816 
1.565 
965 
1.004 
1.004 
731 
3.267 
1.368 
1.594 
815 
858 
1.913 
2.919 
Total 
C.pital 
21.019 
5.4-19 
5.023 
4.733 
15.260 
6.-192 
1.551 
2.577 
1.-158 
2.637 
4.260 
562 . 
1.545 
4.638 
4.605 
6.095 
1.135 
868 
798 
984 
341' 
1.786 
1.3-11 
1.715 
1.013 
504 
1.208· 
2.051 
2.697 
690 
697 
1.527 
(72) 
151 
478 
686 
2.021 
4.043 
803 
207 
316 
342 
115 
2.661 
786 
1.018 
246 
308· 
1.366-
2.401 
Economic V.lae 
Added (Rm) 
(786) 
NjA 
91-1 
N/A 
(1.465) 
118 
NjA 
(125) 
219 
N/A 
(15) 
(52) 
124 
N/A 
N/A 
(100) 
16 
22 
72 
(38) 
N/A 
(89) 
N/A 
(106) 
(95) 
(5) 
N/A 
(28) 
100 
24 
41 
(2) 
265 
55 
(17) 
39 
77 
(14) 
(8) 
(24) 
31 
(5) 
20 
77 
50 
(23) 
~ 
13 
72 
225 
(915) 
NjA 
N/A 
NjA 
(794) 
117 
NjA 
(1-18) 
171 
N/A 
(78) 
N/A 
118' 
N/A 
NjA 
(109) 
26 
16 
68 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(157) 
N/A 
NjA 
NjA 
81 · 
16 
4-1 
2 
278 
N/A 
N/A 
33 
58 
21 
N/A 
N/A 
25 
N/A 
N/A 
179 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
31 
N/A 
Return on Profit c..pit.ll 
C.pit.lll%) !!!.!!!t! Growth I' 
18.6~ 
NjA 
-I23~ 
N/A 
11 .6~ 
19.0~ 
Nj A 
19.2~ 
34. 1~ 
N/A 
24.9~ 
17.8~ 
27.2~ 
N/A 
N/A 
18,7% 
19.4'; 
22.8" 
2-1.6" 
15.0" 
N/A 
13.0" 
N/A 
22.1" , 
18.5~ 
19.4" 
N/A 
19.2" 
26.1~· 
21.3~ 
19.0" 
16.9~ . 
59.2l1'. 
56.3~ 
19.-1" 
22.3~ 
21.-1~ 
19.7" 
19.5" 
16.6~ 
26;8" 
17.4" 
38.3" 
16.3" 
23.U" 
16.U'; 
37.9" 
23.9" 
20.7" 
329~ 
1.1 
N/ A 
1.1 
N/A 
0.6 
I .U 
NjA 
1.0 
1.8 
N/A 
1.4 
0.8 
1.6· 
N/A 
N/A 
1.0 
1.0 
1.2 
1.2 
0.4 · 
NjA 
0.3 
NjA 
1.2 
1.0 
0.7 
N/A 
0.8 
1.3 
1.1 
1.0 
1.0 
3.0 
2.9 
0.7 
1.3 
1.2. 
1.0 
1.0 
0.8 
1.-1 
0.9 
1.9 
0.9 
0.8 
0.-1 
1.0 
0.7 
1.0 
1.7 
13.4" 
157.~~ 
67.6'\ 
so.a 
17.8':1. 
11.7':1. 
23.9" 
51.3" 
39.9':1. 
158.6%. 
i29':1. 
(-I-I.9l1'o ) 
33.9" 
176.5" 
14822~ 
61.7'\. 
18.8':1. 
21:4" 
7.8". 
193.6% 
-1926% 
63.-1% 
105-l.2~ 
324~ 
122~ : 
86.1% 
99.n. 
24.3% 
19.9l1'o 
31.0~ 
16.9l1'o 
17.3l1'o · 
8.-1% 
NjA 
526l1'o 
19.0% 
13.6l1'o 
11.6% 
N/A 
N/A 
18.8l1'o 
2385.5" 
N/A 
21.8% . 
33.0% 
-187.3'" 
8.a 
1525" 
11.3" 
~.3l1'o 
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52 
53 
~ 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59· 
60 
61 
62 
63 
f>.I 
65 
66 · 
67 
68 
b9 
iO 
n 
n 
73 
70l 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
9-1 
95 
96 
97 
911 
99 
100 
62 Allied Technolosies Ltd 
'J9 PI~te Glus Ie Sha~rpruf~ Ind. 
3-1 Foschini Ltd 
N/ A eo .... ir Ltd 
11 Johnnies IndustrYl Corpor~tion 
58 POWfi Technolosies Ltd 
66 Mo"""Ltd 
55 Fintech Ltd 
84 British Amman Tobuco SA 
n ~!I1lftnet Ltd, 
70l Ocsn~ Fishin!;-Groap Ltd 
N/ A Fedic. Group Ltd 
151 Grintek Ltd 
79 SpeeDily Stores· Ltd 
106 Vol_ Holdins • . Ltd 
67 Ch~miQI Sftvicn Ltd 
N/ A MB Technolosies Ltd 
105 C~stal Group·Ltd 
109 T~lemetrix pk 
91 Cr.-amic Indastries Ltd 
77 T~ljoy Holdins. Ltd 
N/ A KUMM Technolor;y Ltd 
122 Choice Holdin&, Ltd 
N/ A Mmpret Ltd 
111 Vor;~l.trui.balt Metal Holdinss Ltd 
N/ A Unihold Ltd 
68 OT)( Holdin!:. Ltd 
1-l6 Siltek Ltd 
96 Basil R~d Holdin&, Ltd 
75 LTALtd 
n Unitran. Ltd 
12-1 Con ... li~ted Ate< Corpor~tion SA 
119 T~ltron Ltd 
118 ~a H~rvest Corporation Ltd 
N/ A Ab~cu. Technolor;y Holdins. 
126 Frale: Ltd 
115 Cullinan HoidinS5 Ltd 
117 Lion M~lCh Company Ltd 
N/ A Combined Motor Holdin!:. Ltd 
lol7 Medtx Ltd 
N/ A· Faobion Atria Ltd 
113 ~teman Project Holdin!:, Ltd 
103 Omnia Holdias. Ltd 
120 Cashbaild Ltd 
11-1 Lithotecb Ltd 
128 u_Group Ltd 
87 Ch"riots Ltd 
N/ A Ternko Ltd 
N / A Coate! Broth~rs (SA) Ltd 
In Mon_&1~ Societo! ADOnym~ 
AtT 
I'GS 
fOS 
COM 
INC 
POW 
MNX 
f1N 
IJT!" ' 
L"T ' 
OCf 
fCS 
GNK 
SPY 
vue 
CHE • 
MBT 
crt' 
TMX ' 
CRM 
Ttl 
KTL 
COl 
MXR 
VOG 
UH5 
OTJ( 
~ 
BSR' 
tTA' 
UTR 
CfX ' 
TtT 
SHY 
ABC 
fRX 
CUt 
LNM 
CMH 
MDX 
fSH 
lITO 
OMN' 
0;8 
tTH 
LSR 
CHT ' 
TRX 
COT ' 
MTE ' 
150 
M",ket V"lu~ Added (Rm) 
5 Yeu MMket Total 
1998 CNns~ V"la~ Capital 
491 
m 
J77 
312 
281 
'Zl9 
T74 
269 
264 
2S4 
245 
244 
m 
179 
172 
171 
162 
149 
146 
137 
136 . 
130 
129 
120 . 
114-
102 
100 
98 
96 
82 
7S 
52 
43 
40 
34 
4 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(13) 
(16) 
(23) 
(27) 
(31) 
(33) 
(36) 
(37) 
(48) 
(49) 
(SO) 
loll 
(1..l43) 
(2.665) 
N/A 
N/A 
(84) 
N/A 
(22) 
(153) 
N/A 
120l 
N/A 
l-lO 
27 
379 
32 
N/A 
N/A 
(608) 
N/A 
61 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
74 
N/A 
N/A 
(147) 
N/A 
92 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(368) 
N/A 
N/A 
105 
(68) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(139) 
(lol3) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1.403 
3.299 
1.891 
-l69 
ol.5Si 
Hl83 
843 
832 
287 
762 
519 
3-15 
301 
606 
3.w 
i02 
377 
539 
568 
305 
537 
139 
276 
2-l6 
184 
321 
1.6~ . 
378 
171 
616 
1.056 
123 
252 
ol2O 
273 
168 
liO 
299 
83 
258 
55 
98 
355 
53 
199 
182 
251 
99 
150 
117 
912 
2.909 
1.513 
157 
ol,276 
804 
5b9 
562 
23 
508 
275 
101 
f>.I 
ol27 
168 · 
530 
215 
390 
422 
169 
40), 
9 
147 
127 
iO 
219 
1.554 
280 
75 
53-1 
981 . 
n 
~ 
3M 
239 
163 
In 
302 
86 
271 
in 
122 
382 
84 
232 
218 
287 
lol7 
199 
167 
Economic Vala~ 
Added (Rm) 
3-1 
(30) 
(-l9) 
20 
76 
(2) 
(33) 
28 
25 
36 
58 
15 
28 
(35) 
192 
32 
(29) 
25 
(62) 
N/ A 
N/A 
35 
(157) 
3 
N/A 
19 
2 
7 
15 
17 
52 
(21) 
(10) 
9 
o 
-l 
(II) 
(13) 
-l 
(-19) 
N/A 
8 
20 
(5) 
(0) 
5 
17 
(1-l) 
9 
(30) 
19 
33 
(66) 
N/A 
206 
38, 
N/A 
24 
20. 
N/ A 
ol9 
N/A 
18· 
(3-1) 
302 
33 
N/ A 
N/A 
(77) 
N/A 
N/'" 
N/A 
(156) · 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(10) 
N/A 
13 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(3) 
N/A 
N/ A 
11 
(7) 
N/A 
(12) 
N/A 
N/A 
27 
(5) 
N/ A 
13 
N/A 
N/A 
Nt A 
(17) 
Return on Profit Capital 
Capital ('10) .l.!!.!!!:!: Growth (0 ,. 
15.2" 
2-1.i'" 
21 ,ol" 
31 .8" 
13.8" 
15.6" 
12.5"· 
33.5'1:.. 
193.3'1:. 
26.5'1:. 
36.3" 
35.8~ 
28A" 
17.3'1:. 
17.9" 
203'1:. 
J.2!'1. 
20.8'1:. 
16.0'1:. 
N/A 
N/A 
28.3'1:. 
0.9" 
22.6'1:. 
N/A 
35.8" 
16.0'1:. 
29. a 
~7.5" 
20.3'1:. 
19.6" 
1.2" 
16.3'1:. 
23.0" 
lOA" 
18A" 
(6.3") 
18.8'1:. 
25.9'1:. 
2.7" 
N/A 
33.0" 
21 .7" 
19.0'1:.. 
15.4"· 
lol.9" 
28.0" 
12.ol'l:. 
2-l.6" 
6.9" 
0.8 
]A 
1.2 
1.7 
0.7 
0.8 
0.3' 
t.7 
2.9 
1.0 
1.9 
1.7 
1.5 
0.9 
1.0 
0.2 
1.2 
0.9 
N/A 
N/A 
1.6 
0.5 
1.1 
N/A 
1.9 
0.5 
1.5 
1.3 
1.0 
0.8 
0.0 
0.5 
1:1 
0.6 
0.5 
(O.ol) ' 
0.9 
1.3 
0.1 
N/A 
1.1 
1.3 
1.1 
0.5 
1.0 
0.8 
0.7 
1.3 
O.-l 
E .J%. 
19.6'1:. 
N/ A 
9.7~ 
12.0" 
221 .9'\ 
35.0'1:. 
21O.0'llo 
66.2'1. 
D.-l'l:. 
N/A 
1.-l" ... 
25.i~ 
(15.5'1:. ) 
:!3.5~ .. 
N/A 
1355.2" 
19.0"-
15. t~ 
22.7" 
(98.5" ) 
163.3'1:. 
N/A 
ol.2'1. 
7464.8'1:.· 
UA'I:. , 
7.3'1:. 
4-l.0'l:. 
13.1 " 
2.,.1 " . 
(Si.O") 
3.9" 
11 .0'\ 
776.1 " . 
(43.8"-) 
(5.8") 
6.8'1:. 
14.7" 
11 .8" 
N/A 
51.2" 
11.8'1:. 
10.3'1:. 
37.ol'l:. 
48.0'\ 
lm.6" 
(39.8'1:.) 
75.n" 
21.7,\ 
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101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112-
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
l·n 
lol2 
1~3 
1-14 
1~5 
1-'6 
147 
148 
149 
150 
92 PortUnd Holdin!;. Ltd 
108 Mulftfrid!;e Ltd 
107 BemaS M~n Ltd 
123 S~bvat Ltd 
104 Howden Atria Holdin!;s Ltd 
132 Bell Equipment Ltd 
N/ A En"iroServ Holdinp Ltd 
N/ A Mic:or Indastri~1 Corp Ltd 
97 City i.odse Hotels ltd 
131 A_·Ltd 
145 Cementltion Comp~ny (Africa) 
99 Oz:z "ltd. 
N/ A A'Ir.1I~k Ltd 
82 Hu~ Indastria Ltd 
140 B.I_~n Indasm.1 Coporation 
59 McCmhy R_il Ltd 
138 · President Medic~lln,,_ents Ltd· 
N/ A In"icQ Holdin!;. Ltd 
101 Concor Ltd 
125 CnIokes Brothers Ltd 
2 An&lo AmeriaD. Corporation' 
N/ A Network Hultltafe Holdinp Ltd 
N/ A AM Mool" Group Ltd 
164 Palco Ltd 
31' Ton~t Hulett Group Ltd· 
102 Wilson B.lyly Holmes - o..eon ltd 
98 NewWits.Ltd 
137 Stocks Hotel. '" Resorts Ltd 
N/ A Brandeorp Holdinp Ltd 
155 Bolton IndaltrUl Holdinp Ltd 
N/A K.!;i50MedY ·Ltd 
139 NEI Africa Holdinp Ltd 
93 Grin~kft' Construction Ltd 
.'1 E1lerine Holdinp Ltd · 
121 Edw .. d L. B.lte_n Ltd 
N/ A O~.Holdin!;. Ltd 
148 Sdurrishuisen Holdin!;. Ltd 
152 unlle~ Holdin!:s Ltd 
157 Boa_t Ltd 
37 Premier Group Ltd 
57 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 
167 D~ c. .... Textile Comp~ny Ltd , 
173 KoJosa. Holdin!;s Ltd. 
42 Politin Ltd 
165 Ronutex Ltd 
166 Stocks &. Stocks Ltd 
N / A RetoiJ Appuel Group Ltd 
I 53 K~rDI Hotels Ltd 
185 Hunt Leach ... &. Hepburn 
161 Unispin Holdin!:s Ltd 
POR' 
FCM 
8RM 
5BV· 
HWN' 
8EL • 
ENV 
MIN 
CLH 
ASR 
CMf • 
OZZ 
APK 
HOC • 
8TR 
MeT 
PSM 
IV! 
CNC 
CI(5 
AAC 
NTC' 
ACR 
PTC 
TNT 
W80 
NWT 
SCH 
8RC 
BLT 
KCM 
NEH • 
CRC 
ELH 
ELB 
OMA 
SCC 
LG8 
BOU 
PML 
CSL 
DAC 
KOS 
PIN 
ROM 
srs 
RAC 
KAR 
HLH 
UN!' • 
1998 
(53) 
(55) 
(56) 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
(63) 
(64) 
(69) 
(72) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
(114) . 
(88) 
(95) 
(95) 
(98) 
(98) 
(100) 
(102) 
(102) 
(lOC) 
(1118) 
(111) 
(111) 
(tt2) 
(114) 
(116) 
(124). 
(125) 
(126) 
(143) 
(157) 
(161) 
(180) 
(182) 
(196) 
(199) 
(201) 
(210) 
(211) 
(213) 
(213) 
(214) 
(214) 
(215) 
(217) 
(220) 
(225) 
(10) 
N/A 
(87) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(280) 
(53) 
32 
(136) 
N/A 
(282) 
N/A 
(175) 
(1-14) 
N/A 
(75) 
(91) 
151 
(31.907) 
N/A 
N/A 
(31) 
773: 
N/A 
(462) 
N/A 
N/A 
26 
N/A 
(20) 
N/A 
(831) 
(351) 
N/A 
(177) 
(660) 
(147) 
(3.653) 
(586) 
(37) 
N/A 
N/A 
(37) 
(148) 
N/A 
(164) 
(1 .-143) 
(58) 
252 
189 
137 
138 
71 
428 
147 
90 
324 
J6.I 
47 
2-14 . 
383 
253 
157 
2.363 
225 
1-14 
167 
70 
45.699 
2.043 
67 
70 
5.033 
122 
54 
124 
196 
176 
415 
133 
320 
1.180 
256 
37 
266 
416 
188 
2.271 
943 
:ro 
374 
2.769 
80 
583 
638 
326 
1.334 
160 
Totol 
C~pitol 
305 
2-14 
193 
198 
131 
490 
:!11 
154 
394 
436 
125 
323 
-'63 
337 
2ol5 
2.ol57 
320 
2ol2 
265 
170 ' 
45.801 
2.145' 
171 
178 
5.143 
233 
166 
238 
312 
300 
540 
259· 
-'63 
1.336 
417 
218 
448 
612 
387 
2.472 
1.153 
ollO 
587 
2.982 
290l 
797 
852 
Sol3 
1.554 
385 
Economic V~lae 
Added(Rm) 
(B) 
(SII) 
(2) 
(2ol) 
lol 
7 
8 
(ol) 
(9) 
N/A 
(39) 
(8) 
(21) 
36 
(10) 
(172) 
(12) 
10 
2 
(8) 
N/A 
N/A 
(17) 
(32) 
(67) 
B 
N/A 
(19) . 
(11) 
(33) 
(4-1) 
(35) 
(ol) 
(16) 
11 
(65) 
31 
(61) 
(86) 
(318) 
3 
(-'6) 
(106) 
189 
(52) 
(129) 
(10) 
(103) 
(-l46) 
N/A 
(40) 
N/A 
(3) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(16) 
N/A 
(21) 
(3) 
N/A 
26 
N/A 
(223) 
(15) 
N/A 
6 
(l) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(27) 
345 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(1) 
N/A 
16 
N/A 
(34) 
5 
N/A 
13 
(81) 
(69) 
(203) 
(6) 
(lol) 
N/A 
N/A 
(B) 
(104) 
N/ A 
(Sl) 
(252) 
N/A 
Return on Profit upit.ll 
Capitol (% ) ~ Growth (D , 
23.b~ 
(B.3~ ) 
2-! .i~ 
5.2~ 
24.3~ 
1 5.2~ 
24.2~ 
15.5~ 
17.3~ 
N/A 
3.8~ 
18.3~ 
1O.9~ 
B.5~ 
3.8'; 
20.5~ 
22.1I~ 
26.5'; 
22.5~ 
13.8'; 
N/A 
N/A 
10.5" . 
10.6% , 
12.7% 
31.5% 
N/ A 
9.7% 
15.3% 
8:1% 
ol.5~ 
7.4'; 
20.2% 
22.4~ 
20.2% · 
(22.9% ) 
25.3'; 
15.2~ 
8A~ 
14.7'; 
18,9'; 
9.0'; 
6.9'; 
B ,6'; 
3,9'; 
11 .)~ 
15.2~ 
:!'5~ 
6.7~ 
N/ A 
1.4 
(0.6) 
1.5 
U.l 
0.7 
0.6 
]A 
U,S 
1.2 
N/A 
U.2 
1.0 
0,7 
1.4 
0,2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
0.7 
N/A 
N/A 
0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
1.0 
N/A 
0.3 
0.7 
O.ol 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
1,1 
1.1 
(1A) 
1.5 
0.8 
0.5 
0.8 
0,9 
OA 
O.ol 
1.2 
0.2 
0.7 
0.9 
0.1 
004 
N/A 
--. ;). 1 " 
1:!'3~ 
24.U" 
(12.1I~ ) 
:!7. :!~ 
215711.5~ 
17.2" 
2.1.3'\. 
11 .6'\, 
(Ll''i; ) 
~1.2'\, 
N/ A 
8.1~ 
10.2'1. 
17.6~, 
61.1I~ 
15-1.7'\, 
30.9" 
13.a 
14.7'\,,' 
26.9"· 
N/A 
4.5" 
8A~ 
26A~ 
1.5'1. 
13.a 
3075.5% 
2.6% 
1643.3~ 
(2.7'1.) 
9.9" , 
B.5~ 
19.6" 
90.8" 
(691 .1'1. ) 
5.5" 
15A'; 
:!.1" 
11.0" , 
6.7~ 
304" 
7.7" 
(8.1~) 
21.5'1. 
16,1'1. 
19.i'l. 
8.1" 
3.8" 
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151 
152 
153 
1St · 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
1~ 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
1U 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
1'" 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
1911 
199 
:!OO 
156 Metair InvestmeolS Ltd 
141 !.eDeo Holdinss Ltd 
158 COMbo HoidinSS Ltd 
85 MNi-Clinic CorpoRtion Ltd 
192 Genc:or Ltd 
129 Fellex Ltd 
171 Grindrod Unicom Group ltd 
130 uMdiao Ove!SOs PKhsins 
177 Sftrdel Inv_ent COrporiltion 
150 Groap five Ltd 
53 Pretori.lI PortLtnd C ....... nt Co. 
183 Dunlop·Atria ltd 
170 Irvin Ie Johnsoo Ltd 
81 S",lJenbosch farm...,' Winery 
175 Metkor.Groap Ltd 
1St RelYAot Retail Ltd 
182 HA~Ltd 
133 Ma1b.k Ltd 
169 Cornick Group ltd 
N/ A CoolOlidAtN Atriao Miaes Ltd 
16 CC Smith Ltd 
88 Clinic Holdinp Ltd 
144 Dorbyl Ltd 
178 RAinbow·Chicken Ltd , 
110 ' IDd"p"Ddeat NewspApers 
180 WACO IalenYlio .... 1 Ltd 
186 ConlOUdAtN fra ..... Textiles Ltd 
N/ A DAly. Ltd 
172 Lonrba.pic 
135 K ....... t IovestmenlS' Ltd 
30 Primedg Ltd 
32 EdSUS Stores Ltd 
195 Delmonte ROYAl foods Ltd 
1~ Sun InlemAtionAl (SA) ltd 
189 Toyota Sooth Atria Ltd 
194 Hip¥eld S_11e VAnAdium 
187 MorrAY Ie Roberts Holdinp 
193 Ans!ovullndo.tries Ltd · 
181 s.tlDilrine Ie Rennin Holdinss 
28 BArlow Ltd 
190 AECI Ltd 
197 MIDOI'a) Societr Anonyme 
191 Aas!ovul MininS Ltd 
12 Cold Field. 01 Sooth Atria Ltd 
6 BilUton PLC 
198 AnSIo AmeriCAn Indoswl COfl'. 
8 SASOLltd 
:!DO Iscor Ltd 
199 S.ppi Ltd 
196 DeBeen 
MTA' 
LNC 
CNS 
MOe 
GMf 
nx 
GNR • 
CAN 
SER 
GRF 
PPC 
DNL • 
lRV 
SfW 
MT1< 
RLY· 
HAG· 
MLB 
CRIC 
CAM 
CGS 
etc· 
DLV 
RBW 
row· 
WAC 
CFM 
DLS 
LON· 
KER ' 
PRJ 
EDS 
DLF • 
SI5 
TOY· 
HVL • 
MUR' 
AVI 
SfR 
BAR 
AFE • 
MNR • 
AIN ' 
Gts 
BrI. 
AMI • 
SOL 
ISC 
SAp· 
DBR· 
152 
5 y.... Market Total 
1998 ChAn!:.. V.ln C..pital 
(238) 
(242) 
(243) 
(257) 
(258) 
(266) 
(305) 
(317) 
(339) 
(359) 
(367) 
(406) 
(409) 
(426) 
(435) 
(473) 
(513) 
(523) 
(582) 
(587) 
(626) 
(629). 
(719) 
(785) 
(&32) 
(838) 
(841) 
(810) 
(929) 
(1.020) 
(1.146) 
(1.n3) 
(1,431) 
(1.568) 
(1,879) 
(2.010) 
(2.176) 
Cl,.3SS) 
(2,360) 
(2.409) 
(2.&37) 
(2.929) 
(3,120) 
(3,638) 
(5,963) 
(8.898) 
(9,480) 
(10,831) 
(12.972) 
(22,772) 
(159) 
(760) 
(192) 
(271) 
(858) 
N/A 
(145) 
(341) 
(195) 
(161) 
(1.601) 
(333) 
(995) 
(200) 
116 
(263) 
(212) 
N/A 
(667) 
N/A 
(3.275) 
(720) 
22 
N/A 
N/A 
(562) 
(47) 
N/A 
(2.077) 
(2.418) 
N/A 
(5,796) 
(4,107) 
(3.805) 
(1.513) 
(1:.300) 
(2.706) 
(5.770) 
(3.607) 
(3.217) 
(1.792) 
(10,214) 
(6.959) 
(11.178) 
N/A 
(8.939) 
(644) 
(5.~) 
(10.077) 
(38.214) 
145 
332 
82 
825 
3.~3 
57 
1.129 
~ 
276 
307 
2.039 
395 
1.040 
781 
1.074 
1,654 
714 ' 
1.785 
211 
1.610 
14.264 
1.412 
567 
562 
753 
1.289 
447 
315 
9,132 
4.473 
3.292 
1,673 
1.898 
1->63 
1.044 
2.333 
2.783 
4.331 
5.736 
9.903 
2.168 
42.409 
6.830 
1.682 
-WA94 
17,498 
16.7-18 
4.538 
21.695 
29.161 
383 
574 
329 
1.082 
3.901 
323 
10434 
1.281 
615 
665 
2.-W6 
801 
1.449 
1.207 
1.509 
2.127 
1.227 
2.308 · 
793 
2.197 
14,891 
2.041 
1.286 
1.347 
1,585 
2.128 
1,288 
1.185 
10.061 
5,493 
4.437 
2.887 
3.329 
2.931 
2.923 
4.343 
4.958 
6.689 
8.096 
12.312 
5.005 
45.338 
9.950 
5.320 
-16,457 
26.397 
26.227 
15.369 
34.1>6; 
51.933 
Economic V.lu" 
AddrdlRml 
(3) 
(31) 
(-W) 
(8) 
N/A 
(39) 
(21) 
(115) 
(114) 
(24) 
(147) 
(151) 
(55) 
(77) 
(130) 
N/A 
(112) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
25 
N/A 
(68) 
(4-18) 
(158) 
(56) 
(208) 
(136) 
N/A 
45 
(349) 
(1-18) 
16(7) 
(39) 
(267) 
(534) 
(223) 
(806) 
(1,191) 
(-W6) 
(2-18) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
(1 .452) 
(U97) 
(892) 
(1.904) 
N/A 
5 
(42) 
(29) 
(8) 
N/A 
N/A 
(5) 
(92) 
(109) 
-17 
44 
(80) 
(23) 
(37) 
23 
N/A 
(36) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
172' 
N/A 
69 
N/A 
N/A 
342 
(57) 
N/A 
N/A 
134 
N/A 
(180) 
(582) 
(95) 
(142) 
(35) 
15 
(686) 
(1.024) 
.roo 
294 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
222 
(385) 
1.124 
(999) 
N/A 
R .. turn on Profit C.pitAl 
upitAl (0/0) !n!!!! Growth (0 
20.2~ 
n6~ 
12.4~ 
16.9~ 
N/A 
11.5~ 
14.3" 
9.0" 
15.7." 
11.0~ · 
13.2" 
10.a 
13.2" 
n6" 
8.8'!!.. 
N/A 
11.8'" 
N/A 
N/ A 
N/A 
18.0" 
N/A 
9.5" 
(11.9" ) 
JJ.9~ · 
10.6" 
6.1 " 
5.1~ 
N/A 
16.9"' . 
18.6'; 
22.1 ,; 
16.2'; 
17.6" 
11 .2'; 
7.6~ 
to.3'; 
13.9'; 
13.3~ 
to.7" 
1104~ 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
12.a 
13.6'; 
11.5" 
;.5'; 
N/A 
1.1 
0.8 
0.; 
1.1 
N/ A 
0.5 
0.9 
0.5 
0.9 
0.5 
0.6 
0.5 · 
0.; 
0.7 
0.5 
N/ A 
0.5 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
0.9 
N/A 
0.5 · 
(0.7) 
0.7 
0.6 
0.3 
0.2 ' 
N/A 
0.8 
1.3 
1.2 
0.8 
0.9 
0.6 
0.4 
0.5 
0.7 
0.7 
0.6 
0.7 
N/A 
N/A 
N/ A 
N/A 
0.6 
0.7 
004 
004 
N/ A 
11 .6~ 
120~ 
4./I'!!. 
42.4" 
(9.0'\ ) 
1.b'!i. 
17.6% 
19.i'\ 
37.5" 
0.5'!!. 
i .i% 
7.9'1. 
l·U'; 
1U" 
(1.-1" ) 
33.8" 
5.0'!!. 
N/A 
1704" 
1721.6 '; 
to.5'\ 
825" 
(2.6" ) 
2504" 
83.1'lO· 
(3.7~) 
6.6" 
163.1'lO 
(2.6" ) 
11.3'lO 
238.7'; 
21;8'; 
141.9" 
11.9" 
11.6" 
15.6" 
1.-1" 
9.3" 
5.2'; 
(O.6~) 
1.9~ 
37A~ 
to. 1~ 
13.1~ 
81.3~ 
2O.n 
304~ 
4.6~ 
31.2" 
16.5" 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
153 
APPENDIXC 
QUESTIONNAIRE relating to an EVA study of three leading South Mrican Retail 
companies 
A. General EVA Orientation Section A 
1.1 Does your company have an Economic Value Added (EVA) policy? Yes I No 
1.2 If yes, how is it used: 
• As a Decision making aid 
• As a Measurement aid 
• As an Incentive based scheme 
1.3 How would you describe the term Economic Value Added? 
1.4 What level of priority does your organisation place on the EVA policy and EV A 
issues? 
None - - Low - - Medium - - High Please indicate why. 
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1.5 Are there any barriers in the development of an EV A financial management 
orientation? 
Cost - - Technical Barriers - - Complexity and Interrelatedness - - Organisational Barriers 
- - Time-scales - - Infonnation shortages - - Other 
1.6 What has lead (or could lead) to your company's adoption of EV A principles? 
Business Pressure - - International acceptability - - New Markets - - Management 
Pressure- - Shareholder Pressure - - Other 
B. Performance Related Issues - EVA as a measure Section B 
1.1 What financial perfonnance measures does your company use? 
1.2 What are the floors (impainnents) associated with these measures? Do any of these 
measures conflict with EV A perfonnance measures? 
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1.3 Does your company appreciate the fact that maximising shareholder wealth is not the 
same as maximising the company's total value i.e. does your company understand the 
essence of Market Value Added (MV A)? 
1.4 Does management understand that an increase in EV A will bring about an increase in 
the market value added (MV A) of company? 
1.5 Does your company use both EVA and MV A to evaluate performance? 
c. Management Issues - EVA as a management system Section C 
C.l Determining the Decision-making process within the Organisation 
1.1 Who are the decision-makers in the organisation? 
1.2 Who makes decisions concerning the deployment of resources - are decisions made 
on a centralised or decentralised basis? 
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1.3 On what basis are decisions made? Do decision-makers understand the Net Present 
Value (NPV) concept? 
C.2 The importance of Technology as a value-adding driver within the Organisation 
1.1 How has technology aided decision making within the company and within various 
departments? 
1.2 Is technology seen as a EV A-driver by your particular organisation? Please Discuss. 
C.3 Other Value-drivers introduced by Management 
1.1 How are future trends, which could impact on the economic value of the company 
managed? 
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1.2 What other EVA-drivers have been introduced by management to positively influence 
the organisations EV A? 
C.4 Organisational Investment Decisions 
1.1 What benchmarks are employed to determine future organisational capital 
investments? 
1.2 Is the company considering the Balance Sheet when dealing with capital investments? 
C.S Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements in Calculating EVA 
1.1 Certain adjustments are made to a company's GAAP financial statements when EVA 
is employed. These adjustments are necessary to accurately calculate EV A and to 
discourage managers from short-sighted behaviour. (Examples include: discontinued 
operations, interest expense, goodwill, gain/loss on asset sale, accrued wages, product 
liability/reserve, R&D expense, operating leases, employee training, sales return, 
marketing and advertising, etc.) What adjustments are made to your company's GAAP 
financial statements and how many adjustments are made? 
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1.2 What guidelines are followed when these adjustments are made? 
C.6 Division of the Organisation 
1.1 Is your company separated into layers of independent EV A business units? Discuss 
these various layers. 
1.2 Is continuous improvement and teamwork betweeni~terfacing units encouraged? 
1.3 What sort of monitoring of the EVA units exists? 
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D. Incentive Compensation - EVA for Motivation? 
1.1 What perfonnance measures are used in designing a managerial incentive 
compensation scheme? 
1.2 What measures are used to motivate managers in your company? 
Section D 
1.3 Have EVA incentive bonuses been brought into lower levels of the organisation? 
Discuss the reasoning for this answer. 
1.4 EV A offers a means of measurement and communicating perfonnance - does your 
company communicate'such perfonnance in the evaluation and compensation of 
managerial perfonnance? 
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1.5 Is there an incentive compensation for what managers are accountable for and what 
they are not accountable for? 
............................................................................................................ 
1.6 The 'Bonus-Banking' principal is a mechanism which lengthens the planning 
horizons of managers - since they know that ensuring short-term performance will 
not do them any good if it harms longer-term results. How is the EV A banking 
system implemented in your company? Are mangers penalised for negative value 
destruction and re-numerated for positive value creation? 
1.7 What percentage (%) of managers incentive is fixed and what percentage (%) is 
variable/performance related? 
.............. ; ............................................................................................ . 
1.8 Are performance measures linked to the company's planning and budgeting 
programme? 
1.9 Does incentive compensation encourage long-term planning within your company? 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
161 
1.10 Do incentive schemes effectively tum the managers into quasi-owners, i.e. do 
performance based incentives create autonomy and entrepreneurism within the 
business unit? 
................................................................................................................................................................. : ............................................... .. 
1.11 Do incentive based schemes ultimately lead to the attraction, retention and 
motivation of key executives through stock options and other equity-linked 
compensation devices? 
E. EYA as a mindset Section E 
1.1 What training do managers within your organisation endure to fully comprehend the 
details involving an EV A fmancial performance system within their company? 
\ 
1.2 How does information concerning the EVA system get communicated throughout the 
company? 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
162 
1.3 Has the company experienced any resistance to using innovative measurement 
systems from any parties or stakeholders? 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
